THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND THE INUIT

1900 - 1967

By

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for

Research Branch
Corporate Policy
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
1985

88-02630/

©Published under the authority of the
Hon. David E. Crombie, P.C., M.P.,
Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development,
Ottawa, 1985.

QS-3413-000-EE-A1

Cette publication peut aussi être obtenue en
français sous le titre:

Le gouvernement du Canada et des Inuit
1900 à 1967

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PREFACE

This study is an exercise in humility. On more than one occasion I came away from the apparently unending store of material in the Public Archives of Canada, convinced that I had explored only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. It was with some temerity that I plunged ahead, delving into the mysteries of government policy toward the Inuit in Canada's first century.

I wish to thank John Leslie and Robert Allen of the Treaties and Historical Research Centre for their support and patience in this endeavour as well as Anne Marie Ferrari, who had the task of deciphering my handwriting in the preparation of this manuscript.

The views expressed, any omissions or errors, are the author's alone.

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NORTHERN CANADA
ARCTIC OCEAN
Beaufort Sea
ALASKA
YUKON TERRITORY
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
Mackenzie River
Arctic Circle
Aklavik
Fort McPherson
Dawson
Banks Island
Victoria Island
Amundsen Gulf
Parry Channel
Gulf of Boothia
Devon Island
Cornwallis Island
Resolute
Eureka
Craig Harbour
Dundas Harbour
Pond Inlet
Baffin Bay
BAFFIN ISLAND
Fox Basin
Arctic Circle
Lake Harbour
Hudson Strait
Baker Lake
Cape Fullerton
Coppermine
Fort Norman
Great Bear Lake
Great Slave Lake
SVERDRUP ISLANDS
ELLESMERE ISLAND
GREENLAND
Hudson Bay
Churchill
Port Nelson
York Factory
Lake Harbour
Cape Fullerton

I

"THE VOICE OF THE ESKIMO" - 1959

On 25 May 1959, in the large conference room of Parliament East Block, George Koneak of Fort Chimo stepped forward and made history for his people. He was the first Inuit to speak officially to the government of Canada and to its prime minister, John Diefenbaker:

> Last year we [the Inuit] made a trip to Greenland, and we saw over Greenland very interesting things never happening in Chimo or near Chimo at the coast. Our people are away behind, and we found the Greenland people are treated very well, and it is a longer time we have ahead of us. We saw Eskimo Greenlanders who have a lot of boats, a lot of houses, and that also most of the people are working and making money -- fisherman, farmers, working in different factories.... I think the Eskimos don't want to go back to the old days any more, they couldn't stand it any longer. We know some of the Eskimo people living in other countries are doing fine. We people are still down in the ground, hardly have come up from the ground. We want help in any way to see if we can make grown-up.[1]

Koneak's remarks and perceptions of the condition of the Inuit in Canada may seem surprising, yet they are not. After decades of contact with government agents, traders and missionaries who saw themselves as working for the betterment of these northerners, the Inuit were still plagued with disease, unemployment and the spectre of starvation. They faced societal changes for which they were, and had been, ill-prepared. Four Inuit, including Koneak, had been chosen to

attend this May 1959 meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee--a committee of whites which had been operating for seven years, since 1952.

Little, if any, thought had been given in 1952 to the inclusion of Inuit representatives in those early deliberations. When queried as to why Inuit were not invited, when the Hudson's Bay Company and representatives of the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches were, F.J.G. Cunningham, acting director of the northern administration and lands branch, Department of Resources and Development, answered:

> the only reason why Eskimos were not invited to the meeting, apart from the difficulties of transportation and language, is that it was felt that few, if any, of them have reached the stage where they could take a responsible part in such discussions.... This does not mean that the Eskimo viewpoint was not presented at the meeting. Many of those attending were men who were or have been very closely associated with Eskimos and who have their interests and welfare very much at heart.[2]

Cunningham's views represented nothing new, for white administrations throughout the world had displayed a similar, British "colonial" frame of mind and exhibited a spoken and unspoken superiority when it came to "natives." Canada was no exception. At the 1959 meeting, a veritable media event, senior bureaucrats were delighted with their wards, their "star performers," and were "astonished at the quality of their participation."[3]

George Koneak addressing Eskimo Affairs Committee, May 1959.

One cannot argue that the Inuit had been "uplifted" dramatically in the short span of seven years by the recommendations of the Eskimo Affairs Committee and the efforts of the Canadian government. Inuit participation in 1959 may have been a result of Diefenbaker's "northern vision," but--more importantly -- stemmed from an unspoken realization that well-meaning southern administrators and concerned white agencies had not only been unable to solve the plight of Canada's northern inhabitants, but had not, to this point, listened to them. In 1939, the Supreme Court of Canada had declared that the Inuit were, like the Indian, definitely the responsibility of the federal government, much to the latter's chagrin and consternation. In 1939 the Court, in that landmark decision, had spoken on behalf of the Inuit; twenty years later, the Inuit were beginning to speak for themselves. This was <u>their</u> historic landmark; by it, they entered - or were "declared" to enter - the twentieth century.

What they said in 1959, and said eloquently, spoke volumes about policy and underscored Inuit concerns. It can best be summed up by the remarks of John Ayaruark of Rankin Inlet:

> In moving from one place to another the Eskimo can feel confident if they can make the decisions without fear, if they can have confidence in those in authority, but in the past many times Eskimos have been moved from their own places and sent to other places because they were over-awed by those in authority and were afraid of those who told them they should go.

...At Rankin Inlet things have changed.... There are people from the land and from the sea who came together, speaking many dialects, living in the same place, and living a new way of life there. You people here know what you want to do with your lives, you people here know how you want to arrange your country, where you want to live. We also have our ideas of where we want to live and what we want to live in. There are other people who have come from inland and from the sea for the first time. For them living this very different way of life is a source of some fear and anxiety....Now we partake of the white people's food. Some of it is good and gives people strength and some has no strength in it, but we eat this food because it is given to us. We have a different way of living, but we are still men and as men we work. Some of us who are strong can do more work than those who are not so strong, and are paid accordingly. It is better for those who have money to get what they want. They should have freedom to purchase what they wish. White people can eat and do their jobs because they have other people to look after their food needs. Eskimos cannot do this; they must supply their own food. Eskimos need strong meat. They should have some people still hunting, bringing the food for the others who are working in the mine.... This confusion about what is right, how to organize this type of life, is what makes them despondent and appear to be lazy, simply because they are confused about how to arrange their lives. But it is not through laziness that people behave in this way; it is because they do not know what to do and this despondency is sometimes mistaken for laziness. ...Therefore, it would be better if the men could get together and were properly organized to know who should take part in the community for those things considered good, both from the land and from the work. Moreover, the arrangement should extend to the allocating of those things which are produced. There should be a proper market for those things produced from the land and from skills so we can share in the profits.

I want to say just a little more about education. It is good that our children should go to school, but we need understanding of our children. It is good to have discipline but the teacher should not be angry. It is not good for children to learn because of their fear of the anger of the people

who teach them. It is a good thing for them to be disciplined and to learn and only by being disciplined is it possible for them to learn. In order that they can learn sometimes the teachers must scold....

Separation is one thing which we are concerned about. Sometimes we men go away to work. Sometimes children and mothers are separated and when they are separated people do not know what and how to think. Thus men who are away from their families may forget about them. There should be some way for people to be brought together. Sometimes they have not enough money and there is no transportation for them to get back to the place they come from. ...Sometimes they do not work well because they don't know what decision to make and are worried about their families. Some arrangements should be made to get families back together.

We lived like Eskimos when there was lots of caribou. Some are still trying to live in this way but with great difficulty in this area where the game is getting less and less. With the decrease in the game those who are still living the Eskimo way of life fear they cannot be living in this way any longer and will have to find a new way of life because the old way is almost done. And so we are very happy there is a place like Rankin Inlet where people are still alive, whereas if they were trying to hunt they would be dead....

Now in Ottawa I see how people live and I can see that the Eskimos are waiting to live in the way in which they think they can and should live. And they can live in the same way the white people are living; it is not a white man's way of life, it is a way any people can live. The time has come now when we can change and it cannot be a slow change, it must be rapid. The white way of life is the way the Eskimos can live. They cannot afford to wait while this transition takes place and they must have the change now....

We can't afford to wait; the opportunity is there now; now, now is the time.[4]

From the vantage of 1985, given the subsequent course of white-Inuit relations and northern development, some of John Ayaruark's hopes for the future of his people may seem naive and impractical. The debate continues, and will continue, over the nature and extent of interaction between the Inuit, the government and northern developers. This historical study will not and cannot address itself to the concerns of today, but is an investigation into the changing policies and premises of the government of Canada towards the Inuit from the beginning of this century to the mid-1960s.

II

THE BEGINNING OF CONTACT AND POLICY: THE LAW PARAMOUNT

By 1959, the bulk of Inuit in Canada had been, or were being, relocated by the Canadian government. Yet before this deliberate policy they had ranged far and wide in Canada's northlands. Like their counterparts in Alaska and Greenland, they occupied, more or less, the various coastal and tundra regions of the Arctic and far North. In the east they had even occupied northern Newfoundland's peninsula during Europe's late Middle Ages, roamed the north shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and plied the waters of James Bay long after the voyages and discoveries of Jacques Cartier; in the Western Arctic, the Inuit had travelled the Mackenzie River to a place near old Fort Good Hope.[1] Long before Europeans "discovered" the New World, Indians and Inuit had occupied, in their own fashion, the vastness of North America. Their origins may be obscure, and the process of dispersal subject to debate, but we do know that by the early Christian era, after centuries of gestation, adaptation and refinement, a culture had emerged which was encountered by the earliest white contacts.[2]

Icelanders were among the earliest of European stock to brush with the Inuit of eastern Canada. The Norse sagas, based on oral traditions, have left us not only a rich body of literature, but also a vivid record of their colonization explorations and exploits. In the ninth

and late tenth century, Norsemen, for a variety of reasons, undertook voyages from southwestern Norway in search of wealth and new homes. In A.D. 874 they began to settle in Iceland, and by A.D. 1000, pushing beyond their newly colonized Greenland, Leif Ericsson reached "Vinland" on the northern tip of Newfoundland near present-day l'Anse aux Meadows. When they pushed out even further to the coast of Labrador (Markland), they met and fought (ca. 1004) near the mouth of the English River in Hamilton Inlet with a mysterious people they called Skrellings (sometimes written as Skraelings) or "barbarians," who may have been Algonkian Indians and not Inuit.[3] If there were Inuit contacts with the Norse adventurers in the next three centuries, they are shrouded in the mists of history. Apparently Vinland was never made a permanent site and Markland remained only a source of timber until 1347. After that date all Norse references to this region cease.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, in the wake of the explorations of John Cabot (1497) and Sebastian Cabot (1501 or 1502) and the pursuit of cod by European fishermen off Labrador and Newfoundland, Inuit-white contact became more or less continual, often brutal and bloody, over the succeeding centuries. In effect, a long state of war existed between the Inuit of eastern Canada and European "intruders" until 1765, when a group of Labrador Inuit who had harassed the English fishing were persuaded by the Moravian missionary, Jens Haven, to negotiate a peace treaty with the English governor of Newfoundland. In return for their role, the Moravian Society was then

free to establish missions and trading stores in Labrador: Nain (1770), Okkak (1775), Hopedale (1781) and Hebron (1829). Not until the nineteenth century would contact with other Inuit intensify, with the renewed quest for the elusive Northwest Passage to the Orient. Cold, the caprice of wind and ice, uncharted water and currents, and general lack of interest insulated and shielded Canada's northern regions and its inhabitants for a long time.

In the nineteenth century, however, the desire of the British admirality to maintain sea supremacy after the Napoleonic Wars, combined with a accelerated scientific curiosity, would mean that the mysteries that lay behind the arctic curtain would slowly be bared to intrepid and bold individuals like William E. Parry, George Lyon, John Richardson and, of course, John Franklin--the most enduring figure in nineteenth century arctic exploration. The search for Franklin's last expedition spurred a frenzied round of exploration by American and British mariners in the second half of that century. Parallelling these official voyages into the North, and having a greater impact on the Inuit, were private ventures in pursuit of the bowhead whale, prized partly for its oil but more importantly for its plastic-like baleen. Scottish whalers roamed Baffin Bay, and American whalers monopolized the upper reaches of Hudson's Bay in and around Foxe Basin and Southampton Island. Americans were in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and, from 1888 onward, in the Beaufort Sea, wintering primarily at tiny Herschel Island.

The whaling industry in these northern waters provided the first intensive contact with the Inuit, and by the turn of the century had effected profound changes in Inuit lifestyle and culture. In eastern arctic waters, Inuit were hired to supplement the hunt for the bowhead, the men hunting for fresh meat and their women making fur clothing. Whaling captains encouraged them, as well, to relocate and to trap foxes. This was a lucrative side-line for the whalers, but for the Inuit, who had previously regarded such skins as worthless, it meant a modification of their values and mode of hunting. Moreover, the whalers introduced their helpers and their families to metal pots, wooden boats, rifles, highly coveted tobacco and southern foods like sugar, flour and tea. It is true, as Diamond Jenness commented, that a "new generation of Eskimos arose that lacked the ancient skills and hunting lore of its parents, a generation that had lost is autarchy and could hardly survive without contact with the civilized world."[4] "Civilization," with all its warts and drawbacks for the Inuit way of life and survival, was there to stay and could not be turned off. In a sense, one could argue that the change brought about by contact had some benefit. When, for example, the bottom fell out of the whalebone market around 1910, the economic blow to the Inuit was cushioned by independent fur traders and especially by the Hudson's Bay Company. The single post at Great Whale River (1852) was rapidly augmented by a series of posts in the Eastern Arctic: Cape Wolstenhome (1909), Lake Harbour (1911), Chesterfield (1912), Cape Dorset (1913) and Frobisher Bay (1914).

In the Western Arctic it was much the same, except the contact had been later, more intense and, not surprisingly, the impact severe. By the mid-1890s, reports filtered south via missionaries of the evils attendant upon the whale fisheries situated at Herschel Island: liquor, debauchery and the general demoralization of the Inuit. Both Diamond Jenness's second volume of Eskimo Administration and particularly William R. Morrison's recently published Under the Flag (a companion piece of this study) document the alleged iniquities in and around Herschel Island. According to Jenness, Herschel Island and the Mackenzie Delta had become:

> a hive of debauchery: drunkeness and immorality prevailed everywhere, strife and murder became everyday events, and diseases previously unknown to the Eskimos began to sweep away old and young like flies. Syphillis took root among them, increasing the death-rate, especially of infants, and causing apparently widespread sterility.... By 1930 the population of Canada's Western Arctic had fallen to about 200, and of that number not more than a dozen - if as many - could claim descent from the 2,000 inhabitants Sir John Franklin had encountered in this region a century earlier.[5]

Jenness's sense of outrage is tempered somewhat by Morrison's even-toned, scholarly study which admits that while such things may have occurred, and they did, the initial reporting by Anglican missionaries like I.O. Stinger, his successor, C.E. Whittaker, and Bishop Bompas may have been exaggerated.[6] Certainly, by the time the Northwest Mounted Police arrived in the North, some six years later, and after the tumult of the Klondike gold strike had abated,

the situation did not appear as alarming.[7] Nevertheless, with the arrival of the police a government "presence" was inaugurated and posts were established in 1903 at Fort Macpherson and Herschel Island in the west and Fullerton Harbour in the east. The appearance of the police, however, was only partly related to the situation of the Inuit; in fact, as Morrison so aptly points out, they were there to "show the flag," not to the Inuit, but to foreign nationals who were operating in Canadian waters, either as whalers or explorers.[8] This was their prime function: the maintenance of sovereignty by proclaiming Canada's dominion over several heartlands, inspecting cargoes, collecting appropriate taxes and confiscating liquor.[9] To Canada, whose main preoccupation for several decades would be her tenuous legal hold over the arctic archipelago, the Inuit and their well-being were incidental and best left to the ministrations of traders, missionaries and Ottawa's sole responsible northern agent, the police.

The police were the embodiment and custodians of Canadian government policy, however feeble, however muddled, however short-sighted and low-key. They were the servants of their political and bureaucratic masters in far-off Ottawa.[10] Where the United States in Alaska and Denmark in Greenland each pursued, in their own way, an enlightened native policy given the times,[11] Canada's policy was a selective application of the sovereign rule of law. In this, the well-being of the Inuit rode the coat-tails of government policy. The government, given its nineteenth century belief in laissez-faire, did not regulate

or oversee trading relations between the Inuit and fur-trading concerns like the Hudson's Bay Company and Révillon Frères, nor did it initiate or direct any programme of education and health. Such responsibilities were left to missionaries. In fact, the Inuit would have to wait until the 1950s before their needs were taken seriously.

In the meantime, the Inuit's only real government contact was the police.

> They patrolled their districts and arrested law-breakers, enforced game regulations, collected the customs duties wherever they were leviable, served as justices of the peace, postmasters, and census officers, searched for the missing, and treated the sick wherever no doctor or nurse was available.[12]

They might have been hamstrung by their southern masters, but the men in scarlet (really in fur clothing) appear to have been caring individuals always concerned -- sometimes exasperatedly -- about their wards, always suspicious of the trader who, in their view, overcharged their clients,[13] and certainly preoccupied with enforcing the king's law. They may have had little use for the Indian,[14] but the Inuit were deserving of their attention.

Admiration aside, the police believed that the Inuit must adhere to certain standards and conduct commensurate with all "civilized" societies. Only in this way could the Inuit be uplifted -- and Canadian sovereignty in the North be effectively demonstrated.[15]

The enforcement and application of Canadian law was a prime function of the police and a means by which northern natives were encouraged to abandon their primitive and oftentimes violent way of life. As the other agent of civilization, missionairies preached against the taking of life but appeared powerless to prevent murder in its various manifestations.

Infanticide was one "branch of murder"[16] that needed to be wiped out. The nomadic Inuit, constantly haunted by the spectre of starvation, may have seen no alternative to the unsavoury practice of abandoning some of their young to the elements. In settlements with an established mission and mission schools, though, this practice -- as well as wife trading and desertion of the old and crippled--was apparently abandoned by Christian natives and other Inuit who came in contact with them.[17] The Reverend Herbert Girling, who returned in mid-1917 from the Coronation Gulf area, was certain that infanticide was still practised amongst the Copper Eskimo.

> While amongst the Copper Eskimo in 1915-16 I warned many of them of the fatal consequences of their continuing this practice, telling them simply that if this was kept up it would lead to their eventual extinction.

Girling went on to illustrate the problems he encountered when trying to discover the identity of a dead one-year old infant.

Over the years the police would find their investigative tasks similarly impossible:

> I then quietly went to work amongst the natives to try and discover whose child it was as I had a suspicion it was a case of infanticide. In my enquiries I met with distinct opposition no information being vouchsafed whatever. My suspicions were centered on a woman named Kaluktaugyok whose husband is Kaminggoaluk as the previous Spring this woman had a little child who corresponded to the age of the dead child.... This woman now had a child younger than the child of the previous Spring. I asked her discretely [sic] what had become of the other child and it was then that I met with absolutely no response to my enquiries.... It is mostly female children that are killed but always one of twins. The reasons for doing this are plainly stated by the parents. In the summer time the women are obliged to carry heavy packs and consequently object to carrying two young children.[18]

As well, Inuit women usually breast-fed their babies to about the age of three. It was impossible, given a poor diet and obligation to carry the household goods, to raise two children no more than three or four years apart.[19]

Rather than attempting to track down or prosecute the perpetrators of infanticide, the police began in 1921 to issue what they termed "baby bounties" to the Inuit of the Coronation Gulf District.[20] The object, of course, was to discourage the practice of infanticide by inducing the Inuit to keep and bring up any children under the age of five. These humanitarian bribes--more correctly, inducements -- included the issue of thread, needles, tobacco, pipes, ammunition,

clasp knifes, saucepans, kettles, calico, woolen stockings and socks.[21] Yet by 1925, officers responsible for the distribution of these articles had begun to grumble that the task was a "nuisance," as it was necessary to mount special patrols and to carry these heavy packs to the natives. Said one R.C.M.P. officer, "it would take six men and teams the whole winter to distribute this bounty" to the scattered settlements.[22] During the first half of 1925, the police had distributed fifty-six packets on a catch-as-catch-can basis.[23] In light of such discouraging information, the baby bounties were discontinued in the spring of 1926, and the police, obviously throwing up their hands, chose to ignore that infanticide was still prevalent.

> Personally I am of the opinion that infanticide is still practised extensively in the vicinity of Tree River, and that the only difference between it now and a few years ago, is that it is now hidden, where it used to be done openly. As reported previously, evidence in such cases is hard come by because the natives are all tarred with the same brush and will not talk.[24]

If police were unable to cope with this problem, leaving the task to the missionaries, their success in applying the king's law in cases involving murders by Inuit was otherwise.

In truth, the government attitude regarding such crimes over a span of four to five decades is revealing. In 1912, for instance, two white men, H.V. Radford and George Street, were murdered by a group of Killinimuit Inuit in southern Bathurst Inlet. Once news of the affair

had reached Ottawa, a search was begun to find the killers, the intent not being to punish so much as to "establish friendly relations with the tribe, secure their confidence, and carefully inquire into all the circumstances."[25] Five years later, during the winter of 1917-18, the Mounties got their men. Once apprehended, the police lectured the killers on Canadian law, warned them that they would not tolerate a repeat of these actions and took no further action.[26] Given the circumstances surrounding the murders, the police and the Canadian government thought this was the wisest course of action. The murdered white men had acted foolishly, as Radford -- an ill-tempered man -- had struck and threatened one of his Inuit guides. The Inuit who had been struck retaliated in fear, for many traditional Inuit "believed that if a man spoke harshly to you he had it in his mind to kill you. It was thus only sensible, and proper, to defend yourself by killing him first."[27] The white men had been foolish and Radford, as a seasoned northern trader, should have known better. Both Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his successor, Prime Minister Robert Borden, agreed that since "no jury would convict them" it was best to "quickly bring these people under the influence of the law."[28]

Also, by 1918 a celebrated case involving parallel circumstances had been concluded, which no doubt influenced the Radford and Street ruling. In 1913, a year after Radford and Street had met their maker, two Oblate missionaries were murdered near Bloody Fall on the Coppermine River, Fathers Jean-Baptiste Rouvière and Guillaume Le Roux. Again, the Inuit, in this case Sinnisiak and Uluksuk, were

frightened and feared for their lives. Impatience and misunderstanding had led Le Roux, known to the Inuit as Ilogoak, to make threatening gestures with his rifle. When Sinnisiak tried to talk to Ilogoak, "...he put his hand on my mouth. Ilogoak was very mad and was pushing me. I was thinking hard and crying and very scared and the frost was in my boots and I was cold. I wanted to go back, but I was afraid. I got hot inside my body and every time Ilogoak pulled on the rifle I was very much afraid."[29]

On the heels of this confrontation the terrified Inuit killed both priests and proceeded to indulge in ritualistic cannibalism by eating Le Roux's liver. Both were apprehended, brought south, and stood trial in Edmonton; the case, the first of its kind, was attended by sensationalism and sympathy. Nevertheless, the prosecuting attorney made the government's position crystal clear for all Inuit, not just Sinnisiak and Uluksuk:

> These remote savages, really cannibals, the Eskimo of the Arctic regions have got to be taught to recognize the authority of the British Crown.... It is necessary that they should understand that they are under the Law... that they must regulate their lives and dealings with their fellow men, of whatever race, white men or Indians, according to, at least, the main outstanding principles of that law, which is part of the law of civilization, and that this law must be respected...as far as the Pole itself. They have got to be taught to respect the principles of Justice - and not merely to submit to it, but to learn that they are entitled themselves to resort to it...and to take advantage of it the same way as anybody else does. The code of the savage, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life must be

Uluksuk and Sinnisiak as prisoners,

> replaced among them by the code of civilization. They must learn to know...that death is not the only penalty for a push or a shove, or a swear-word.... They have got to learn that even if slight violence is used it will not justify murder, it will not justify killing, and they must be made to understand that Death is not "the only penalty that Eskimo know" or have got to know....
>
> ...the great importance of this trial lies in this: that for the first time in history these people, these Arctic people, pre-historic people, people who are as nearly as possibly living today in the Stone Age, will be brought in contact with and will be taught what is the white man's justice. They will be taught that crime will be swiftly followed by arrest, arrest by trial, and if guilt is established punishment will follow on guilt.[30]

Both men were sentenced to death, but this was a formality, and the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The judge had recommended, in passing the death sentence, that because the accused "did not know our ways, that they did not know what our laws are" the "Big Chief far away" would not put them to death.[31] Of Sinnisiak we hear little except that by 1930 he was dead. Uluksuk was murdered in 1924 by a fellow Inuit and was probably the "Ulukshack" whom the police considered a real troublemaker, a bully and a thief, with little regard for the white man-- a sin in itself, one imagines. Ulukshack "often bragged that he is not afraid of the Police, and that he would not mind killing a whiteman, as they are only taken outside and given a good time, and then sent back to their own country again."[32]

The government hoped that posters in Inuktitut might disuade Inuit from taking the law into their own hands:

> KNOW YE The King of the Land commands you, saying:
>
> "THOU SHALT DO NO MURDER"
>
> Why does he speak thus?
>
> Long ago our God made the world, and He owns the world.
> The people also He made, and He owns them.
> The King of the Land is commanded by God to protect the people well.
>
> The white people and Indians and Eskimos have him for their ruler.
> He is their ruler, therefore he commands, saying:
> "THOU SHALT DO NO MURDER"
> But if a man kills a man, the King sends his servants, the police, to take and kill the murderer.
> But yes do not kill the murderer, nor cause him to be killed. This only the King's servants, the police, ought to do.
> But when a man commits murder, at once tell the King's servants, the police, and he will take and bind the murderer and the ruler will judge him.
> Thus our God commands us so that you are to follow the King's command.
>
> DUNCAN C. SCOTT.
> In Charge of Eskimo Affairs,
> Ottawa, Canada.[33]

Reports that various Inuit still defied southern conventions meant that stern punishment should be pursued. Obviously the leniency of 1917 and the warnings had not had the desired effect. A lesson had to be taught. In the summer of 1923, two Inuit were tried for the 1921 murders of four Coronation Gulf Inuit and for the murder of two white men, including Cpl. W.A. Doak of the R.C.M.P., while under arrest.

This time the full measure of the law was meted out. The trial was held at Herschel Island, probably to impress upon the natives that the king's law would prevail. At the outset, the trial was tainted; the defence lawyer recommended, even before meeting the defendants, "that the law should take its course and those Eskimos found guilty of murder should be hanged in a place where the natives will see and recognize the outcome of taking another's life."[34] In anticipation of the "correct" verdict and sentence, "the judicial party brought with it an executioner and material for the gallows" which "made a very bad impression." Another hint of poor form was the report that even before the judge had passed sentence the graves had been dug.[35] Alikomiak, aged approximately 16, and Tatimagana were hanged in February 1924, the first of their race to feel the full force of Canadian justice. No other outcome was allowed.

The adverse publicity and press debate as to whether the two should be hanged may have tempered the mood of the government, yet it appeared bent on letting the Inuit know who was boss. Shortly after the execution, another murder trial was held in Aklavik, during the summer of 1924. The facts of the case need not concern us, but rather the actions of the all-white jury and the sentence imposed. The defence counsel described the proceedings:

> The jury were out for an hour. I was afterwards confidentially informed, by some of the jurymen, that three of them were for acquittal on the ground of self-defence. The other three did not feel that they could justifiably acquit, although

> the facts brought the case so close to the border line that these three wanted to record a nominal conviction only. Consequently, the verdict was finally agreed among then [sic] as manslaughter in a minor degree under great provocation, and as the prisoner had been under arrest for almost three years, and because of the long separation from his family, they respectfully recommended him to be dealt with leniently by the Court.... The judge sentenced Ikalaptak to five years in Stoney Mountain penitentiary.... excessive in my opinion. Unquestionably this severity....came as a shock to those attending the trial. In fact I have best reasons or saying that if the three jurymen who held out for a conviction of manslaughter had anticipated so severe a sentence, they would almost certainly have brought in a unanimous verdict of "not guilty"....[36]

Distasteful, but if the Inuit were to be moulded, they had to be made to see the light. Yet the light remained obscured as murders continued. Somehow the strategy of toughness had not produced the desired effects. By 1941, with the Belcher Island murders, officials in Ottawa were ready to throw up their hands.

In 1941 the Inuit of the Belcher Islands, directly opposite Great Whale River in the eastern portion of Hudson Bay, were torn asunder by a religious frenzy. Dissension, hysteria and finally murder erupted between opposing factions--between those who believed that the Second Coming was at hand and those who scoffed at such notions. To the men in Ottawa, nothing had changed. R.A. Gibson, deputy commander of the Northwest Territories, was frankly "at a loss to suggest something to take the place of the Criminal Code." He agreed with R.A. Olmstead, who had investigated the Belcher Island incident for the Department of Justice and who,

> likens the primitive Eskimo to under-developed children, of, say, 12 years of age.... Olmstead states that the Code does not hold such a child responsible for criminal actions and therefore it is not amenable to the laws. Again we are inclined to agree with Mr. Olmstead, but children of tender years have parents to guide them and instill in their minds what is right and wrong.... The Eskimo has no such guiding influence when not in touch with civilized people and so will go on each enforcing justice as he sees it....on his neighbours.[37]

By 1945 Gibson was convinced that Inuit should be removed from the criminal code altogether and that something be put in its place[38]--some other form of punishment, not to suit the crime but to suit the Inuit. J.L. Cory, legal advisor to the Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, mused that the fear of hanging made little impression

> to a man who is constantly in danger of his life...nor does it carry any stigma of shame to his family or relatives...it is the opinion of those with northern experience the only way to punish an Eskimo is to humiliate him; to make him 'lose face' in the eyes of his community. For murder or manslaughter a public flogging has been suggested.... If each Eskimo were given a chevron to attach to his parka if his record was good, with perhaps a different coloured chevron for any outstanding achievement, the removal of these chevrons would constitute a punishment which would probably be appreciated."[39]

Public flogging, though, was considered a step backwards and would have been very hard to justify in the public mind. No doubt, singling out or segregating the Inuit for special forms of punishment would be

impossible to square with the post-war world, and special badges of any sort for Canada's Inuit might conjure up the odious practices of the Third Reich. Both J.G. Wright, who had been in charge of the Eastern Arctic patrol, and R.C.M.P. Superintendent Martin felt that no changes should be made to the criminal code. Most juries, understanding as they had become, would not convict an Inuit of first-degree murder or would at least reduce the charge to manslaughter, sufficient punishment being removal from his home region. "Contrary to popular belief, the Eskimo do not look upon the removal of one of their numbers as a holiday especially if he is not allowed to go back to the region. The average Eskimo likes to be amongst his own family and banishment is a real punishment."[40]

The code should, and would, not be changed. Educating the Inuit was considered the best solution.[41] But were the Inuit not being educated? For almost four decades the government had had dealings on a number of levels with the Inuit, but little appeared to have changed between the two. The administration of justice vis-à-vis the Inuit before 1945, sometimes enlightened, but predicated on the rule of law, illustrated not only a lack of sensitivity but a subtle neglect on the part of bureaucrats. Things had not prospered in matters of law; nor had they progressed far in other sectors of government-Inuit relations.

III

GOING SLOW: THE STATUS OF THE INUIT BETWEEN THE WARS

One of the major problems in the Canadian government's accepting responsibility for the Inuit and promoting their interest, aside from parsimony, was the confusion over which department, if any, should undertake the task and to what degree any obligation should be exercised. If they were merely ordinary citizens of Canada, government responsibility towards them before the advent of the welfare state would be negligible; if they had a special status, like Indians, then Canada's commitment to them would be of an entirely different nature.

At the end of World War I, the Inuit were still wards of the police, who had very little connection in these matters with any other government department or branch. Yet the 1920s saw a quickened activity in the North, and one result was Canada's giving the Inuit a closer look. Contact with the Inuit had accelerated. In the Western Arctic, for example, the Canadian arctic expedition under Vilhjalmur Stefansson had ranged far and wide between 1913 and 1918. The presence of independent traders and the Hudson's Bay Company intensified, the latter opening up fourteen new posts between 1910 and 1920.[1]

The Company was also competing with Révillon Frères of Paris, which had established posts along the northern and western coasts of the Labrador peninsula, and the western shores of Hudson Bay. Also, ever mindful of the question of sovereignty, the Canadian government made a number of moves to secure a Canadian presence in the Eastern Arctic by establishing a series of seven R.C.M.P. posts between 1920 and 1927 along Canada's northeastern flank and by inaugurating in 1922 (perhaps more properly, reviving) a succession of ship visits to these northern waters and posts--the Eastern Arctic patrol.[2] More significantly in terms of administrative structuring, the Department of the Interior was revamped on the heels of oil finds near Fort Norman; in 1921 the Northwest Territories branch was created to oversee the natural resources of the area. Its first director, O.S. Finnie, would prove to be far-seeing, sensitive to both northern development and the plight of the Inuit. "He realized, as did few other Canadians, that territorial rights carry obligations; that it was the duty of the federal government to civilize the Eskimos and to safeguard their health and welfare; and that it was shamefully evading its responsibilities when it shuffled off those tasks on the traders and missionaries, neither of whom had the means to carry them out."[3] Be that as it may, Finnie soon discovered that his enthusiasm and concern would be obstructed.

The problem arose over the murky status of the Inuit and whether they merited any special attention, humanitarian reasons excepted. It was an issue which vexed politicians, and especially bureaucrats, for over

Waterfront at Aklavik, c1925.

two decades and did little for the Inuit, who paid the price for indecision, a smattering of reticence and a healthy dose of parsimony.

Soon after becoming commissioner of the Northwest Territories in 1920, W.W. Cory was made aware of the Inuit's anomalous status. When the manager of the Hudson's Bay post, C.H. Clarke, was prosecuted under the Indian Act (section 35) for supplying liquor to the Inuit in late 1919, the police doubted whether the Act applied to the Inuit and hoped that the point "might well be cleared up with a view to offering the Eskimos the same protection as the Indians."[4] Confusion of this sort continued for a number of years, but it was not until 1923 that civil servants began to address the problem. Officers within the Northwest Territories branch argued that while Inuit were "morally" the wards of the Indian department, they were not legally so.[5] Unofficially, the Department of Indian Affairs had been looking after destitute Inuit from about 1880, spending approximately $31,000 between 1918 and 1923 for their education at mission schools and for medical attention at Herschel Island.[6] Yet in most ways, Finnie's northern branch was the best prepared, as the "Eskimo will not be developed to the best advantage by the adoption of the methods ... used in dealing with the Indians." Finnie could only agree with L.T. Burwash, one of the branch's field officers on the east coast of Hudson Bay, who enumerated the advantages of such a move. Many powers and responsibilities had been delegated to the Northwest Territories and Yukon branch: Arctic transportation, enforcement of the Northwest Game Act, the development and conservation of natural resources,

action on the findings of the Commission on Musk-Ox and Reindeer, and relief grants in the form of "baby bounties." As for schools and hospitals, they too should be placed under Finnie's organization, "making this question largely one of accounting."[7] Yet Duncan Campbell Scott, superintendent general of Indian affairs, would have none of it and--much to the dismay of Finnie and others[8]-- an amendment to the Indian Act, 19 July 1924, explicitly stated - in the vaguest of fashion - that the Indian department "shall have charge of Eskimo affairs."[9]

The original bill received a rough ride in the House of Commons, particularly from the leader of the Conservative opposition, Arthur Meighen. In its original form, the bill read:

> The Superintendent General of Indian Affairs shall have the control and management of the lands and property of the Eskimos in Canada and the provisions ... of the Indian Act shall apply to the Eskimo in so far as they are applicable to their condition and mode of life and the Department of Indian Affairs shall have the management, charge, and direction of Eskimo Affairs.[10]

As no treaties had been signed with the Inuit, Canada had no special relationship with them. The act had been amended to avoid any change in their legal status; they were not wards but ordinary citizens, with all the benefits of Canadian citizenship, including her civil and criminal law. Meighen would have no part of creating for the Inuit a status akin to the Indian:

> After seventy-five years of tutelage and nursing, for the most part they [the Indians] are still helpless on our hands. I do not think we could have treated the Indian differently, and we treat him generously yet. But the Eskimo is different in this regard. The only air he can breathe is the northern air. There is where he is going to stay; there is where we are not going to go in very great numbers. Let us give the Eskimos the full benefit of our civil law; if necessary give him the benefit of special precautions to see he is not imposed on. But I do think we are taking a pretty serious step when by this bill we put our wings all around his property and tell him he is our ward and that we will look after him ...
>
> I have no objection to one of the Departments having charge of Eskimo affairs, and I have no doubt that the Indian Department is the right one, to see that the officers of the law are there, to see that our general civil rights are given them to the full, and to see as well that they are not left to starve; that on the principle of relief, and that principle alone, we may help them the same as any others who are in distress.
>
> But what I object to is that we should make the whole population our wards from this day henceforth and make their property legally ours, they simply enjoying the use of it; bringing them into the category of the Indians, with all the responsibility entailed. I think it is a mistake".[11]

In reality this did nothing for the Inuit of Canada; it further divided and confused authority and responsibility. To Finnie, this was a foolish and short-sighted policy, as the government was seriously considering at the time a high arctic reserve for the exclusive use and benefit of the Inuit. If created, independent

> fur traders and companies must be kept out. I see no other way out of the situation, except to create the reserve and to establish there the

> necessary schools for the natives and trading posts where they can secure their limited requirements. These schools and trading posts should be under the care and supervision of the Government itself. This is the practice followed both in Greenland and northern Alaska ... Any other system has only tended to seriously reduce the game and to bring the native to a state of want and starvation.
>
> However, this is a matter which has now been placed with the Department of Indian Affairs. It is very difficult to separate the administration of the game from that of the native himself; they are so bound together that it is almost impossible.'[12]

Once the Arctic Islands Game Preserve was established in 1926 (see below, chap. IV) even the minister of the Interior, W.W. Stewart, who had introduced the 1924 Indian Act amendment, agreed with Finnie's steadfast opinion'[13] and sought to have the Inuit placed under his wing. In retrospect, it made little sense to have Scott's department in charge of anything related to the Inuit, except that it had already been dealing with "natives." To W.H.B. Hoare, one of Finnie's fieldmen in the Barren Lands, to leave the Inuit to the care of the Indian department would be ruinous; the Indian department was under a terrific burden and handicap which might affect its handling and understanding of the Inuit. The Inuit could not be treated or dealt with like the Indians, as "they are as widely different from one another as is the Englishman from the Italian ... The Indian is of low mentality, and seems a dour, discontented fellow with no ambition to better his conditions either materially or intellectually ... They must be looked after as minors, consequently, they constitute a heavy

liability." Hoare intimated that the Indian department's policies were holding actions, as its wards would never amount to anything. On the other hand,

> the Eskimo looks upon himself as the equal of any white man. He, and his wife will meet a white man of any official or social standing on an equal footing without the least embarrassment. Intellectually, the Eskimo is capable of as high development as the average white man, as has been proved by experiments in education, both in Greenland and Alaska ... Eskimos are provident, skillful in all their occupations, exceptionally industrious and keenly alert to grasp any opportunity that will improve their living condition ... The Eskimos can be developed from wards into affluent and intelligent citizens, capable of managing the affairs of their own district; and are destined, under the right direction, to become a most valuable asset to the country. It is the unanimous opinion of all those that [sic] have experience with Eskimos that the Northwest Territories is the proper branch to direct the Eskimos if they are to attain their highest development and to fill that place in Canada's scheme which, by nature, they are so peculiarly fitted to fill.[14]

By order-in-council, the charge of Inuit affairs was transferred to the commissioner of the Northwest Territories on 31 August 1927.[15] Inuit status, however, was never clarified and the Inuit continued to be viewed, legally, as Canadian citizens pure and simple. For example, it was illegal to sell liquor to Indians; yet if Inuit were considered ordinary citizens of the realm such laws should, theoretically, not apply to them.

Technically, the Inuit were entitled to all the liquor that a white man was legally allowed in the Northwest Territories. In actual fact this was not so:

> ...the question of the status of the Eskimo with respect to the issue of liquor permits was brought before the Northwest Territories Council in session of the 11th December, 1928 ... Parliament has declared that the Eskimo is neither an Indian nor is he a ward of the nation. It has always been felt that he should enjoy the full status of a white man in the Territories. However, for the present it is not considered to be in the best interests of the Eskimo to issue liquor permits for medicinal purposes....'[16]

The problem sharpened as the twenties gave way to the Depression. Throughout the 1920s the northern economy experienced a decline; as well, the caribou upon which the Inuit depended were disappearing. Lacking money to buy food and the means to hunt effectively the rapidly diminishing game, the Inuit found themselves on the verge of starvation, especially in the province of Quebec. By early January 1929, arrangements had been made between Quebec and Ottawa whereby the latter would provide relief for Quebec Inuit; Quebec would then reimburse the federal government for the expenses incurred.'[17] Supervision of the relief was carried out through the Northwest Territories administration, "which was familiar with Eskimo affairs in other parts of Canada."'[18] For a period of three years the government of Quebec did reimburse the central government, to the tune of $54 660.16 or $9 per person per year.'[19] By mid-1932, however, Quebec, under the Taschereau government, adopted a new and stubborn

position. For reasons of economy, the province began to question its responsibility towards Inuit within its boundaries. Thus, the deputy minister of Justice wrote to Ottawa:

> Will you [Ottawa] please let us know on what the Federal Government bases its contention that the Province is responsible in the matter [of relief to destitute Eskimos]. Are not Eskimos included in "Indians" in number twenty-four of section ninety-one of the British North America Act?

Section 91 of the British North America Act enumerates the exclusive powers of the central government; number 24 of section 91 states simply: "Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians." To the query Ottawa replied in the negative, stating that Inuit were ordinary Canadian citizens, hence ordinary citizens of the province and not wards of the crown, as were Indians.[21] After a further exchange of "views," Quebec informed Ottawa that it would make a final payment in the ongoing scheme but that such a payment "must be taken as an admission of our liability in connection with Eskimo relief in the Province. This moreover will be the last payment we will make until the question of liability has been definitely settled...."[22] There the matter lay until both sides agreed to have the issue referred to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Both sides prepared their cases during 1933 and 1934. In this period Inuit relief was minimal and their situation unimproved. No long-range plans were forthcoming to better their circumstances. In

Padlermiut woman feeding caribou skin to child at camp near Pahki, NWT, 1950.

the absence of policy there was only "ad hocery" and a general evasion of responsibility. For example, in 1934 the government initiated the infamous Dundas Harbour colonization experiment in which responsibility for the Inuit was placed squarely on the Hudson's Bay Company, without expense to the government.[22] The latter's avowed policy was as follows: if a trading company wished a licence or permit to establish posts, the Department of the Interior "stipulated that all applicants must assume full responsibility for the welfare of the countries who trade with them and the destitute natives must be maintained without expenses to the Department."[24]

As the federal case was being prepared, a number of weaknesses became apparent. In August 1934, Alaskan Indians were given extended rights which included educational and business opportunities, namely the development of Indian lands and resources. For the purposes of this American act the term "Indian" was to encompass all Alaskan aborigines, thus including the Inuit.[25] The act suggested a precedent for the Canadian case. As 1934 wore on, the federal position seemed hopeless. The deeper the Department of Justice's researchers dug, the more the Quebec position seemed to be confirmed. The department's major external legal counsel, James McGregor Steward of Halifax, was inclined "more and more to the view that the Courts will find that the term "Indian" as used in ... the British North America Act includes the "Eskimos" and felt Quebec would "win the day."[26] As the federal case was not strong enough to win, Stewart questioned the wisdom of pursuing the matter: "on the whole I would

seriously consider whether it is wise to incur the expense incidental to bringing this matter before the Court."[27] Despite the warning Ottawa went ahead, mainly, one suspects, because it had to. The status of the Inuit had to be defined. Unless it went to court, the issue would never be resolved.

The case finally reached the Supreme Court in June 1937. The federal government led off, its goal being to demonstrate that there was a basic difference between Inuit and Indians:

> In preparation of the Dominion's Case, Council for the Dominion have collected considerable material relation to, 1. The ethological, anthropological and sociological aspects of the question, with a view to showing that in a scientific sense the Eskimos are not Indians, although there may have been or was a remote common stock; and that at the time of Confederation the consensus of scientific opinion was against a remote common stock. 2. Popular usage, with a view of showing that in the common understanding of mankind in 1867, the term "Indian" did not include "Eskimos", and 3. Governmental or departmental usage, with a view to showing that the Governors, Colonial Secretaries, legislature and other bodies making treaties, appointing committees and passing legislation dealing with "Indians", never had in mind "Eskimos."[28]

The federal government lost, despite an impressive array of anthropologists, including Diamond Jenness,[29] a wealth of evidence including history and geography books, dictionaries, and a scattering of nineteenth-century political and administrative practices. Quebec was successful in disproving exactly what Ottawa had tried to prove.[30]

Anthropological and ethnological testimony from some of North America's most noted authorities was largely ignored and played virtually no role in the Court's decision. The Court relied on evidence which outweighed conflicting academic theories and ideas.

The government of Canada claimed that, at the time of Confederation, there were no Inuit within the boundaries of the newly created Dominion, especially Quebec. Technically speaking that may have been correct, given the truncated nature of Quebec in 1867; her boundaries were not extended until 1912. The Court, however, ruled otherwise. At the time of Confederation, the territory in question--Rupert's Land in the North Western Territory--was under the administrative control of the Hudson's Bay Company. In this territory were found ninety per cent of the Inuit population--some 4000 to 5000 souls. Canada acquired these areas in 1870. As well, there were Inuit on the coast of Labrador, east of Hudson Strait, under the control of Newfoundland. The Court pointed out that one of the most reliable authorities of the time, the Hudson's Bay Company, considered Inuit in its domain to be Indians. In 1857, a decade before the passing of the British North America Act, an investigation was conducted into the affairs and future of the venerable Company. A committee of the British House of Commons was charged with the probe, which had been sparked by charges of mismanagement and dereliction of duty. The Canadian government of the time was present at these meetings in London, represented by Chief Justice William Draper. The United Provinces of Canada had a vested interest in the proceedings, as it

hoped that adverse findings would lead to the transfer, without any compensation, of Hudson's Bay Company territory to itself. The committee also wished to discuss the Company's relations with the aborigines. Partly to this end, a census--along with a map--was drawn up by the Company to show the Indian population under its control throughout North America. Both the census and the map included Inuit under the general heading of "Indians." In the margin of the HBC map, printed and published by authority of the British House of Commons (making them official documents), appeared two significant tables which included "Esquimaux" with such Indian nations as Blackfeet and Sioux, Cherokee, Algonquin and Iroquois. The census itself concluded that the total number of "Indians" in Hudson's Bay Territory amounted to 147 000 of which 4000 were the "Esquimaux."

Seven years after the investigation, the Quebec Resolutions (10 October 1864) declared that provision should be made for the admission of Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories and British Columbia. Section 146 of the British North America Act (1867) made specific provision for the acquisition of Rupert's Land as well as the Northwest Territory. By 1870 these vast territories became part of the Dominion and were brought under the jurisdiction of Parliament. For the most part this area was populated almost entirely by aborigines. The Court ruled that the latter term included both Indians and Inuit and placed much weight on the findings of the 1857 Select Committee of the British House of Commons, "the principal source of information as regards the aborigines in those territories until some years after Confederation."[31]

As for Inuit living along the Labrador coast beyond Hudson's Bay territories and within Newfoundland's jurisdiction, the Court believed there was conclusive evidence, from about 1760 to Confederation, that Inuit were known and referred to as Indians. Such evidence could only strengthen Quebec's case. In 1762, for instance, General Murray, then governor of Quebec and later first governor of Canada, officially reported on the "Indian" nations residing within the government. Dealing with the "savages" along the North Shore, he included "Esquimaux" and Montagnais in the same group. In fact, from this time until the 1880s a succession of governors, commanders-in-chief of the navy, missionaries and traders in the region consistently referred to the Inuit as either "Esquimaux Indians" or "Eskimaux Savages."

The word "savages" was used interchangeably with "Indians."[32] As well, the official French translation of the word "Indian" was not "Indien" but "Sauvages." This could be found in the official French translation of the Quebec Resolutions and in the official French version of the British North America Act. In fact, when Champlain visited the New World in 1625, he wrote of discovering "une nation de sauvages qui habitent ces pays, qui S'appellent Esquimaux." The French regime had viewed, or considered, Inuit as Indians.[33]

In addition to this official usage of interchangeable terms and perceptions, the Court placed much stock in contemporary books known to the fathers of Confederation and the British parliament of the day which indicated that "the Eskimo was considered as one of the Indian

tribes." The 1885 edition of Webster's American Dictionary defined the Eskimo as: "A nation of Indians inhabiting the northwestern parts of North America."[34] Other contemporary works with a similar view were Adrien Guibert's Geographical Dictionary (1855) and Charles de Wolf Brownwell's The Indian Races of North and South America (1856).[35] Despite the Dominion government's evidence to the contrary, the Court sided with Quebec in this particular argument, citing from the 1934 edition of Webster's International Dictionary which defined "Indians" as:

> ...a member of the Aboriginal American race; an American or Red Indian; an Ameridian. About 75 linguistic families or stocks are recognized in North America and about 75 more in South America and the West Indians. Some stocks comprise many tribes speaking distinct, but related, languages. The 16 stocks listed below occupied more than half the area of the continent and comprised a large majority of the Indians at the time of the discovery of North America, Algonquin, Athapascan, Eskimauan, Iroquoian, Mayan, Muskhegan, Siouian, and the Uto-Aztocan.[36]

On another point the Court did agree that Inuit had not been mentioned in any legislation until 1924. In that year, the Indian Act was amended to include a subsection which stated "The Superintendent General of Indian Affairs should have charge of Eskimo Affairs." This was repealed and the repeal could be considered, said the Court, as an explicit denial of responsibility by the government of Canada. But this belated action would count for naught, because Quebec possessed a trumpcard: 1879 correspondence between Hector Langevin, then the

postmaster general and the first minister to act as superintendent of Indian affairs (from 1 July 1867 to 7 December 1969), and Sir John A. Macdonald, prime minister and superintendent general of Indian affairs - both "fathers of Confederation." The Court considered this evidence especially as "conclusive as to what was in the minds of those responsible for the drafting of the [Quebec] Resolution [1864] leading to the passing of the British North America Act.[37]

In 1879, there existed a serious food shortage among the Quebec natives of the north coast of the St. Lawrence River below the Saguenay. Langevin felt something had to be done:

> Ottawa, 20 January 1879
>
> My dear Sir John,
>
> The enclosed letter from the Very Reverend Edmond Langevin, Vicar General of Rimouski, calls my attention to the position of the Montagnais and Esquimaux Indians on the north coast of the St. Lawrence below the Saguenay. He says that the amount that used to be given to these Indians was seventy eight cents a head, and that now it is only thirty eight cents. These poor people are starving; they can't cultivate the land, which in that region is hardly cultivable, and have had no provision made for them by the Government, and he requires on their behalf that we should come to their help. Will you kindly see that they are treated as well as we treat the Indians to our new territories. Of course I leave the whole matter in your hands.
>
> Yours truly
> Hector L. Langevin[38]

The matter was commented upon by the deputy superintendent general of Indian affairs.

> Ottawa, 27 January, 1879
>
> With reference to the letter of the 20th Instant (placed herewith) from the Honourable Hector Langevin, enclosing a letter of the 13th Instant, from the Very Reverend Edmond Langevin, of Rimouski, in the province of Québec, relative to the insufficient relief given to the Montagnais and Esquimaux Indians of the Lower St. lawrence the undersigned has the honour to report that frequent representations to the same effect have been made to the Department and that last year he endeavoured to induce the then Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to ask Parliament for a larger grant. But that when the proposed estimates for the year 1878-79 were submitted to Council for revision, the proposed increase of $2,000 to the Parliamentary Grant for these Indians was struck out.
>
> The present government has however santioned the Supplementary Estimates for 1878-79 which will be submitted to Parliament at the approaching Session being anticipated by granting the said sum of $2,000.00 and the undersigned moreover increased the grant for those Indians by that amount in the proposed estimates for the year 1879-80 with the hope that the Government will sanction and Parliament confirm the same.
>
> All respectfully submitted,
>
> L. Van Koughnet,
> Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs.[39]

"Where," asked the counsel for Quebec, "could be found better contemporaries than Mcdonald [sic] and Langevin to understand the meaning of the word Indians in the British North America Act?"[40]

The point needed little elaboration: the actions of these fathers of Confederation in 1879 made their intentions of the 1860s crystal clear. The Court could not but agree. The word "Indians" in the British North America Act was meant to include Inuit.

On 5 April 1939, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Inuit were Indians. Diamond Jenness, one of Canada's most respected anthropologists, described the decision in the following erudite fashion: Parturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculous mus ("The mountains are in labour. From their womb will issue an absurd little mouse" - Horace). Despite Jenness's obvious scorn, the judgement represented a landmark decision in Inuit relations with the federal government.

One would have assumed that the matter ended there, but it did not. For another half decade the legal status of the Inuit would be in limbo; this additional delay, along with the inaction of the government in the 1930s while the matter was before the Supreme Court, meant that positive action was postponed. In a rather strange aftermath, Ottawa's civil servants felt that the Canadian government should take over Inuit affairs, but were of the opinion that the case should be appealed to what was then the highest and final court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Northwest Territories Council debated the subject from April 1939 to January 1941, worried essentially -- apart from legal technicalities -- about placing the Inuit under the Indian Act, a step backward from their point of view.[41] In essence, the debate of the 1920s was replayed, with a slight twist, in 1940.

> There would seem to be a disposition on the part of everyone to make it possible for the Eskimos to be legally wards of the government so long as the Eskimos need such supervision. However, the difference of opinion arises as to the method by which this should be accomplished.
>
> Undoubtedly there are certain features of the Indian Act that are not in keeping with established Eskimo customs nor with the practice in dealing with them. The question to be decided is whether it would be better to accept the judgement of the Supreme Court and ask Parliament for an amendment to the Indian Act, making special provisions for those who have been theretofore known as Eskimos, or on the other hand to appeal the judgement, and, if successful, start with an Eskimo Act which will make the status of the Eskimo clear and provide for whatever degree of supervision is necessary, also enable an Eskimo to become enfranchised as a citizen if he so desires by giving up whatever benefits might otherwise accrue to him under the Eskimo Act.
>
> Entirely apart from the position of the Eskimo under the Supreme Court decision is the question of whether by accepting the decision we commit the Dominion to reimburse the Province of Quebec for payments made by the Province before the Province questioned the responsibility. A substantial amount is involved. This factor should be considered when we are deciding whether an appeal should be made.[42]

Nevertheless, it was thought wise not to pursue the question during the current world crisis and an appeal would be forthcoming once hostilities cleared.[43]

But before war's end, an appeal was considered impolitic by the minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent, one of Mackenzie King's most important Quebec representatives in cabinet, "since it raises a dispute between the Dominion and one of the Provinces."[44] Over the

following years, the idea of an appeal was dropped and certainly would have been impossible after 1949, when the Supreme Court of Canada became the highest court in the land; only appeals launched before that date could have been considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Given this, the vexing question remained: what to do with the Inuit and, more especially, where do they fit?

The late 1940s witnessed the same discussion that had taken place earlier, time and again. As expected, those involved in the administration of the Northwest Territories did not wish to see the Inuit become part of Indian affairs. Their reasoning was cogent and, no doubt, inspired by genuine concern. To T.L. Cory, the legal advisor of the branch, the nomadic Inuit could never be confined to a reserve as were Indians, with Indian agents, untrained to deal with another people, to run their affairs. "A confined Eskimo would soon be a dead Eskimo....the whole Arctic region is a reserve for Eskimo, but if this were so, the Arctic is so vast that no supervision such as contemplated by the Indian Act would be possible." In addition, if government agents were located at strategic northern points the cost would be prohibitive and the temptation for such isolated agents to exploit the Inuit, too great.[45] To others, however, there appeared to be a prevailing notion that if Inuit were Indians then they should be under the jurisdiction of one department. In 1947, the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Indian Act certainly believed this.[46] Perhaps Indian Affairs was pushing thispoint before the committee. In any case, no distinction was being

made, as a native was a native, profound differences notwithstanding. The committee's views, fortunately, did not prevail as opposition from the Northwest Territories and Yukon Services persisted.[47] By order-in-council, dated 27 June 1950, authority for the Inuit was vested in the minister of Resources and Development.[48] The 1951 Indian Act made government responsibility explicit, in terms of the 1939 Court decision, by excluding Inuit:

> A reference in this Act to an Indian does not include any person of the race of aborigines commonly referred to as Eskimos.[49]

The Indian Act of 1970 contained the same provision.[50] The Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, created in 1953, became the locus for Inuit affairs when government Inuit policy witnessed a "take-off" period, which lasted, for better or worse, for over a decade. No formal Eskimo Act, akin to the Indian Act, was ever promulgated, as will become evident, because the Canadian government hoped that the Inuit would become self-sufficient, and such an act would be a constraint on their development. It is true that by the Government Organization Act of 1966 (section 17) the powers and functions of the minister of the newly formed Department of Indian Affairs included Eskimo affairs, but always separate from the Indian Act.[51] But Canada continued to avoid any formal legislation which might qualify Inuit rights. As before, Inuit were considered full citizens of Canada. They were not given any special status, as federal responsibility to them was viewed as "an extra service and not

an alternative to normal citizenship."[52] Constitutionally, the federal government was capable of making laws respecting the Inuit to provide education, welfare, health and other services. They would do this, most jealously, throughout the 1950s. The change would come in the 1960s, with Quebec's assertion of jurdisdiction over Inuit within her boundaries. Suffice it to say here that by 1969 Quebec did not dispute Ottawa's exclusive right to legislate with respect to the Inuit, but the province argued that it should be able to provide normal provincial services to the Inuit and receive full reimbursement from the federal government.[53]

In sum, the many confusions over status, the wranglings between federal departments, disagreements and imprecisions between Ottawa and Québec, and the overwrought anxiety over sovereignty, meant little to the Inuit themselves. What it meant to them, in real terms, was delay, procrastination, two decades of benign neglect, and then roughly two decades of frenzied government activity, perhaps equally harmful, to redress the relative inattention.

IV

THE POLICIES OF THE INTERWAR YEARS

Concern for the welfare of the Inuit was always present but never paramount. Priority was given, as we have seen, to the wider aspects of sovereignty and the application of the king's law. Yet in a number of areas Canadian government officials, struggling under the fuzzy precepts of Inuit status, managed to address themselves, officially and unofficially, to a series of questions during the 1920s and 1930s: conservation, the economic condition of the Inuit (including their relationship to various trading concerns), health and welfare, and even education. One can argue that, in doing so, the government of Canada never totally abandoned the Inuit, although a cynic might suggest that if more had been done -- even in paternalistic fashion -- the Inuit would have at least avoided some of the hardships and traumas that beset them in these years. This may well be true, but the fact remains that Canada chose otherwise and steered a course that differed from the Alaskan and Greenland experiments.

At the centre of much of government policy from 1921 to 1931 was the Northwest Territories and Yukon branch of the Department of the Interior under O.S. Finnie. In 1931, with the Depression cutting a swath through Canadian society, white and native alike, he and his branch were cut as an economy measure. Thereafter, the deputy minister of the Department of the Interior doubled as commissioner of the Northwest Territories, and was responsible for things Inuit. The

Northwest Territories Council, which met almost exclusively in Ottawa, was his advisory body and implementation of policy was placed in the hands of the Dominion lands branch, later known as Lands, Northwest Territories and Yukon branch.

During the 1920s, the Northwest Territories branch, hamstrung as it may have been, pursued an enlightened Inuit policy, as enlightened as circumstances would allow and squaring with what was thought best for Inuit survival and protection. In essence, this would mean not direct intervention, except in upholding the king's law, but encouragement to become or remain self-sufficient hunters and trappers -- a policy that would ring through four decades.

Finnie's branch had, in truth, no mandate to deal directly with the Inuit; nevertheless, empowered to advance the interests of the territory as a whole, it could in ingenious ways construct a number of measures which touched on the Inuit and their way of life. Finnie himself possessed a genuine concern and was not of the usual mould. To him, the Inuit should come ahead of sovereignty as "the welfare of the Eskimos should be considered of first importance in any scheme of future development."[1] Much of his mandate came from the findings and recommendations of the "Royal Commission to Investigate the Possibilities of the Reindeer and Musk-Ox Industries in the Arctic and Sub-Arctic Regions of Canada" established in 1919 by the efforts of the arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson.[2] In 1922 the commission made some fifteen recommendations, a number of which could be acted

upon by Finnie's operation: continuing conservation and protection of musk-oxen; establishment of small experimental reindeer herds, with the natives encouraged to learn reindeer husbandry; research and information gathering on the numbers and movements of wild caribou, and prevention of their "wasteful or useless slaughter" either by natives or others.[3]

Shortly thereafter, "A letter from the Government to the Eskimo People" was issued and posted in accessible locales in the Northwest Territories in English and in various Inuit script; it warned of dire consequences if too many caribou were killed:

A letter from the Government to the Eskimo People

THE CARIBOU
ARE VERY VALUABLE
TO THE ESKIMOS

They give them skins for clothing and bedskins for winter to keep their children warm and enable the men to hunt and trap.

If the Eskimo kills many more caribou each year than he needs for clothing and bedskins, after a while there will be only a few left, and the Eskimos will be cold, and their children will be cold also.

A good hunter will not kill more caribou than he needs but only enough for food and clothing and bedskins for himself and family.

A good hunter will not kill female caribou when they are with young, or when the young are suckling them.

A good hunter will always try to kill bulls and not cows. If he does this every year there will be plenty of young ones.

Far away to the East live a tribe of Eskimos who once had plenty of caribou in their land. By and by the hunters got good rifles, then they said "now we will kill all the caribou we want", but they were stupid people because they killed and killed until there were only a few caribou left far away from their hunting place, and now they have no deer skins for winter clothes and their children cry because they are cold in winter.

The Eskimo must not forget that without deer skins he cannot travel in winter but will have to stay in one place and be hungry and listen to his children crying because they are cold and hungry too.

If the Eskimo thinks of this he will not kill all the caribou he sees, he will say "It will be bad for our people if all the caribou are killed so I will just kill what I need for food and clothing when the skins are good."

A good hunter will never kill caribou in the months of April, May, June and July (except when he is very hungry and then he will only kill bulls if he can) because in those months the skins are no good.

Eskimos! You should know that the wolf is a very great enemy of yours, and you should kill him winter and summer because he kills a great many caribou. The police and the traders will give a very good trade for winter, summer, spring or fall wolf skins, large or small, because they want the wolves killed to save the caribou for the Eskimos. Let every Eskimo tell his friends this news.

The Government and the Police say that the people must not kill musk-ox. If any more are killed the Government will be very angry. Traders will not buy musk-ox skins.

The Government and the Police are the true friends of the Eskimos. The Eskimos should do as they say because it is right. The Government wishes the Eskimos to be well and happy.

O. S. FINNIE,
Director

Ottawa, 1st April, 1924.

Apparently such measures had little impact over the years in more remote or isolated northern areas. As late as 1949 complaints were received from the Western Arctic that not only were new game

regulations not being observed by the Inuit in these places -- Coppermine, Holman Island and Minto, Burnside -- but the Inuit had little appreciation of the concept of conservation as preached for over a quarter century.[5]

The conservation programme was continued with the establishment in 1923 of two huge game preserves exclusively for Inuit, Indians and half-breeds, one in the Back and Thelon River basins and the other on Victoria and Banks Islands.[6] In 1926, the latter reserve was extended to cover all the Arctic Islands and became known as the Arctic Islands Game Preserve.

Much of government perception and policy regarding the Inuit had its origin in the early to mid-1920s. The bulk of information was received through its field agents, the police, whose observations, although thorough, could be contradictory and were limited to their immediate post areas, their patrols and quick visits to Inuit locations. Explorers, missionaries and, to a lesser degree, traders also played their part in this information-gathering. By the early 1920s interest in the North and its natives was sparked by seemingly diverse events ranging from the Wrangel Island episode[7] to the well-publicized murder trials of Inuit. More to the point concerning the future of the Inuit, and shared by the Northwest Territories and Yukon branch, were the public and well-publicized sentiments and suggestions put forward by Henry Toke Munn, F.R.G.S., retired explorer and Baffin Island trader, with eleven years experience in trading and

dealing with the Inuit there. As an independent trader, he may have had an axe to grind with the Hudson's Bay Company, but he assured the minister of the Interior, Charles Stewart, that he was "actuated solely by my regard for the Eskimo, and my firm conviction that only ... Governmental action ... can preserve them."[8]

He hoped to stir up "the Powers" to do something.[9] Certainly his articles received the editorial support of a number of newspapers, including the Ottawa Citizen,[10] which endorsed a provocative article which appeared in the widely-read magazine National Life:

> ...To induce the Eskimo to trap, the Trading Companies adopt the device known as "creating new wants" for these simple living people. Kerosene takes the place of the old stone blubber lamp, where a trading station is near enough to guarantee a supply. New, expensive and often unsuitable high power rifles, such as a high power .22 rifle, are imported and urged on the hunter, ever keen for a novelty in firearms ... This is used as a level to hold the native to the Trading Company he may be dealing with, and its effect is demoralizing .... To anyone familiar with the Eskimo, there is a depressing difference between the natives living remote from a trading post and those who live near one. The remote native, a blubber and meat eater, with tobacco his only luxury, is rosy checked, well fed, independent and friendly in his demeanor, generally scorning to beg, and with a dignity soon lost by the Post native. They on the other hand are often unhealthy looking, tuberculous, grumbling, prone to beg, and always threatening the trader to leave him for the rival store unless he is free with his credit:... The Royal Danish Company, run by the Government, closed trading rights to everyone but themselves, discouraged as far as possible any avoidable change from the native's usual mode of life, supplied doctors and nurses, and inculcated a cleanly mode of living, running the country, at

> least up to a recent date, at a loss. It is a fine effort in state philanthropy for this acquisitive age to contemplate.[11]

Both Finnie and Cory could not but agree with these sentiments, Finnie angling for a huge reserve for the exclusive use of the Inuit, with the necessary "schools and trading posts ... under the care and supervision of the Government itself," the practice followed in Greenland and northern Alaska.[12] Cory was working for the establishment of an arctic reserve controlled and operated exclusively by the crown, "an ideal we have been working on for some time."[13]

But what was needed was something more comprehensive, something that might embrace a greater portion of the Arctic. No one was better suited to inform Ottawa on a comprehensive and current scale than the Danish explorer, Knud Rasmussen, as "his recommendations should go a long way to suggesting the course of action we should follow in our administration."[14] Like his contemporary, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, this native Greenlander never tired in his fascination with, and scholarly interest in, the Inuit. Under his pioneering command, the Danish Fifth Thule Expedition (1921-24) provided more than a passing glimpse of the natives of arctic North America.[15] After headquartering one and one-half years at Danish Island, at the top of Hudson Bay, south of Melville Peninsula, Rasmussen set out in the spring of 1923 on a stupendous journey. Until then, he and his party had studied the surrounding Inuit from Baffin Island to Baker Lake. In August 1924, he completed his trek by crossing the Bering Strait to

Siberia, travelling some 20 000 miles by sledge. In that time he traversed the coastline of the Northwest Passage, prized by many mariners for over a century, and in the process he was able to investigate every major Inuit group which inhabited the Central and Western Arctic of North America. For Ottawa, with a greater concern for the Inuit than ever before, Rasmussen's travels and observations were of considerable import.

The forum would be the Advisory Board on Wild Life Protection. Finnie arranged for Rasmussen to attend four vital meetings between 29 April and 5 May 1925, and to answer subsequent inquiries during the summer of that year.[16] Rasmussen, when queried about traders and their posts, pointed out that it was his opinion that the clock could not be turned back. With few exceptions, all the Inuit in Canada were dependent on white men's goods. In most sections the young were familiar with firearms and had lost their ability to hunt with bows and arrows, kayaks and spears. As long as only the necessary, as opposed to luxury, articles were imported, any harm trading stations could do would be "compensated for by the great aid the importation of firearms gives a hunting tribe in their battle for existence." Once the traders "are informed of their responsibilities, they will be able to bring the milder customs of the white man out among the native people." There was little danger of the caribou becoming extinct, but all care should be taken not to disturb their migratory patterns, as repeated gun shots made them shy away from traditional trail patterns and turn back to the interior of the country. This disturbance of

migratory habits had occurred where traders and police had established posts outside or close to caribou trails. Caribou, it appeared, shrank from the odour of coal smoke,[17] and the Inuit of Coronation Gulf were facing an unprecedented disaster because caribou had altered their migratory patterns because of the permanence of coal-burning trading posts.[18] It was also Rasmussen's opinion that high-powered rifles should be discouraged, except in the hunt for walrus, as their use led to wanton overkill of caribou. "It will be necessary everywhere that the Authorities and if possible also the traders try to teach economical hunting to the Eskimos, so that through the years the people will learn to understand that hunting should not be done in such a way as to kill as much game as possible at the moment but that future generations must be taken into consideration."[19] Rasmussen may not have said it, or even thought it, but such a suggestion would involve a revolution in the way an Inuit viewed the world and his place in it.

As for the alleged ruthless exploitation of Inuit by the traders, Rasmussen saw none of it. True, the Inuit had to pay high prices for their goods, but one had to take into account that "the risk in trading in these different sections is very great and that expenses necessarily must be in proportion to the great distances...." Moreover, he could not recommend that the government involve itself in trading, as it would incur considerable losses, given the nature of government enterprises. "Private trading -- private initiative -- seems to me to be the healthiest and most modern way of furnishing the

Eskimo with their necessities." Further, white trappers should not be entirely kept away from the arctic coast because "as a rule competition with these has a stimulating and educating effect on the Eskimo." Besides, the country was so large both could trap without the Inuit experiencing any adverse effects. "The question of a larger invasion [of whites] will never come up."[20] Rasmussen was quite keen on the introduction of reindeer and reindeer herding in northern Canada. Inuit had succeeded in Alaska, where they had made good progress since reindeer were first introduced in the 1890s; however, it might take a generation to teach the Inuit herding and wean them from the wasteful practices of hunting.[21]

Overall, Rasmussen's information and opinions were useful and crucial to Canada's southern administrators of northern lands, but in many respects they were at variance with individuals (R.C.M.P.) and agencies whose sympathies -- in most part -- towards the Inuit went just as deep, and whose northern experience in Canada may not have been as far-ranging but derived from longer periods of contact. Their experience was not of the whirlwind variety. In many respects their ambitions coincided with Rasmussen's, but they were more pointed in their worry about widespread starvation and the lack of game. Their most pointed remarks were directed at the traders, including the Hudson's Bay Company. Unlike Rasmussen,[22] who appeared more charitable in his remarks about the Hudson's Bay Company, the police were always suspicious of the Company's trading practices and they may have had good reason. The police considered the majority of fur

traders, managers and assistants in the Central and Western Arctic "a poor class of men ... the beachcombers of Nome and the coast."[23] In the Eastern Arctic, one of Finnie's field men, exploratory engineer L.T. Burwash, pulled no punches and provided a gloomy and depressing report on fur trade activities vis à vis the Inuit on Baffin Island:

> For many years trapping was conducted chiefly by the women and in no way influenced either the selection of camp sites, or indirectly, the food and clothing supply.
>
> ... concurrent with the increase in value of the arctic furs, and the practical closing of the whaling operations, the traders commenced to organize both the natives and the territories with a view of increasing the fur production. With the business assuming greater proportions the traders in many cases considered it to their advantage to keep large numbers of natives either at, or in the close proximity of the Post where they have been used as labourers, stevedores, etc., only leaving the post late in the summer to take up winter quarters at a site selected by the company agent as a good fox area and which might or might not supply either caribou or seal.
>
> Traders will, it is true, issue a weekly dole of biscuits, tea and molasses which possibly keeps body and soul together, but which in no way compensates for the lack of meat, seal and caribou skins. During the past winter an Eskimo settlement was seen, containing forty-five natives, who were without meat or blubber. The inside of the tupeks were dark and festooned with frost, and the people, more especially the women, and children, existing in misery almost beyond belief. These people had been sent to this area not only without their consent but in the face of as strenuous a protest as an Eskimo, with his fear of the trader, dared make. Just here it may be said that one of the strongest arguments against permitting the establishment of trading posts on any of the uninhabited islands, or in fact at any point at which posts are not already operating, is that such new posts will necessarily mean the

> deportation of native families from the countries in which they have been born and lived, the separation of close relatives and a new settlement, the site of which will be selected primarily as a fur centre.
>
> The problem of correcting the evils that no doubt exist in the fur trade as carried on today is not altogether a simple one but it would appear that one of the following courses must finally be taken -
>
> (1) Private traders with Government supervision
>
> (2) Government depots.
>
> Should the first be accepted many phases would necessarily have to be dealt with but the two outstanding points to be considered would be the permissable percentage of profit and the ratio of goods supplied to total overhead making each post a unit in itself when computing the above.
>
> The freedom of the native to follow their own desires should of course be guaranteed.
>
> The second alternative involving as it does Government ownership, will scarcely meet with approval today but in its defense it may be pointed out that the Danish Government have made an outstanding success under this system.[24]

In Greenland, as Burwash noted, Danish authorities had had success with state monopoly of trade. The year 1924 represented the one-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of that monopoly, and Danish authorities had no hesitation in asserting that the practice would and should continue, as it was "an absolute necessity ... for the single reason that the native population would be exterminated if it came into unrestricted connection with the great world."[25] Whether Canada could adopt such a practice was a moot point. Greenland's coastal settlements were much more accessible than Canada's far-flung arctic counterparts. The venerable Hudson's Bay Company had, for all

Inuk with fur pelts at Hudson Bay post, 1951.

intents and purposes, entrenched rights and powerful connections; also, for any government to stray from the path of laissez-faire capitalism ran the danger, in those days, of strong and adverse criticisms from the Canadian business community.

Nevertheless, Canadian officials were in a quandry. Something had to be done. The unscrupulous practices of the venerable Company appeared quite widespread, to the detriment of the Inuit. To be sure, there may have been "smart" Inuit, particularly in the Western Arctic in and around Aklavik, who had amassed some money and indulged in a comfortable life-style, but they were the exception. All the adverse reports Ottawa received could not be based solely on a "Paternalistic desire to protect the Inuit"[26] and a singular misunderstanding of what a fair and reasonable profit meant. But the exploitation was patent.

> Avanna, a south Victoria Land native, made a catch of one hundred white foxes and purchased from the Hudson's Bay Company at Bernard Harbour a second Land canoe for which he had to pay fifty fox skins, the market value of the skins would, at the time, be around $41.00 each and the canoe was of the type sold to Mackenzie Delta natives at $75.00
>
> The following prices for commodities sold to the natives of the islands and in coronation Gulf, where the Hudson's Bay Company has to meet practically no competition, are reported as follows:
>
> "One fox skin for 7 lbs. Rolled Oats
> Two fox skins for 50 lbs. Flour
> One fox skin for 1 lb. of Tobacco.
> One fox skin for 60 and sometimes only 40 rounds of ammunition
> One fox skin for 1 cup full of lead."[27]

The government was also of the opinion that Baffin land Inuit had been "reduced to a state of peonage" by the Company and cited a number of unsavoury practices, including questionable hiring procedures between an Inuit and the trading operation:

HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY
HIRING CONTRACT
Capacity .....Hunter

I, Oo-took-oo-too, of Ponds Inlet, Baffinland, do hereby agree on this 11th day of August, 1924, to faithfully serve the Hudson's Bay Company in the capacity of hunter and in such other capacity as the said Company shall appoint for the term of Five years, to be computed from the 11th day of August, 1924.

I do also hereby agree not to engage in any other employment whatsoever, than that of the said Company, for the said term of Five years and to deliver my entire hunt of first to the said Company for the said time of Five years.

In compensation for the above mentioned services the Hudson's Bay Company agrees to pay me twenty ($20.00) dollars per annum and also to pay me for my aforementioned annual hunt turned over to them at the prices allowed Eskimo hunters by the said Company.

In witness whereof these Presents have been executed at Pond Inlet, Baffinland, on this eleventh day of August, 1924.

Witness Akoomalik	His X Mark	Oo-took-oo-too	His X Mark
Witness Toopingna	His X Mark	Sgd. W.C. Parsons (name of Employee) for the H.G. Company[28]	

On this occasion, as in later cases, the Company had its version of the alleged charges and acquitted itself well in defending its practices. Obviously it was irate that its integrity had been questioned, adding that "the company's strongest argument is the history of its dealings with them [native races] through more than 250 years and it would be strange indeed if the Company should prove false to its history, traditions, and principles."[29] Not really concerned by this display of outrage, Canadian officials remained wary of the Company and its practices, and their communiqués and incessant inquiries served notice on the Hudson's Bay Company that its practices and dealings with the Inuit were being watched closely. Now and then, government officials would raise the spectre of the government of Canada entering the trading arena, on a monopoly basis in the Arctic much like the case in Greenland, or like the limited government intervention in Alaska.[30] How serious the Canadian government may have been is debatable, but it was determined to influence the Company's activities, even if it had to drag out from time to time this veiled threat or bogey man.

When informed, shortly after the game reserves were established in the Northwest Territories, that only Indians, Inuit and half-breeds would be allowed "to hunt, trade or traffic" in these areas and that "no trading post should be established or maintained in any part of the Northwest Territories without a special permit,"[31] the Company took great exception. Arguing that the Company had the interests of the natives and wild life at heart, its fur trade commissioner could not

accept such proposals, as they would "seriously interfere with our trade and trading rights."[32] The government was not prepared to push too hard and was willing to allow the maintenance of posts already established in the preserve,[33] but it would not be cowed, confident it possessed the "absolute" power should it be necessary, "to legally forbid traders in the Northwest Territories to deal with the natives and that we might establish a Government protectorate similar to that in Greenland...."[34] This was duly communicated to the perturbed and blustery party. Despite apparently overzealous attempts to "pin" something on the Company, especially by the frustrated police, Department of the Interior investigations in the 1930s indicated that charges of extortion and exploitation, at least, were either unfounded or on shaky grounds. It appeared that the Company had regulated its northern operations.[35] To determine whether the H.B.C. had always been scrupulous in its dealings with the Inuit or whether government pressure and scrutiny had frightened the Company of Merchant Adventurers and forced it to change its practices, would entail another type of historical analysis and is beyond this paper's purpose.

The government had more on its mind regarding the Inuit than the alleged practices of the H.B.C. Equal, perhaps more pressing for Canada's northern operational policy, were other problems confronting the Inuit during the interwar years. Yet even on other fronts, government officals were handicapped, partly by the uncertain status

of the Inuit which gave little room to manoeuvre, and partly by the onset of the Depression, which consumed Ottawa's energies further south and ended Finnie and his brand of care and zeal.

Relief

Of immediate concern as the 1920s gave way to the Depression was the problem of relief for destitute Inuit. Traditionally, relief was extended to widows, the old and orphans. In the Eastern Arctic the situation appeared very severe. The problem arose not so much out of responsibility but out of a standardization of relief issue. Suggestions had been made regarding a set scale for relief items,[36] but it was found that each case required discretionary action by the person in charge. While accounting procedures might be simplified, individual circumstances had to be taken into account.[37] Whether equity was guaranteed was another matter. During the 1930-31 season, for instance, two Povungnituk widows with no other support were each supplied by Révillon Frères with differing quantities and articles:[38]

Napatok		Shoodloak
97 lbs.	Flour	62 lbs.
10 1/2 lbs.	Tea	6 lbs.
1 1/2 lbs.	Baking Powder	1/2 lb.
11 lbs.	Sugar	5 lbs.
24 boxes	Matches	11 boxes
2 bags	Salt	--------
3 gallons	Gasoline	4 3/4 gallons
6	Fish Hooks	--------
1 Pkt	Sharps N.	--------
1 lb.	Lard	5 lbs.
1/2 gallon	Coal Oil	--------
---------	Saccharine	1 bottle

For those not considered in such dire circumstances it had been the established policy of the Northwest Territories branch since mid-1928 to encourage Inuit "to rely upon native foods rather than those of the white man."[39] Such rations as milk, butter, bacon and patent medicines were considered luxuries and were not issued as relief items, except for infants. This was in agreement with Dr. Frederick Banting's recommendations after his tour of the Eastern Arctic in 1928, "when he said 'keep the native, native!"[40] In early 1933, the 40th session of the N.W.T. Council, after studying the question of relief distribution, decided in order of priority who should issue relief on behalf of the government. First, the doctor or medical agent; if no such individual existed in a district -- as in the Eastern Arctic where the only doctor was at Pangnirtung -- then the responsibility fell to the officer in charge of the local R.C.M.P. detachment; in the absence of either a doctor or police officer then a relief officer designated by the Department of the Interior, usually a missionary or trader. All were informed that the greatest economy was to be practiced and whenever possible ammunition was to be used in lieu of food and clothing. Also that congregating or loitering at the trading posts was absolutely prohibited. The trading post officials were instructed by their district managers to encourage and teach the natives to provide for themselves and families and not to depend upon the trade stores for support. District managers were informed that where no trading competition existed, the post managers would be expected to provide whatever relief was necessary without the expectation of being reimbursed by the department.

As well, consideration was given to continuing the issuance of dried buffalo meat as a suitable relief ration, although the Inuit food preferences of raw meat, fish and canned goods made this a less-than-popular item. The dried buffalo meat was taken north annually and was made from "old bulls and barren cows, which the National Parks Branch considers partially worthless commercially."[41] Twenty years later, supplementary meat rations had not improved. During the winter of 1953-54, the government considered issuing frozen reindeer heads (without the commercially valuable tongues) as a regular relief ration.[42]

In 1937, mission "industrial homes" were opened at Chesterfield and Pangnirtung to take care of the aged, infirm, or chronic cripples. It was a humanitarian gesture welcomed and supported financially by Ottawa at $200 per inmate; in addition, the homes were designed to relieve physically fit Inuit to carry on their hunting and "the issue of relief would be reduced to a minimum." Thought was given to the establishment of similar homes in the Northwest Territories, in the Coronation and Queen Maud Gulf areas, but the government demurred in this instance until the Supreme Court decided on the status of the Inuit.[44] Nevertheless, the government was anxious for others to take on the burden. Certainly, both missions and traders received compensation for the activity of relief, but the government, as the evidence suggests, wished to keep costs to the minimum. The drain on the public purse and the "spoiling" of the Inuit, according to the government officals, was attributed partly to the uncertain fur cycle,

but also to the centralization of relief at mission and trading posts. In the eyes of "old timers" in the North, missionaries encouraged the Inuit to come to the posts rather than going out among them, the result being that the natives abandoned fur trapping; this made them dependent on relief and raised the costs of hospitalization.[45] Once the H.B.C. had absorbed its Eastern Arctic rival, Révillon Frères, there was some comfort gained that relief costs for the government had fallen off as "competition in 'charity' disappeared."[46] By the terms of the Northwest Games Act, reimbursement to a trading concern could only be expected if a rival post existed; otherwise, where no competition existed, post managers were expected to provide the necessary relief without government compensation. In this, the onus of the cost was put on the fur trade and the bureaucrats were relieved of being scrutinized by members of Parliament who, theoretically, might question their spending.

In the Western Arctic, which had an ailing economic base, less effort and expense was put into actual relief, as faith was placed in an experiment more positive in nature. The Mackenzie delta, in particular, was endowed with richer food resources, including muskrats, fish, white whales, ducks and geese in the summer, and seals off shore; even the caribou appeared to be returning. This region would have appeared an absolute paradise to the suffering Inuit of the Central and Eastern Arctic. In the Western Arctic, one of the central recommendations of the Reindeer and Musk-Ox Commission was implemented to "reduce further dependence by the natives upon the white man for a

living."[47] The royal commission had recommended in 1922 the establishment of reindeer herds in northern regions which could support such an enterprise. Feasibility studies were begun in the spring of 1926 under an experienced arctic biologist, A.E. Porsild. Porsild studied the successful reindeer operation in Alaska begun in the 1890s and then traversed the area between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers and between Great Bear Lake and the Arctic Ocean. Two years later he concluded that the country examined could support upwards of 500,000 reindeer.[48] The government, anxious to avoid a repeat of the disastrous and poorly conceived Hudson's Bay Reindeer Company promoted by Stefansson on southern Baffin Island,[49] preferred to move slowly but firmly. In the spring of 1929 the Canadian government purchased a herd from Lomen Brothers of Alaska, and by 1935 a herd of 2370 animals finally reached the newly constructed reindeer station near Kittigazuit in the eastern Mackenzie delta.[50] It was hoped that under tutelage, first by Lapp and Alaskan herders that had accompanied the drive, the Inuit would eventually take over; but that would take some time. Upon delivery of the herd, local Inuit in Aklavik wondered why the herd had not been turned over to them immediately for their use, but it was considered politic to retain government supervision for the time being; otherwise the Inuit would deplete the herd "and expect that more animals would be obtained in the same way.... The idea of always having fresh meat available and also for clothing, appeals strongly to the Eskimos, but he is like the Indian in that he does not see the need for providing

for his future."[51] Inuit apprentices would be hired and trained with a view to taking over the ownership of the herd, but for the time being "the time is hardly ripe to experiment in that direction."[52]

Despite experiments like this--too few indeed--Eskimo relief and attendant starvation continued to dog government officials throughout the 1940s. The government was convinced that the best type of relief for the Inuit in the Eastern Arctic was regular rations of ammunition.[53] Such a policy might have worked were not for the vagaries and caprice of weather conditions from year to year and the cyclical nature of the game. Traders and bureaucrats tended to hope that "next year" would always be better,[54] but much was left to providence rather than planning. The H.B.C. instructed its post managers, "by all means at their disposal," to encourage a credit or banking system "so that excess prosperity ... may be carried over, thereby preventing unnecessary suffering ... next year."[55] No plan existed, however, to cope with a succession of bad hunting seasons or hard winters.

By the end of 1942, with war raging in Europe and in the Pacific, the Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs could claim some control over relief expenditures, aside from the policy of parsimony. Separate cards were kept for each individual who received a relief, according to the settlement or post. "It will be noted that in the N.W.T. where relief issues are controlled by medical officers and R.C.M. Police the costs average 73 cents per head for destitute

whites, Inuit and half-breeds whereas in Eskimo territory of northern Quebec where there is no supervision the costs run to $13.17 per head."[56] The costs were higher in northern Quebec partly because there were no hospitals, residential schools or industrial homes, except at Fort George where an Indian population predominated.[57] Total relief expenditures for Quebec Inuit took a welcome nose dive by mid-1943, from $22 510 (1941-42) to $5287.93 (1942-43). The decline was due mainly to a high fur cycle and high fur prices, the transfer of natives to more productive areas, and, most important, but nevertheless a mixed blessing for the future of the Inuit, their employment on joint defence projects carried out mainly by the United States Army.[58]

The war was a period of opening up for the North and, for the government and especially the H.B.C., the onset of severe criticism by U.S. Army personnel and newspaper reporters over deplorable conditions amongst the Inuit. The H.B.C. reacted in a cavalier fashion, dismissing charges of exploitation as

> a weakness of many temporary visitors to the North [who] make sweeping and general criticism and comments, which do not hold water when they are put up against the test of plain facts ... I think we all recognize that the present defence activities in the North will have some repercussions upon the Eskimos, and not many to their advantage, and no matter how well intentioned these critics may be, most of whom are seeing the North for the first time, it would be too much to expect them to understand the Eskimos and their characteristics, and govern themselves accordingly.

> ... May I say that we are probably just as qualified to express opinions upon the conditions and circumstances of negroes and sharecroppers in the Southern States as are these casual visitors in expressing their opinions concerning the Eskimos in the North.[59]

The government was assured that no effort would be spared by the H.B.C. to "bring about some sensible degree of stabilization in the single economy of the natives...."[60] Nevertheless, because the government looked askance at the relief practices of the H.B.C., which appear to have kept the Inuit on the edge of subsistence and thus open to public criticism, the H.B.C. directed its district and post managers in July 1944:

> that in regard to relief measures nothing should be done which could in any way undermine the natives' self-reliance and initiative. However, a too literal interpretation of this objective has, I know, often resulted in a procedure being followed which merely amounted to supplying such meagre ration that it was all the native could do to keep body and soul together. Such a parsimonious and short-sighted attitude can only defeat the main objective, namely that of maintaining the native's self-reliance and initiative, because anybody so undernourished suffers in health to such an extent that they lose initiative and ability to make a living for themselves. Doubtless a great deal of sickness and epidemics which result from under-nourishment could be avoided if a more humane and common-sense attitude was used in looking after the native basic life necessities during poor times.[61]

One problem which seemed to plague both the government and the Company during the 1940s was that of the so-called "Non-Producers," those able-bodied Inuit who were not hunters. This category of male Inuit

was considered as "lazy" and any relief given to them "should be of a character, while nourishing, does not encourage them to get along on relief rations ... these lazy people should be required to do menial tasks in return for the allowance."[62] The term "lazy" was a charitable one when compared to their being called, locally at least, "flunkies" and "bum boys."[64] Later they would be referred to, politely and for official reasons obviously, as "camp assistants" and "inefficient trappers." The Company argued that it should not be responsible for their well-being, but in 1941 the matter was left in the air.[62] The H.B.C., which at some posts had been keeping track of individual Inuit hunting prowess, wanted a system of relief based upon a distinction between efficient and inefficient hunters and distribution of relief and grub-stakes accordingly. The Company's view, in northern Quebec at least, of government relief policy was rather low; relief should be avoided at all cost:

> We believe that the government, in its present policy of giving the natives what they themselves cannot afford, is undermining their morale. The natives are being forced to accustom themselves to a standard of living that their economic system cannot support. Natives in this locality are becoming more concerned with the questions: "How can I get relief?", rather than working harder to make their own way. We believe that the present policy is making "bums" out the majority of these natives. No person can keep his self-respect when the attitude is: "The more I get for nothing, the better."
>
> We hope that our criticisms will be taken in the spirit with which they are given. Our concern is for the natives. We would like to see them the strong, upright, hard-working, independent and prideful people they were before the white man

> brought his "blessings of civilization" to them. To approach that goal, the native must be made to stand on his own feet, and it is our personal idea that the present policy of too much help is killing him with kindness.[65]

The government, never known for its generosity in such matters, acknowledged that a problem existed and moved to partly relieve the trading companies of relief responsibilities. In early 1949, the government undertook to pay the relief costs of Inuit formally designated "Inefficient Trappers" by the traders and the locally responsible government officials; only those natives whose average catch over the past five years was fewer than ten foxes per year would be categorized thusly.[66]

The old policy of keeping the native native had not worked. Several factors made it impossible to encourage all male Inuit to be hunters and trappers. The relief scheme was one but there were others: the encouragement of trapping for profit did not go hand in hand with, for instance, hunting for meat; traditional skills were lost by many who had no recourse but to remain close to camps and posts. Neither white traders nor government officials were happy with the situation, and the Inuit, who may have had other ideas and aspirations, were at the mercy of forces beyond their control. Besides, no one bothered to ask them if they wished to remain in this predicament, merely hoping for better days.

Government Liquor Policy and the Drinking Problem

If the government's policy to minimize relief was less than successful, the same could be said for its policy to discourage the use of alcohol by the Inuit. Alcohol had been a problem since the days of the whalers, at the turn of the century. According to C.E. Whittaker, the presence of the police curtailed the traffic in drink for many years, but by 1930 he was thoroughly alarmed that the problem had raised its head again in the area around Aklavik, and "the good work of a generation will slide back into a morass."[67] The murky status of the Inuit was partially responsible. During the 1920s, supplying intoxicants to the Inuit was thought to contravene section 135 of the Indian Act, but the Inuit, although under the jurisdiction of the Indian Affairs Department, were not considered part of the Indian Act per se.[68]

The Northwest Territories Council recognized this dilemma late in 1929, admitting that since Inuit had the same status as white men in the Territories, they were free to acquire liquor permits. Nevertheless, "Council felt it was not in the best interests of the Eskimo to issue liquor permits to them, but that any Eskimo who had established a permanent place of residence in the Territories could not very well be refused the privilege of buying liquor in his own right."[69] It appears, though, that all responsible white parties refused to issue permits to Inuit or cancelled them if Inuit slipped through the net.[70] As long as the Inuit were not aware of their

legal status as ordinary citizens, the government (ironically, given its obsession with an application of the king's law to Inuit) would keep them in the dark. This was a mixed blessing, for such a strict policy unwittingly encouraged other -- sometimes more dangerous -- forms of alcohol abuse. There were alarming indicators, for example, that there was a rise in the consumption of denatured alcohol and methylhydrate, commonly called "canned heat," mixed sometimes with condensed milk.[71] In reaction, the Northwest Territories Council, in 1934, warned trading companies that their operating permits could be cancelled if such articles were sold "for beverage purposes."[72] The language appeared strong, but what trader would admit that he sold these items for other than use in primus stoves and the like?

Even more difficult to control was the consumption or transformation of patent medicine, toilet water and lotions, especially when the Department of Pensions and National Health, responsible for the acceptance and registration of such mixtures, refused to act. Listerine, for example, was in "unusual demand" in the Northwest Territories and certainly not for social or hygenic reasons. It was found to contain 25 per cent alcohol by volume, but as a patent medicine, duly approved, little could be done.[73] Perry-Davis Painkiller, found to have 88.1 per cent "proof spirit," was another popular item.[74] When the commissioner of Dominion lands, Lorne Hume, wished more information on the subject, he was informed by the Department of Pensions and National Health, in normal bureaucratese, that "under the Proprietary or Patent Medicine Act the ingredients

were strictly confidential." Notwithstanding, "no medicine containing alcohol in excess of 2 1/2% by volume is granted registration under the said law unless it has been approved by an Advisory Board...as containing sufficient medication [e.g., an emetic] to prevent its use as an alcoholic beverage. Perry-Davis Painkiller has been so approved."[75] Really, little could be done except to caution the traders to be observant and on their best behaviour when selling such products. They could be given the absolute prohibition of selling to Inuit any preparation with alcoholic content,[76] but this was considered too drastic and unfair and "might tend toward a feeling of inferiority by the Eskimos as compared with white men.... At present many white residents of the Territories enjoying liquor permit privileges are not as good citizens as large numbers of the Eskimos."[77] It was Ottawa's opinion that, by the mid-1940s at least, the real and serious problem lay with the Indian and half-breed and not the Inuit.[78]

Essentially, little was done except to monitor the situation and to disuade, whenever possible, the consumption of alochol. But the "problem" remained. By the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the practice of making home brew from molasses, malt and hops sold in northern stores increased. The time was approaching when the idea of very tight controls would have to be abandoned, particularly in the Western Arctic. Besides, Inuit living in the province of Quebec could not be brought under territorial liquor laws.[79] L.A.C.O. Hunt, sub-district administrator at Aklavik, did "not consider that stopping

the sale of any commodities stocked by the traders would be an effective remedy as there are so many products which can be used to make home-brew, and stopping the sale of one would simply mean a switch to another." He proposed relaxation of the liquor laws with respect to Indians and Inuit, and at first suggested permits whereby white persons and Indians or Inuit in good standing might be allowed to make home-brew legally." In other words, for the Territories at least, the liquor regulations should be relaxed and "given priority consideration."[80]

"An Ordinance to Provide for the Control and Sale of Liquor in the Northwest Territories" was enacted and passed, 27 January 1955, by the commissioner of the N.W.T., with the advice and consent of his council.[81] Inuit were not to be issued permits except in the following cases:

> (a) the illegitimate child of a female Eskimo who has applied to the Commissioner and obtained an Order declaring him not to be an Eskimo;
>
> (b) the Eskimo wife of a person other than an Eskimo; and
>
> (c) an Eskimo who has applied for a permit and who, for eighteen months immediately preceeding his application, has earned his livelihood chiefly by means other than hunting and trapping and in other respects has ceased permanently to follow the Eskimo mode of life.[82]

The idea of having to declare oneself a bastard, however, was seen as repugnant and embarrassing to the party concerned and could lay the government open to criticism "as an offence to good taste."[83]

Just as important, it would appear, were the continuing number of deaths due to alcohol poisoning. In August 1955 three Inuit poisoned themselves at Tuktoyaktuk by "drinking two bottles of Listerine followed by two small bottles of perfume" and methyl alcohol.[84] Drunk but alive Inuit consuming safe alcohol was, no doubt, preferable to dead Inuit consuming who knew what. By the winter of 1958-59, full liquor privileges were granted to Inuit of the Northwest Territories.[85] The prohibition reins were loosened, partly because there was no other answer and partly because there was a glimmer of enlightenment on the part of a responsible, yet still colonial, administration. As the chief of the arctic division, Ben Sivetz suggested in 1955:

> it is sometimes said that primitive people are like children. This is true in certain respects but it is not the whole story by any means. Adults among primitive people are not children. Their general patterns of behaviour are adult. Given proper motivation and opportunity to learn, their progress can be very rapid. Legislation which regards them as juvenile or incompetent denies them the opportunity to learn by the exercise of responsibility and probably creates resentments which express themselves in rebellious and challenging acts. Probably much of the illegal drinking among the native people of Canada results from attempts at repression.[86]

Early Educational Policies

An enlightened attitude, coupled with a deeper sense of responsibility and the ever-present issue of sovereignty, was to influence government education policy. A growing awareness emerged in the 1940s, but caution, reticence and parsimony were still active ingredients. Before World War II, lip service was paid to educating -- or rather, providing education for -- the Inuit. It was simpler to let others do it: Anglican and Roman Catholic missions, from the 1890s and into the first quarter of the twentieth century, had spread across the Arctic (The Moravians of Labrador had been on the scene since the 1770s).

Early in the twentieth century it was recognized that the Inuit had the potential to become excellent workers, but there had to be something "in sight in that far northern country to justify expenditure" beyond relief measures and the prevention of starvation.[87] When the Reverend E.J. Peck requested support for his mission school on Blacklead Island in Baffinland in 1909, he was informed that for the time being "it is not the intention of the government to assist in educational work amongst these people."[88] The foremost concern of the missionary, generally speaking, was the teaching of Christianity and the conversion of the "pagan" Inuit. In the Eastern Arctic, the New Testament, along with other hymn and prayer books, was translated into Inuktitut by Reverend Peck,[89] who adapted and taught the syllabic form of writing first devised for the Plains Cree by James Evans in the 1830s. In the Western Arctic, Roman script would be used.

Continued missionary requests for financial aid in education did bear some fruit. By 1915-1916 the Department of Indian Affairs was providing a grant of $400 per year for a teacher's salary and $100 a year towards the renting of a building at Herschel Island for the Inuit there.[90] Between 1918 and 1923 that department had spent about $4000 per year for the education of Inuit children in mission schools.[91] Throughout the 1920s monies were devoted to Inuit education (through Finnie's proddings), but scarcely enough. In 1930-31, $12 787.50 was divided among eight mission schools in the North. As Diamond Jenness observed, such subsidies "could hardly be termed manifest, especially when the churches were operating their arctic missions on shoestrings and possessed no funds of their own for educational purposes. Their first task ... was to teach the Eskimos Christianity, not to instruct them in regular school subjects ... Inevitably, then, the secular education that the missionaries imparted to the Eskimo children was commensurate with the funds that the government expended on it. In other words, it was negligible."[93] From the government's point of view, admittedly coloured by the missionaries' perceptions and reports, there seemed little reason to do more. Again, it was a question of keeping the native native. Why give Inuit children a white-oriented education when, for the foreseeable future, they would just be fur-trappers. Besides, "their mental capacity to assimilate academic training is limited."[93]

When two Inuit lads were brought south by missionaries in 1928 to the exclusive Lakefield School in Peterborough, of all places, the government appeared displeased with the scheme and the surrounding

B. Porsild entertaining children at Aklavik mission, 1928.

"cute" publicity.[94] The experiment ended in failure as both youngsters, although academically promising, succumbed to repeated bouts of colds, flu and head infections and were forced to return to the North.[95] The government strongly agreed with the Reverend A.L. Fleming, the Anglican archdeacon of the Arctic, that the Inuit should be left to lead a natural life and not confined or sent to boarding schools of any sort:

> My feeling about the boarding school question is simply this. For a period of years at any rate the Eskimo in the Far North are not likely, as far as I can judge, to suddenly change their nomadic habits... If this be the case, then as far as I can judge the boarding schools would serve to make him a less successful hunter... and therefore would be less able to earn his livelihood in the winter. Further as a result of these years in a boarding school, he would adopt the white man's ways, and become used to the white man's food. When therefore his school years were over, he would have a strong hankering after the white man's ways and food, and I believe would tend to become inefficient from the point of view of a citizen dwelling in the far North.
>
> How can the Eskimo children be educated without destroying those habits so necessary to them as nomads? Either they can be taken into boarding schools and speedily educated, but in the process they will become less fit to continue the nomadic life of today; or if the nomadic life is not seriously interfered with, the education of the children must be of necessity somewhat slower.[96]

This position was certainly in startling contrast to Alaska and Greenland where, although caution had not been thrown to the wind, there were distinct and enlightened government educational policies. In Alaska, all schools were operated by the United States Bureau of

Education: missions, apparently, were no longer permitted to operate private schools for natives. All villages of a "certain minimum number" of children were provided with a teacher, usually white, and a schoolhouse. In Greenland, all schools were operated by the government. Following public school, native students of exceptional ability, or those unsuited for the life of hunters and fisherman, were encouraged to go to high school or normal school; all teachers were natives. Canadian government officials were well aware of these successes but felt that the Inuit of the N.W.T. "are not yet sufficiently advanced for the 'white man's system of education'."[97] This view seems to beg the question of when they would ever be ready unless some concerted action were initiated. The time never seemed right. Education was left to the missionary, with some government financial support.[98]

Regarding native orphan white children who were being maintained in residential schools at the expense of the Department of the Interior, their training

> should be limited very much to the original 'Three R's', and manual training ... These children, whether boys and girls, are going to live out their lives in the country. It is, therefore, necessary that everything possible should be done to avoid having the boys over-educated in a scholastic way, particularly if this is to be at the expense of their ability to make a living off hunting, trapping and fishing.[99]

In effect, very little would change in educational policy until World War II, and some of the prods came from outside Canada. W.L. McKeand, the man in charge of the Eastern Arctic patrol and R.A. Gibson's right-hand man, felt that the publicity given in Canada to the Alaskan Eskimos[100] could be matched by similar stories of success by Canada's Inuit. "We have splendid motor mechanics, watch repairers, gunsmiths, etc., among the Eskimos and of course Labrador has the only Eskimo brass band n the world."[101] But McKeand, always sympathetic towards the Inuit and their future, acknowledged that their education could no longer be retarded. Before long, the Canadian government faced severe and embarrassing criticism from United States forces and civilians involved in the various defence projects in the Eastern Arctic. "Why has nothing been done to educate the Eskimos.... Why have the traders been allowed to exploit the Eskimos?"[102] For foreign representatives to criticize their hosts -- in this case Canada -- was considered a serious breach of diplomatic protocol. The U.S. military attaché in Ottawa, Colonel Graling, was given a polite and unofficial warning by Gibson who explained the problems in northern native education as a factor of the Depression followed by the exigencies of war. Nevertheless, to avert future criticisms Gibson privately told McKeand that Canada should pick up the pace of "any arrangements that could be consummated even under existing conditions."[103]

The problem went deeper, however. Fundamentally, the view that it would take generations to educate the primitive Inuit properly had to change. Political masters in Ottawa had to realize that the

stereotype of Canada's Inuit, their mental capabilities and their place in the fabric of Canada, and of its northern regions, could not stand up to close examination. Nowhere was this truer than in the Mackenzie delta area, where many Inuit in the early 1940s were chafing, near seething, under restrictions and regulations which retarded their advancement. In terms of conspicuous wealth, portions of the Western Arctic were a veritable paradise compared to its eastern counterpart.

> The majority of them are derived from the Alaskan natives brough to Herschel Island and Baillie Island by the whalers about fifty years ago....Some have white blood, others have none. All have the cultural background of Eskimos and the genetical mixture of the successful individuals is no different from that of their less enterprising neighbours...all of the "successful" group are educated. Mostly they were educated through contact with friendly white people, without formal schooling....These people have actually achieved the material success and adjustment in the modern world towards which we are supposed to be leading all Eskimos. The attainment of success might well be expected to bring social rewards over and above worldly goods just as it does with the white man, and it is the desires that their money cannot gratify that are at the root of their complaints. One of the most universal desires of prosperous people everywhere is that their children should have the cultural opportunities that they themselves were unable to have. Some of the older Eskimos who had no formal education see with dismay that their children are learning no more or even less at school than they themselves were able to pick up in their youth and at the same time are losing interest in Husky culture. They are substituting squeaky phonographs for the Husky [Inuit] drums of their fathers, but at the same time they cannot run an engine as well as their fathers, and often cannot speak English as well. Many well-to-do Eskimos would readily abandon the present free schooling available to their children if they could obtain better at their own expense.[104]

This demand for education was to be paralleled in the Eastern Arctic a few years later[105] and anticipated a wide-ranging evaluation of education facilities in the Eastern Arctic prepared in late 1948 for the Northwest Territories administration.[106] The "Report on Educational Facilities in the Eastern Arctic" cited the general inadequacies of the present system -- including the spotty and ineffectual education imparted by the missions, the acknowledged intelligence of the Inuit, and the growing pace of change in a region entering the Cold War era -- and recommended a sound educational policy under federal auspise: experimental day schools operating year round in addition to seasonal day schools, which were seen as the most satisfactory answer to the Inuit way of life; qualified teachers to serve as nurses' companions; instruction in the English language and the eradication of syllabic writing, considered then, and later, as a psychological impediment; health instruction, elementary science, handicraft industries and the collection and printing of Inuit folklore; first class teachers who would be considered "welfare teachers," (that is, teacher and social worker).[107]

By the late 1940s the federal government itself embarked upon a long range but understandably cautious programme to provide northern education for both whites and natives, with federal schools being established at Tuktoyaktuk (1948), Aklavik and Coppermine (1951), Lake Harbour and Coral Harbour (1949), Cape Dorset and Chesterfield Inlet (1951), Fort Chimo (1949) and Port Harrison (1951). By 1951, out of 8646 Inuit, there were 288 children attending federal schools

full-time in the Northwest Territories and northern Quebec, compared to approximately 600 Inuit children attending the missionary schools that dotted the Arctic.[109] Still the debate existed as to just how and to what degree the Inuit should be educated. The government's official policy--getting them back to the land to hunt, remain self-sufficent and independent--was still in force in the early 1950s;[110] but the idea of keeping the native native would ultimately lead to cross-purposes, confusion and a painful period of adjustment for both parties. Because of decades of what at times could be termed scandalous medical neglect, priority was given in these early postwar years to intense instruction in "healthful living."[111]

Health Care Policy Before and After World War II

In the fall of 1938, the Canadian Resources Bulletin, a government weekly, proudly announced that the Eskimos of Canada were in good health, as a result of care provided by government doctors and nurses supported by the extensive activities of the Eastern Arctic patrol inaugurated in 1922. "Instances of heart disease, and various forms of tubercular disease among the natives ... are less frequent than among whites."[112] The basis of this official report was a general medical survey of Eastern Arctic Inuit conducted by Dr. Keith F. Rogers during the summer of 1938. Yet, if one examines Rogers' reports, one discerns a gap between what he actually reported and what the government wished to convey. As this was Rogers' first trip to the Arctic, he made clear in his report that his observations were opinion

only and based largely on conjecture, especially his views on the prevalence of tuberculosis. In fact, he acknowledged in his report to Ottawa that:

> (a) In order to make an accurate diagnosis of early pulmonary tuberculosis, an X-Ray is an essential -- this must be taken properly, and must be interpreted by one who has had special training, and experience, in disease of the lungs.
>
> (b) Neither the hospital at Chesterfield, nor the one at Pangnirtung, are at present equipped to make a proper survey of lung conditions among the Eskimos, or to do so in a manner which would enable one to decide definitely just how prevalent pulomary tuberculosis is among the natives.
>
> (c) No X-Ray study of the lungs of Eskimos is available at present.[113]

Despite the glowing medical reports that emanated from the North during the 1920s and 1930s and found their way to departmental annual reports and bulletins,[114] the health and care of the Inuit, particularly in the Eastern Arctic, was in shambles. Policy was virtually non-existent, and a "band-aid" approach had been adopted. D.L. McKeand, R.A. Gibson's right hand man in policy matters, who had been in charge of the Eastern Arctic patrol since 1932, considered in 1938 that northern medical services were unsatisfactory. "Since the patrol was inaugurated in 1922 ... there have been no less than thirteen different Doctors serving as Medical Officers with the partrol. Consequently, there have been wide differences of opinion on medical questions, glaring evidences of inexperience, no continuity of

service, no research, and, therefore, the cause of at least seventy deaths in Southern Baffin Island alone remains unsolved." Lack of continuity alone made it impossible to establish a coherent medical programme. Doctors were unwilling to serve on long-term basis, and in 1936 McKeand's office had been reduced to telephoning boys' summer camps for a doctor--any doctor.[115] Lack of northern experience and specific expertise meant, for example, that a debate ensued in the 1930s as to whether T.B. was rampant in the Eastern Arctic or whether the Inuit merely had serious colds or chronic bronchitis. Because of such divisions, and probably because of lack of funding, a proposed conference of doctors dealing with the question of T.B. in the North was postponed year after year and apparently never took place.

Also, in terms of general treatment of ailments, it was very difficult to convince the Inuit of the advantages of the white man's healing powers. According to Dr. J.E. Bildfell, who reported on the medical conditions in the Eastern Arctic in 1934, trying to convince the Inuit of the efficacies of southern health techniques was a "herculanean task from a white man's perspective."[116] After retracing, in a bad, amateurish anthropological and psychological analysis, the evaluation of the native from his present state of "Tea and Biscuit servitude" and "the present happy state of mental inertia," Bildfell described his futile efforts to win over the Inuit. His views reveal as much about himself as about the Inuit;

The practice of Medicine among the "Inuit" is as interesting as it is difficult. The interest is the same as is always associated with the extraordinary, but the difficulty is more in keeping with the ordinary. Something of the same type of difficulty ... better perhaps disappointment, which a salesman encounters when a prospective customer slams the door in his face, or else that of a missionary who is sure that he has the correct solution to the salvation of the soul, but finds that his impatient listeners turn away unimpressed....Medical benefits like Christian benefits, are largely invisible. As is known, Medical results are seldom dramatic and startling. The natives expect them to be. The only way to convince the native is by way of the eyes. Hence the Doctor, is early compelled to throw off his scientific cloak, and disguise himself as salesman, and missionary.... the natives seldom present themselves for treatment, until disease processes are well advanced. The only exceptions to this are such minor ailments, as constipation which they know the white man can remedy intelligently, minor wounds and abrasions. (I might add here that there are some natives - call them more intelligent if you like, who are more under the influence of the white man directly than others. These natives bring all their medical troubles to the doctor - big and small). The above are obviously abnormal and are to be taken to the doctor. This of course for two reasons; one being that they are by duty supposed to and the other it encourages the doctor's "good will".... A cut finger should be good for a mug up or perhaps a cigarette. Such ailments as the annual Conjunctivitis or other periodic complications arising out of conditions of climate, are merely tolerated as something which occurs naturally. Sickness is not understood. Pain and discomfort are merely something to be tolerated along with other hardships which they bear without a grumble. Since there is no appeal to reason in these matters, disease advances considerably and is usually not regarded as such until some particular function is disturbed.

...In the native mind, surgical advantages are extremely doubtful. They feel sure that whosoever undergoes an operation necessarily dies. They have mentioned this. Perhaps this is in part a return of the powers they enjoyed in the past, of

> being able to die whenever they seemed to desire. Their lives are intimately wrapped up with a fatalistic outlook and death is relatively a simple matter. But the fact that they are poor surgical risks constitutionally, is not to be denied; this largely because of the prevalence of Tuberculosis among them, and it appears to me that natives although they are up and around, are taxing every bit of energy and resistance they possess; hence they are unable to tolerate any added stress which is necessary for surgical recovery.[117]

In reality, it was the deplorable health conditions of the Eastern Arctic Inuit, duly reported internally year after year since the 1920s[118] but only publicized in the war years, that would spur the government to action. With decent mission hospitals at Aklavik, the plight of Western Arctic Inuit and care of their sick was by comparison never as serious. Besides the suspected high level of T.B., their Eastern Arctic Inuit cousins were suffering from other realities. At Fort Chimo in 1935, approximately 50 per cent had badly decayed teeth, with a number of cases of pyorrhea; there were numerous cases of eye problems, ranging from conjunctivitis to partial and total blindness.[119] Although the reports are illuminating, they make sad reading. The organization of health services, if one can call it that, needed not only an overhaul, but direction, expertise and the continuing presence of qualified personnel. On the eve of World War II, government reliance on others to do the job, though perhaps cost-efficient, had not ameliorated the suffering of the Inuit in Canada's Eastern Arctic:

> In various posts there are two or three individuals more or less attempting to attend to the health needs of the native. To cite the case of Lake Harbour as being fairly representative we have the following state of affairs: the Anglican missionary receives the Government Medical supplies; but according to his own words is not in any way trained nor gifted in the matter of treatment of illnesses, as a consequence our supplies accumulate from year to year in his cupboards. The Hudson's Bay factor administers whatever relief he can with the medical supplies that are issued by his company. The most logical men, the R.C.M.P., to do this work, are not supplied in any form with medical equipment. It has been the experience at this post that whenever surgery has been necessary the R.C.M.P. have been called.
>
> Other posts such as Sugluk, Wolstenholme, Southampton and Dorset have no problem as far as the decision as to who will be responsible for medical aid to the natives in as much as there are no R.C.M.P. or missionaries resident. On the other hand natives at these places are being given whatever attention the post manager can with the Company's supplies that are issued to him. In some cases the work done is excellent, in others, it is grossly inadequate.[120]

The question of establishing medical facilities in Ungava can be considered a good illustration of how slowly the government moved to address the problem. In 1935, Dr. A.L. Richards, special medical investigator for the department, had recommended with some urgency that a competent medical officer be appointed for the area.[121] More than six years would pass before the N.W.T. Council agreed that such an appointment was necessary.[122] Debates in the interim had ranged from money, the fact that the area in question was in Quebec, that the 1939 Supreme Court decision would in all likelihood be appealed, the war, to the shortage of doctors and so on. It was not a matter, one

suspects, of a deliberate stall; just the usual, slow-paced way of doing things. World War II, and its attendant "opening up" of the Eastern Arctic to a host of American defence schemes, would change this.

Still the reports during the war contained tales of human suffering and tragedies under the guise of a smile on the part of the Inuit.[123] According to the Reverend A. Steinmann, in charge of the Roman Catholic mission at Wakeham Bay, the false impressions given to visiting members of the Eastern Arctic patrol regarding the condition of the Inuit bordered on the theatrical. According to Steinmann the real physical conditions were covered up. Instead, "the Chief of the Eastern Arctic Patrol makes a picnic of his inspection. He is installed on a trading ship, and when he arrives at the different posts he sees everything shipshape. The traders must give a good impression to the visitors. Everything is in order; painted, polished, and the Eskimos dressed in the cleanest they can find, even buying new clothing, or, as I have seen with my own eyes, borrowing from the more fortunate some garments that will make them appear less miserable. Why blame them when it is the instruction they have received from the traders? They do what they are told, and what they have seen done. At ship time all must be well-ordered; 'we must save our face,' said the Chief of the Eastern Arctic Patrol" on 4 September 1943.[124]

While such observations were being made, a series of epidemics was sweeping the Eastern Arctic; not unusual, perhaps, as government authorities "had known for twenty years that epidemics of more or less severity followed the visits of ships to government stations and trading posts."[125] In 1941-42 there were three serious epidemics which were partially checked by immediate action on the part of the medical officers using local radio communications. Still, the tragedies continued. During the fall and winter of 1941-42 there were two epidemics running concurrently in and around Pangnirtung--respiratory diseases with a high percentage of lobar pneumonia and influenza or paratyphoid fever. Of the eighty individuals treated, forty-three died; thirty-five of the latter died in camp.[126] The following year an epidemic of cerebro-spinal meningitis hit the Eastern Arctic from Southampton Island to Lake Harbour. The death toll was apparently high; at Cape Dorset alone the mortality rate was 25 per cent amongst the Inuit.[127]

By this time the region was being invaded by U.S. military personnel and doctors who, in their valiant attempts to help, expressed shock and outrage at the health conditions of the Inuit and the medical care extended to them by the government of Canada.

D.L. McKeand, Gibson's principal advisor in such matters, dismissed the U.S. medical officers as "itinerant, inexperienced doctors" with no previous experience with the Inuit and no idea of the financial constraints imposed by government.[128] When an incredulous

Gibson--who should have known better as the responsible bureaucrat--asked, "Am I to understand ... that medical officers at either Pangnirtung or Chesterfield have refused admission to any Eskimos requiring medical treatment because they believe funds were not available to take care of the hospital bills?"[129] McKeand replied in a matter of fact manner: "Certainly. Incurable tubercular Eskimo patients have never been admitted, except under exceptional circumstances. Moreover, when death was imminent from any cause, patients were removed from the hospital to die in tents or snow houses. I doubt if ... the U.S. army doctors temporarily stationed in the Arctic are familiar with these well-known departmental regulations and practices."[130] It was no wonder that American doctors reacted so; if the whole truth had been made public, the Canadian government, already stinging from embarrassment, would have had much to answer for.

For decades the government wished to keep out of the hospital business. Simply put, it was not just a matter of funding but the prevailing notion that government had no business in socialized medicine or anything that smacked of it. But the experiences of the Depression, and the war itself, were fostering a new mood in the country. Canadians would soon expect their government to involve itself more the daily lives of its citizens.

Public aid in the North to hospitals was based on the Hospital Ordinance of the Northwest Territories and subsequent amendments. The commissioner of the Territories had the discretionary authority to

determine the nature and extent of public aid to be given. There were no government hospitals. By 1943 there were eleven hospitals in all the vast Northwest Territories, nine operated and owned by the missions and two by mining companies. Aklavik had two mission hospitals, with a total of seventy-three beds to treat the Inuit, and served an area stretching from the Yukon-Alaska boundary to the gulf of Boothia; there were 1777 Inuit in the district, according to the 1941 census. Chesterfield had a thirty-bed hospital and served 1632 Inuit north of 60°, along the coastal area, the islands in northern Hudson Bay and a section of northwestern Quebec. Baffin Island and the north coast of Quebec including Ungava Bay, with an Inuit population of 1993, was serviced by an eighteen-bed hospital at Pangnirtung. Aid to these hospitals in 1943 included a 40 per cent grant toward the initial costs of construction, exclusive of furnishings, a $2.50 per diem rate for the care of indigent whites, half-breeds and Inuit, a portion of the drugs and medicines, and the services of doctors and registered nurses. Also, $200 per year was allotted for the maintenance of the tiny industrial homes at Chesterfield and Pangnirtung which cared for the aged and infirm who could not be looked after by their own. The government would not, however, contribute towards the purchase of X-ray or other medical equipment.[131] The inadequacy of such arrangements took its toll among the Inuit. Surveys conducted for the years 1937 to 1941 indicated that 85 per cent of Inuit in the Eastern Arctic who had died did so without a doctor in attendance; of the white and Indian population in the region, 37 per cent and 48 per cent respectively.

The death rate from tuberculosis, the big killer among the Indian and Inuit population, was placed at 761 and 314 per 100 000 respectively - compared to 50 per 100 000 for Canada as a whole. The general death rate from all causes for the Inuit was a staggering 1100 per 100 000.[132]

There was still sentiment to let the missions continue their healing. Their staffs worked without remuneration; the missions received large donations from a wide variety of organizations to continue their work; the missionaries were themselves in intimate contact with the native population; "hospitalization is synonymous with the advancement of civilization and Christianity"; federal ownership of hospitals would cost approximately a half million dollars. On the other hand, there were compelling reasons for the government to enter the field vigorously:

> (1) There are two hospitals at Aklavik - one operated by the Anglican and the other by the R.C. Mission. One hospital would suffice for a settlement of this kind but the policy of erecting separate institutions in places where both denominations are represented will probably be continued as long as the hospitals are owned by the Missions.
>
> (2) The doctors do not have the same jurisdiction over the operation of the hospitals as they would if the institutions were Federally owned.
>
> (3) Up to recent years the Missionaries have selected the sites for the hospitals, and also determined the type of building to be erected, the Department having no say as to location, type of construction, design, etc.[133]

One compelling reason for change went unspoken: things were a mess.

Prodded by a series of exposés, epidemics and far-sighted and concerned people like Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, undersecretary of state for external affairs, the government realized that "it is now clear that more radical and fundamental steps will be taken."[134] Throughout 1944, medical officers and the like were asked not only to look after the sick, but to comment on the condition of the Inuit -- which was really already known and had not changed for the better in two decades of observation -- and to proffer suggestions as to how the system should be improved. In many ways, these efforts resulted in the first hard look at what had to be done. Epidemics continued, the most serious being at Eskimo Point-Padlei where diptheria carried off 25 per cent of the Inuit population in 1943-44.[135] The reports received all suggested a revamping of the medical system under government auspices, and the improvement of transportation facilities, particularly by air. In the light of such reports, though the Northwest Territories administration was jealous of its prerogatives, responsibility for the health of the Inuit (as well as of Indians) was transferred to the newly created Department of National Health and Welfare on 1 November 1945.[137] The Department of National Health and Welfare, its budget bolstered, immediately embarked on far-ranging services. As many Inuit as possible, in both sections of the Arctic, were x-rayed and immunized, while those Inuit who desperately needed outside hospital care were removed to the south by boat and plane. Dental, eye and nutritional surveys were intensified.

The war against all the ailments which had plagued the Inuit had begun in earnest. Southern hospitals in western and eastern Canada were filled with Inuit--T.B. patients especially--in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. It is true that for decades northern administrators, including medical officers, R.C.M.P., missionaries and traders, had argued against removing the Inuit from their environs and continued to do so, but the Department of National Health and Welfare felt otherwise. They pointed out that, in cost-effective terms, it was better and cheaper to accommodate Inuit in established southern hospitals under expert care than to embark on massive spending to duplicate facilities; moreover, it was particularly difficult to persuade medical experts to move north. In this, they were correct, for T.B. was battled successfully in the south in the 1950s. There were social costs, however, as Inuit patients, dropped into a strange and bewildering environment, unable to speak the language and cut off from their families, found the change difficult and traumatic. According to a 1962 memo of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources:

> In 1956, 1,600 Eskimos were in hospitals in southern Canada. Now there are only about 350. Many of the 3,000 Eskimos who have been hospitalized over the past six years and who have returned to the north cannot return to their life on the land; many have been unable to adapt to a wage economy and culture (where such an economy and culture existed.) Because all could not be absorbed by existing rehabilitation programs, the inevitable alternative has been relief. Better health services have saved more lives than before, but many of these persons have been left handicapped and depend to a greater or lesser extent on relief for the subsistance.[137]

At least, by war's end, the Inuit and their plight were receiving serious attention, and the pace of government concern and policy quickened appropriately in the next decade. In its wake, new problems and other types of solutions, some misguided, were created. Without entering the debate as to whether the new postwar policy could have been otherwise, one can observe here that there is a price attached to all good things and good intentions.

V

WHITHER THE INUIT? GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE POSTWAR YEARS

The war and the attendant publicity given the North had focused attention on the Inuit problem. A number of connected activities were begun. But for an era which spawned numerous planners of defence and economic policy, there appeared to be little actual, long-range and coordinated policy formation regarding the Inuit. The Eskimo Affairs Committee was not established until 1952. In the interim, civil servants of the Northwest Territories branch struggled manfully and humanely without any real rudder.

To be sure, the North was now considered vital, but much more as a geographical and strategic entity. Its inhabitants took a back seat to what Canadian planners and politicians considered the real crisis: the Cold War and the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. Just as important was the continuing and expanding presence of the United States in the North and the inherent threat to Canada's sovereignty and control in her northern latitudes. To some, this may be an unfair observation, as many bureaucrats and politicians paid more than lip service to protecting and improving the lot of the Inuit.

Yet, Canada's northern priorities were clear. On 19 January 1948, under cabinet authority, the Advisory Committee on Northern Development was established, "to advise the government on questions of

policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for the effective coordination of all government activities in that area."[1] The first meetings of A.C.N.D. in 1948 and 1949 set the tone of concern, calling for "maximum possible Canadian effort" in northern defence efforts with the United States to ensure not only coordination but Canadian presence, "control and a reasonable degree of independence."[2] The "Re-Canadianization of Northern Canada," and "keeping the Canadian Arctic Canadian" were of prime importance.[3] As far as can be determined, the mention of Inuit was never made in the first five meetings of this body. After the fifth meeting of A.C.N.D. in December 1949, the committee became moribund and was not resurrected until 1953, a year after the establishment of the Eskimo Affairs Committee. The A.C.N.D. owed its revival to demands for more complete knowledge of the area, the increase of U.S. pressure for radar networks, and "an apprehension of seeming encroachment upon Canadian sovereignty."[4]

During the period of Canadian anxiety over U.S. activities, roughly from 1942 to 1952 and beyond, the condition of the Inuit had not improved to anyone's satisfaction. In fact, some would argue that their fortunes had declined drastically in the postwar era, which was disconcerting, given their state in the decades before the war and the promise of better things to come after the global conflict. They may have been given the right to vote in federal elections in 1949, but this had not arrested their obvious deterioration. The postwar files

of the R.C.M.P. were replete with instances of privation and hardships amongst the Inuit, reminiscent of earlier days, and R.C.M.P. Inspector H.A. Larsen reported on his northern tour in 1951:

> It is believed the encroachment of civilization is having a detrimental effect on the natives generally, particularly where there has been a large influx of white persons. The natives remark that they are confused with so many white officials governing their lives, that it is extremely difficult to know just what the Government requires of them. It would appear that the natives are becoming more and more dependent on Family Allowances and Relief, congregating in the settlements and in many cases living in dire circumstances. The Eskimo as we knew them a few years ago are quickly disappearing, and in their stead we have a sadly dejected race, undernourished, ill-clad, living in filth and squalor, with no immediate hope of any improvement in conditions.[5]

In late November 1951, the deputy minister of the Department of Resources and Development, H.A. Young, thought the time appropriate to convene a conference of "interested parties" to address the Inuit question, as "relief and family allowances ... is tending to reduce the initiative of the Eskimo in obtaining a living for themselves."[7] The policy of refusing relief to Inuit who did not appear to be making an effort to support themselves and their families had not worked; expenditures in relief had increased from $14 000 in 1946-47 to $112 000 in 1950-51, even though $250 000 had been paid in family allowances in 1950-51.[8] The Inuit's acknowledged inability to cope with relief and family allowances was a chronic problem to be sure, but there were more fundamental aspects that had to be

addressed. A step in that direction came on 19 and 20 May 1952, when a meeting on Inuit affairs was chaired by H.A. Young, commissioner of the Northwest Territories. In all, some fifty-eight persons attended -- from a dozen government departments and agencies, the churches, the Hudson's Bay Company and the U.S. embassy. This meeting became the basis for the establishment of the Eskimo Affairs Committee and an educational sub-committee; its goal was to devise ways in which "Eskimos should be encouraged and helped to live off the land and to follow their traditional way of life."[9] In other words, keep the native native despite the wholesale intrusion of the modern world.

After the first meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee in the fall of 1952, some wide-ranging proposals and programmes were implemented. It had been arranged earlier at the meeting of the sub-committee on Eskimo education that the Inuit should no longer be permitted to remain illiterate, even though their economy might be largely restricted to hunting, fishing and trapping. "They should be furnished with that degree and kind of education which will enable them to live a fuller life in their own environment and at the same time be able to take advantage of opportunities which may arise from the encroachment of outside civilization."[10] Based on the recommendations of this sub-committee, its parent body approved a number of educational initiatives. A new eight-room school at Aklavik was to be built by 1954, and the current two-room day school converted to a manual training centre for Inuit. Promising students from the new school would go on to receive special training to fit them as

teachers, stenographers, clerks and technicians for employment locally or outside the Arctic. At Frobisher, a day school for children and adults and a nursing station would be established to help Inuit learn skills at the airbase. Tent hostels for schools at Chesterfield and Coppermine were approved to enable children of remote parishes to attend school from Easter to the end of August. Instruction in Inuit schools was to be in English, and the use of Roman characters instead of syllabic script encouraged in Inuit writing. Elementary textbooks in English and Roman script were to be prepared; existing southern readers would be the pattern, "but the text and illustrations should agree with the Eskimo scene." To improve the Inuit economy, a revolving Eskimo Loan Fund (initially $40 000) was recommended to assist individuals or groups "to purchase necessary supplies and equipment with which to increase their earning power," or to embark upon any approved project which local traders might not be prepared to support. The handicraft industry was to be continued under the auspices of the Canadian Handicrafts Guild; this meant more than soapstone carving.

Special projects such as boat-building, fishing and eiderdown collecting were approved to widen the native economy. The employment of Inuit at northern centres and air bases on a cash basis would be encouraged, and government agencies and contractors would be requested to use native labour wherever possible, "provided that they and their families do not lose their ability to return to the native way of life ... Rotation of employment and time off for hunting are good

precautions." To ensure that post dependency, relief and overcrowding were discouraged, assistance would be given to Inuit to relocate to areas where local resources (game) would enable them to be self-sufficient.'[11]

In a number of ways these plans were not new, as some had either been considered or begun earlier. Overall responsibility for the well-being of the Inuit, except in matters of health and education, belonged to the arctic services section of the Department of Resources and Development. Its special task was the economic improvement of the Inuit through the fur trade, fisheries, handicraft arts and home industries, and the exploitation, where possible, of other natural resources. Education was in the hands of the education and welfare section of the Department of Mines and Resources, while health was invested in the Department of National Health and Welfare. In general, however, they worked under a major handicap. True, a series of government department and sections along with an advisory board and co-ordinating committee did exist, but to date a coherent policy had not been enunciated for either the North or the Inuit. As the Ottawa Journal asserted in mid-1953, "it is not enough for a modern nation to deal with the problems as they arise, paint a piece of map red and say Canada's territory runs up to the North Pole. There should be imagination and foresight, and, most of all, a public policy Canadians at large can study and approve."'[12] Within government circles, the necessity of a policy statement was acknowledged. To formulate and follow a general policy would be difficult, given the fact that

conditions varied greatly from one point to another in the North and that each case frequently required consideration on its own merits, but the desire for long-range guidelines and fear of public criticism "from people with a very limited knowledge of the north" demanded that such a step be taken.[13]

The upshot was the first major statement by the Canadian government, "Canada and our Eskimos," under the signature of Jean Lesage, minister of the new Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, which was created in December 1953. The carefully worded article, crafted by members of his department, appeared in the Beaver (March 1955) and was tantamount to a policy statement.[14] Lesage acknowledged that the present condition of the Inuit was the result of uncoordinated activities of a number of agencies -- missionaries, traders and government -- and that the latter had in the past administered the North, as Prime Minister St-Laurent had stated in the House of Commons (8 December 1953), "in an almost continuing state of absence of mind." This was about to change:

> The objective of Government policy is relatively easy to define. It is to give the Eskimos the same rights, privileges, opportunities, and responsibilities as all other Canadians, in short, to enable them to share fully the national life of Canada....The task...is to help him adjust his life and his thoughts to all that the encroachment of this new life must mean....The natural food resources of the Arctic are limited and the primitive Eskimo was a part of the balance of nature. As soon as we take measures to provide against starvation, to eradicate tuberculosis, to

> end infant exposure and the elimination of elderly dependents, and to improve health generally, we upset that balance....
>
> It is not enough to cure disease, the cause of disease must be removed and this is largely a matter of education and improvement of economic conditions. Education must be provided, but this depends on good health and the needs of the economy. A sound economy means a diversified economy not based on the white fox alone; but for new occupations, both health and education are required....A new social order is supplanting the primitive life of the Eskimos. In the new order, however, direction is given by the various white men on the scene. The Eskimo inevitably tends to lose initiative individually and collectively in such a regime. It seems obvious that an effort to place the direction of local affairs in the hands of the Eskimo is desirable ... The northern service officers who have recently been appointed in the Arctic Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, are being instructed to encourage the Eskimos to take responsibility for local decisions to as great an extent as possible....It has been asked whether there are not already too many white men issuing orders to the Eskimo and whether the northern service officer will be just one more. The remedy, however, does not lie in confining this kind of authority to one or two, but rather in returning local responsibility and authority to the people. It would be rash to offer a blueprint. It will doubtless be necessary to proceed from trial to revision repeatedly, looking not to the day when the pattern will be set for all time but to the time when revisions will be suggested by the Eskimos.[15]

The process of trial and revision had begun apace by 1955 and with it a change, albeit grudging at times, from a policy of keeping the native native, to one of responsible tutelage and advancement by a still paternalistic government. On-the-spot implementation of this government policy was to be under the watchful eye of the northern

service officer, another custodian, whose "primary responsibility is toward the Eskimo. Considerations of their welfare are to be dominant at all times."[16] Northern service officers, initially six in 1954, were to be located at Aklavik, Coppermine, Coral Harbour, Frobisher Bay, Port Harrison and Fort Chimo. They were to administer government programmes "designed to procure better utilization of the available resources and to improve economic and social conditions; to supervise and develop Eskimo participation in local industries designed to diversify the economic basis of Eskimo life...."[17]

These northern service officers, along with the police, were to be for the 1950s and 1960s the major government representatives, and although there would be instances of confusion, conflicting approaches and sometimes unclear responsibilities, it would be the northern service officers, more and more as the 1950s bore on, who would become the officials with ultimate responsibility for all departmental activities.

In 1954, the R.C.M.P. officers who enforced law and order also performed the following northern duties for other federal departments:

For the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources

(a) The general supervision of Eskimo welfare, including employment, contacts with whites, the issue of destitute relief, payments of family allowances, old age assistance, old age security and blind pensions.

(b) The recording of vital statistics, including births, marriages and deaths, the maintenance of Eskimo identification disc records, and the taking of the decennial census.

Inuit mother and child at RCMP station.

(c) The enforcement of game regulations and the issue of licences and permits in the N.W.T.

(d) The enforcement of other Northwest Territories regulations, including those dealing with scientists and explorers, archaeological sites, and prospecting and mining activities.

(e) Reporting on economic and general welfare conditions among the Eskimos.

(f) Supervision of Eskimo trading operations in isolated areas under the Eskimo Loan Fund.

For the Department of National Health and Welfare

(a) Rendering first aid and other medical assistance at places where there are no doctors or nurses and reporting cases of illness requiring treatment

(b) Arranging for the evacuation of tubercular and other patients requiring hospital care.

For the Department of Citizenship and Immigration
Acting as Immigration Officers in recording entry and movements of non-Canadians in the Arctic.

For the Department of National Revenue
Acting as Customs officers in the entering and clearing of hips and cargoes.

For the Post Office Department
Acting as Postmasters at all detachments.[18]

The police, joined by the northern service officers, were to be part of a concerted government effort to ameliorate the condition of the Inuit. Often, it would be muddled and frenzied, long on compassion but short on understanding.

Government policy and action would be a mixed blessing, especially in the 1950s, as gains were made at an exacting price for some of the Inuit.

Relocation

The idea of relocating Inuit in the North during the 1950s was not new. During the Depression, the government of Canada had enthusiastically endorsed such plans, partly to relieve the plight of Eastern Arctic Inuit and partly to relieve the government of any responsibility for their welfare. In the mid-1930s the Northwest Territories Council, none of its members familiar with either arctic ecology or arctic winters along the coast, forced the Hudson's Bay Company to ease the effects of starvation and a broken economy among the Inuit. The council assumed, as would others later with no scientific basis or resource studies, that the traditional Inuit way of life, anchored in hunting and trapping, would and must continue.

Accordingly the Department of the Interior informed the Company in 1934 that, if the latter wished to open and operate new posts in Canada's North, it must assume full responsibility for the natives who traded with them; as well, destitute natives were to be maintained by the Company without expense to the department. The trading concern had no option but to comply if it wished to be granted, in this case, a permit to operate and trade in and around Dundas Harbour on Devon Island. At the time, there were no natives on Devon Island and the Company was given permission to import Inuit from various locales in the Eastern Arctic. In the summer of 1934 the Company's vessel, Nascopie, took on fifty-two Inuit "volunteers"--men, women and children, along with their dogs--from Cape Dorset, Pangnirtung and

Pond Inlet. Thus began an arctic trek which lasted for over a decade for those uprooted Inuit, as site after site -- Dundas Harbour, Croker Bay, Arctic Bay, Fort Russ, Spruce Bay -- proved unsuitable for hunting and trading. Some of the original migrants were returned home after each port was closed; a number remained to eke out an existence in new, unfamiliar surroundings, attempting to live precariously, as their forefathers had.[19]

In the 1950s, turning back the clock was only one motivation. The government of Canada attempted a series of relocations for the Inuit but recognized that a wholesale return to the land would be impossible. By 1953 it was recognized that three different types of situations had to be dealt with:

> 1. In areas where the natural resources will support the Eskimo inhabitants it has been decided that their basic way of life is to be maintained as far as possible.
>
> 2. In areas where permanent white settlements have grown up, the Eskimos will be educated to adapt them to this new situation.
>
> 3. In areas of the north which cannot continue to support the present Eskimo population, attempts will be made to move the Eskimo to areas with greater natural resources.[20]

The police in particular had been proposing some type of relocation since at least 1950, and believed the high Arctic Islands would have sufficient resources to support one or two communities.[21] It should be noted, too, that the police were anxious to relocate their Craig

Harbour post to Cape Sabine and to employ Canadian Inuit as hunters and guides instead of Greenland Eskimos, who had heretofore been used by Ellesmere Island detachments.[21] Government officials admitted they were taking a risk, as no proper resource survey had been done in the Resolute area, but plans and preparations went ahead because all thought it a worthy and noble experiment. Fundamental, also, was the issue of arctic sovereignty. "(T)he Canadian Government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this."[22]

With trading supplies and small advances made possible by the Eskimo Loan Fund, really a redrafting of the Indian Loan Fund,[23] the task of relocating groups of Inuit began in 1953. Seven Inuit families were transferred from Port Harrison and six from Pond Inlet to Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour; additional families in the Western Arctic were "encouraged" to winter in Banks Island. The following years saw small groups of Inuit relocated at such places as Alexandra Fiord and Herschel Island, without real incident except the problem which became obvious after a few short years, that some Inuit who had not been transported initially now wished to join their relatives and friends. Some of the relocated, either lonesome or, in some instances, apparently coerced to make a move in the first place,[24] decided to pay a visit to their original homes, or to quit outright their new surroundings.[25] For a while, this shuttling back and forth across the Arctic became the norm, an expensive practice which the government tried to discourage.

Most departmental officials were pleased with the limited success of these small-scale experiments in relocation, but urged caution when thought was given to either increasing the migrations or selecting additional sites. By mid-1958 there was growing pressure from the Inuit of the east coast of Hudson Bay to move to the high Arctic. Such pressures were resisted by government officials because it lacked "a thorough knowledge of the remaining resources in the new areas." Without such responsible and vital studies the experiments in relocation--the entire programme--was still a gamble. Since 1956 the arctic division had been urging the Canadian Wildlife Service to embark upon a study of the food resources of the Lancaster Sound area. While the project had been accepted in principle, the Wildlife Service had been burdened with other important commitments.

> ...Eskimos from many other areas might well be allowed to move if we had confidence in what awaited them. We are now embarking on a project to fit land-based Eskimos to a sea culture, but we still have only the sketchiest ideas of the areas in which they could best be absorbed in a sea culture elsewhere in the Arctic. The present inability of the fur market increases the number of trapping Eskimos in a marginal economy and heightens the folly of assuming that they can all be absorbed in jobs; we must still look for some more efficient places where they could hunt and form some efficient ways for them to do it. Unfortunately, while our program on wage employment is going satisfactorily, the years are going by with no progress on the examination of the local food resources.[26]

Good intentions could be confounded by bad luck or non-existant studies. This could mean embarrassment for the government and wholesale disaster for groups of Inuit.[27] In 1957-58 luck ran out.

Starvation among the Inuit had been endemic for decades. Government policy in the 1950s had been directed towards its eradication, with the relocation policy as one major facet of the solution. Yet the relocation policy backfired in the case of the Ennadai Lake and Garry Lake Inuit of Keewatin. The Ennadai Lake Inuit had always lived inland, hunting and trapping between Nueltin Lake and Ennadai Lake.

By the mid and later 1940s these Inuit congregated at a radio station operated by the Royal Corps of Signals, Department of National Defence. In 1950 they were transported to Nueltin Lake and encouraged to establish a commercial fishery. The venture was unsuccessful and the Ennadai were transferred back to the radio post which, by 1954, was the responsibility of the Department of Transport. In 1955 their caribou hunt was adequate but the fall hunt left them with just enough meat to last until Christmas; relief supplies were airlifted in. The following year the caribou hunt was again a failure, and they faced the spectre of starvation as the winter of 1956-57 approached. Again emergency supplies were forthcoming, and their condition was monitored on a monthly basis by a northern service officer. Because of their precarious situation, it was decided to move them (fifty-eight souls) in May of 1957 to North Henik Lake "where caribou and fish had been reported plentiful." All seemed well during the summer of 1957, but as September came and went the expected main herd of caribou did not appear. Between 8 February and 15 February 1958, eight people died, two by murder and six by exposure and hunger. One report concluded that the failure of the caribou to appear caused an unfortunate chain

of events, which progressed from theft and vandalism of the nearby Sheritt Gordon Mining Camps at Bray Lake, to murder and starvation.[28] "Although there were other wildlife resources, such as fish and ptarmigan, the Eskimos were unable to harvest them in sufficient quantities because the shortages of caribou skin clothing and dogs for transportation. The situation was further complicated by the existence of traditions and taboos."[29] The report did not point out--although the reference to "traditions and taboos" hints at it--that these Inuit, earlier on, had not been successful at fishing; either they had not been properly instructed, or they were adverse to this non-traditional occupation and refused to learn.[30] It appeared also that they had been moved "from one depressed area to another," resource assessments to the contrary notwithstanding.

> Moves have rarely been successful unless they are done with the full consent of the people concerned. To us, one part of the barrens may appear very much like another, but this is not the case with the Eskimos. The region where they have lived for many years has associations which mean a great deal to them, and detailed knowledge of any area is essential for hunters who wish to exploit its potentialities fully. In view ... that these Eskimos liked the Ennadai region and did not want to leave it, it appeared unlikely that the move was really accepted by them. It is, of course, comparatively easy to get a temporary acquiescence from Eskimos to any suggestion put to them, and especially from this group who go to great lengths to avoid any form of conflict.
>
> ... In this case the Eskimos probably felt a real resentment at being moved from an area where they had lived for a long time. They may have thought that the moves from Ennadai were directly connected with the fact that the white man had

> established a radio station there, and that they implied that the white man wanted to get rid of them from the area.
>
> It seems clear that only two years ago the Eskimos were happy and contented at Ennadai. The deterioration which appears to have set in is certainly owing in part to their being moved to unfamiliar surroundings. Another reason is probably a lack of discipline which has resulted from weakening the normal tribal procedures. Among the Eskimos in general, and specifically among this tribe, decisions on moving a camp are reached after considerable discussion within the tribe ...The decision to move, to Henik Lake, initiated from outside, cannot have failed to weaken the authority of those who usually decide these things, and may have contributed to the general despondency reported in the new area.[31]

There now appeared a dawning that Inuit, as a race, were not homogenous.

In 1955, J.B. Cantley of the arctic division, a veteran of the fur trades for many years, had with some perception sounded the warning when he mused about Inuit in general:

> In anything we may attempt to do for the Eskimos, we must keep in mind also that there are wide variations in the cultural advancement of various groups and that there are just as wide differences in intelligence and adaptability among Eskimos as there are among individuals of other races. Eskimos cannot just be classified generally as Eskimos; we must take into account the background of each group and the progress they have made away from the primitive. Some groups and even individuals within groups may be about ready to make a complete change; others may be brought gradually to this stage, but there will always be remnants everywhere among the present generation

> at least who will never be able or willing to adapt themselves to anything but the life of the hunter and trapper.[32]

That same uncompromising winter, other Inuit groups suffered similarly as their traditional game (caribou and/or fish) did not materialize, although they had not been part of any relocation scheme. At Garry Lake, N.W.T., nineteen of fifty-eight starved; at Chantrey Lake, N.W.T., six of sixty-one starved. Clearly, the government was shocked, questions were asked in Parliament, and the embarrassment continued when Farley Mowat's slightly biased and, some say, distorted account of the Ennadai Inuit tragedy appeared in Maclean's magazine in January 1959[33] The Ennadai survivors were transported to Eskimo Point, "and the Administration is wondering what to do with them."[34] One thing was certain: the government had to take "a decisive course of action which will involve a basic departure from the caribou economy which has been destroyed," including plans to establish a new and self-sustaining coastal community on the western shores of Hudson Bay.[35] The Ennadai Lake fiasco sounded the death-knell of hasty relocation, no matter how well-intentioned. The proposed new settlement did not sit well with at least one member of the administration, who perceived this plan as premature and confused in policy and purpose;

> At present there is a scheme to start a settlement on the coast where possibly thirty or more families might be brought from inland and taught how to live on the resources of the sea. I cannot help feeling myself that this is a little

> premature until we know how great a population can be supported from the resources of the sea. Certainly Eskimo Point does not sound particularly flourishing at present. At this coastal settlement, if it is ever established, the plan is that the Eskimos would run a cooperative store and they would have boats sufficiently large to allow them to go far afield in their quest for fish, seals and white whales. So far as I can determine the idea is to get these Eskimos and to put them where nobody else can get at them, no company, no missions, only a benevolent Administration. In this way they would be protected against everybody - except of course the government. I asked who would protect them against the government, but this was of course assumed to be a joke. If this scheme goes through - and there is a good possibility that something along these lines will be done - we will then have two policies going on at once. One might be described as "integrate at any cost and the devil take the hindmost" and the other as the ultimate in paternalism, with a just, strict, and uncomprehending Victorian father. In pursuing these two extremes, which at any rate appear incompatible, it looks as if the gradual planned adjustment to conditions which are changing will be neglected.[36]

Before any new site could be selected it was decided that no Inuit would be relocated in areas of poor transportation and communication; that Inuit relocation would be <u>within</u> rather than <u>across</u> natural arctic areas; that priority for resource studies be given to Keewatin, the east coast of Hudson bay, Tuktoyaktuk-Coppermine, and North Baffin Island.[37] By late 1960, the policy of relocation or resettlement for the following decade reflected, if nothing more, traces of the old colonial approach. Government policy was still aimed at ensuring that Inuit obtained a reasonable standard of living "according to their stage of development," assisting "the more primitive groups to continue their hunting and trapping way of life," helping more

advanced groups to add other occupations to trapping and to take up wage employment, encouraging the more advanced, younger men to use training opportunities, so that they could fill positions available at the weather stations, other military and civilian centres, and with oil companies. With these goals in mind the government could move to create pockets of settlement, in reality new colonies in the high Arctic, as "the occupation of these northern islands by Canada's first Arctic citizens only enhances our claims of soverignty [sic] of those regions."[38] To this end, it was decided to

> 1. Canvass or hold meetings, individually or collectively, with organizations concerned to discuss employment opportunities
>
> 2. Revive the suggestion that proper surveys be carried out to ascertain the wildlife and other resources of the region. We consider this important in the interests of the Eskimo people and the economy of the country. More adequate knowledge of all the resources would be invaluable in planning for the future.
>
> 3. We should make a careful survey of the present distribution of population with a view to determining which areas are over-populated and which groups would benefit most by being transferred, provided that they are willing to move! Presumably, as a result of any surveys as suggested in Recommendation no. 2, we would decide on the areas to which such groups should be transferred, keeping in mind the resources available and other advantages that may accrue.
>
> 4. Pursue, immediately and vigorously, with the R.C.A.F. their desire to employ more Eskimos, ...
>
> 5. Related considerations which will have to be made in any move are numbers, educational facilities, housing supplies, medical treatment and supervision.[39]

Keeping the native native would not be a part of prime government policy. If an Inuk wished to pursue a traditional way of life, that would be his decision.

Relocation to the South

The government's plans for resettlement of Inuit were primarily directed northward. In the mid 1950s it did toy seriously with the project of moving some south, based on assumptions that the resources of the Arctic would not, over a period of time, be sufficient to support a growing Inuit population. Southern resettlement might afford an "escape hatch" to drain off surplus population from the North.[40] A formal report which considered such resettlement feasible and desirable[41] was submitted to the Eskimo Affairs Committee in May of 1957. The Arctic was creating a surplus population which available resources could not support and "the fact had to be faced that a traditional relationship with their physical environment had ceased to exist."[42] A strange and confusing paradox existed in the mid 1950s, as the same planners were also supporting and pushing ahead with northern relocation on shaky and questionable assumptions.

To stay north meant enormous relief and medical costs, something that government obviously wished to avoid, as it was one of the darker or more negative features of Inuit policy. As well,

> There are Eskimos who have taken the first steps away from their own culture and desire an opportunity to make a new life for themselves in southern communities.
>
> Some former patients, because of their hospital experience in southern communities and their physical condition are particularly suitable for resettlement.
>
> Eskimos have demonstrated a high degree of adaptability and have won for themselves a reputation in the various trades which they have attempted so far. There is every prospect that they will be fully accepted by any southern community in which they settle.
>
> Resettled Eskimos in the south will, in time, supply a pool of highly trained natives who can return as technicians and professionals.
>
> A nucleus of resettled Eskimos in the south will provide a stepping stone for newcomers arriving from the north to take up a new life.[43]

The report recommended a cautious approach, with a series of transitions to be supported by welfare offices, instructors and interpreters. Members of the Eskimo Affairs Committee agreed that a limited pilot project should be attempted, using former hospital patients who could not return north as the nucleus for a modest community.[44] A number of locations were suggested, including Edmonton and Hamilton, but the Dynevor Indian hospital at Selkirk, Manitoba was decided upon for the experiment.[45] It appears, though, that the plan was shelved and little, if anything, came of it.

What is important about the plan is that, with hindsight, it is indicative of the lengths to which those well-meaning civil servants, responsible for the handling of Inuit affairs, would go in their

attempts to find solutions to the "Eskimo problem." Whether such a plan would have worked is a moot point, given the Inuit tie to the land, but it was only one in a series of attempts to "do something."

Doing "Something"

In the rush to make up for years of neglect, those responsible for Inuit policies pushed projects to improve the Inuit economy which indicate that, on a number of occasions, anything would be put forward. The flurry of activities, for instance, in northern agriculture in the 1950s was impressive, but the actual results were disappointing. An attitude of "why not" and "let's give it a try" seemed to permeate some hasty agricultural experiments in the North, noble experiments which lacked proper research. A cynic might conclude that these experiments, particularly in and around Fort Chimo, were window dressing to show the Canadian public that the government was earnestly trying.

By the winter of 1952-53, plans were developed for the planting of pilot plots to test various grasses, their hardiness and their ability to grow in a short season in the little-known soils of Fort Chimo, and to assess the cultivation of potatoes. The interest was coupled with the possible use of electricity in the Arctic where the government "could try out a few electrically equipped starting beds, who knows some day we may have greenhouses in the Arctic and grow bananas ..."[45] In connection with this was the introduction of "Chickens

and Sheep." Obviously the hope was that the land, if it could produce the appropriate crops in abundance, might sustain animals like chickens and sheep. The Department of Agriculture lent its support but knew little of the Eastern Arctic, as its northern experimental studies and experience were in the Western Arctic. But domestic poultry "lay outside the realm of Eskimo experience," and the half-starved dogs of Fort Chimo made short work of the ten sheep sent from Ottawa's Experimental Farm.[47] Even if the sheep had escaped that fate, one could argue that the experiment was myopic because no one knew whether enough forage could be grown locally to support the enterprise through the long winters. "While those concerned with forage crops in the Department of Agriculture do not say this cannot be done, they do not commit themselves as to what extent it can be done," commented one enthusiastic member of the northern administration branch. When it was pointed out that it would require at least 700 sheep to have any appreciable effect on the economy, those pushing the project maintained that they had never envisaged such a prospect "in a program of diversification which certainly does not look to sheep as the complete answer."[48]

Undaunted, and searching for solutions, the arctic division fastened upon the "pig project" in 1957. A suggestion had come from one of their northern representatives at Great Whale River that hog raising might help diversify the Inuit economy. The author of the scheme himself had "a farm background" in southern Canada and was convinced that hogs could be raised on large quantities of kitchen scraps from

defence establishments.[49] By the spring of 1958, problems had arisen to consternate government custodians in Ottawa. Chief of the arctic division, R.A.J. Phillips, was amazed at a request that straw bedding be shipped in, when the thrust of the experiment was to determine whether swine could live in the North "without depending upon the comforts and amenities that only the south can provide....I am afraid that if we start shipping such creature comforts to the north, it is hard to say where it will all end.... This hog will just have to live off the country."[50] On top of this, the local establishments were reluctant to part with their garbage without prior permission; however, once this obstacle was overcome, it was found that the garbage was not in a pure state, being mixed with cigarette butts, paper serviettes and glass.[51] In other words, it was too costly in terms of facilities and supplemental feed to continue the project. The Inuit themselves had not shown any real interest in hog raising, "nor do they enjoy our epicurean delight in the pork." Accordingly, the project was discontinued in May 1959, and its funds diverted to the yak project.[52]

Talk of introducing the yak to Canada's northern climes had begun as early as 1954. A rather sturdy and hardy beast, the yak was seen as another animal that might be adapted for the Inuit, as "a possible alternative meat supply...." Suffice it to say that some yak were purchased but were never taken North and are probably still braving the elements at the Experimental Farm in Ottawa.[53]

If some of these experiments and ideas seem a trifle humourous, one must remember that all were well-meaning in intent. Nevertheless, as the 1950s progressed there was a realization that diversification of the Inuit economy could not be solely along the lines of relocations, animal husbandry or other exotic schemes. The economy of the Inuit, with their increasing population, had to take into account that living off the land could never have wholesale application. This may have been the case even before World War II, but government officials began to face this reality when the North became "fashionable" in the postwar years. Only then were serious efforts begun, sometimes reluctantly, to prepare Inuit for, and integrate them into, a wage economy.

The Introduction of Wage Economy

The flurry of northern defence activity during and after World War II was a determining factor, particularly in the Eastern Arctic. At Frobisher Bay, for example, the work done by local Inuit for the United States military in 1944 received high praise from the local commander and, according to R.C.M.P. Constable V.H. Marchbank, eight Inuit were placed on the permanent payroll:

> The terms of their engagement, which may be altered to coincide with existing conditions, are as follows: payment will be made by cheque at the rate of twenty-five cents an hour. They will work from 8-10 hours a day excluding Sundays, when they will be permitted to hunt seal or other game. Meals for the workers will be furnished from the

> Quartermaster Stores for their families. Under my personal supervision adequate rations, to be issued weekly, have been arranged for with the Officer in Charge of Quartermaster Stores. These foods will be purchased at outside retail prices (approximately), and after additional education has been made for tobacco and sundry articles, I will insist that each native makes out an money order payable to the Hudson's Bay Company, Ward Inlet. The reason for my action in this case is two fold; firstly, I will endeavour to make the Eskimo realize and appreciate the monetary value of merchandise accessible for their procurement, and secondly by having an accumulated credit account at the Hudson's Bay store they will be able to purchase certain items of equipment, such as boats and arms, which they may need in the future and which they are unable to obtain at this base.[54]

Before long, more and more Inuit were congregating at Frobisher Bay and the deputy commissioner of the Northwest Territories expressed concern over this ominous development, suggesting that Inuit be employed on a rotating basis for only one year "to give all of them a chance to earn some money and prevent any of them losing the native way of life."[55] Initially, the government decided to allow some limited permanent employment, but children and young men and fathers of Inuit working on this basis would not be allowed to work more than one year; they would be relieved at yearly intervals to return to the land.[56]

> ... It is the policy of this Administration to try to ensure that the Eskimo get a balanced diet and clothing suitable for the country in which they live and that they be encouraged to achieve this by their own efforts in living off the country produce. At the same time we feel that with the encroachment of the white man's activities into

> Eskimo territory, the natives should be given an opportunity to acquire training and experience which will enable them ultimately to fit into any development programme which may arise. Such training and experience can be acquired by giving them an opportunity to work on local white man's projects but the purpose of this training will be defeated if entire native communities are allowed to abandon their native pursuits and live around the project as seems to be occurring at Frobisher Bay. Employment conditions for Eskimo should be arranged so that at least some of the natives living in the vicinity of the project be required to hunt and trap to procure native meat supplies and train the children in the native way of life. Certainly no concentration of natives should be allowed to live at a project beyond the families of those who are acquiring experience and training.[57]

Canadian authorities seemed anxious that the United States use fewer Inuit and bring in more white personnel, but Ottawa was informed politely but curtly that the War Department would continue to employ local help.[58] The administration could not reverse the situation at Frobisher or elsewhere in the Arctic and had to face the fact that Inuit were suited for more than merely hunting and trapping. The real worry and continuing problem became the dearth of guaranteed long-term employment; without this, Inuit would be left to their own devices once a project had been completed or a base closed down.[59] However,

> the Eskimos are an ingenious race and many have marked inherent mechanical ability as evidenced in their care and operation of boat engines. It is our belief that, if continuity of employment could be assured, many of them could learn to handle maintenance work at air establishments, meteorological and radio stations, etc. In fact, in time, with education, there seems no reason why they might not be able to fill more technical

> jobs. If opportunity for permanent employment for Eskimos should present itself at any of your (R.C.A.F.) establishments in the north, we can see no objection to allowing young Eskimo men of proven ability to occupy such positions. This would be of advantage to the Eskimos by providing careers for them, and to their employer in not having to bring men out on furlough.[60]

Nevertheless, this project entailed drastic changes in their way of life and care was needed to provide them "encouragement, leadership, instruction and supervision in the big task of learning to live satisfactorily under settled conditions."[61] Wholesale abandonment of traditional lifestyle had to be avoided, given the temporary nature of job projects, but, given the fact that living off the available natural resources was becoming just as impossible for many Inuit, continuing efforts would have to be made to provide other avenues of economic diversification.

By the winter of 1956-57, the government of Canada was actively involved in promoting work and vocational opportunities for Inuit in the hope that "integration into our industrial society will follow progressively."[62]

With the construction phase of the DEW line and related facilities completed, it was apparent that both the Canadian and U.S. military were only "mildly interested in the native people." There now existed possibilities that mining activities could fill the void and provide employment for the Inuit.[63] Besides, from a public relations view,

> one of the best ways for an American company operating in Canada to gain Canadian goodwill is to create good conditions of employment for the local Canadians. A special opportunity exists for a company going to work in northern Canada to interest itself in the welfare and development of the indigenous population of the locality. For example, the Atlantic Iron Ore Limited could do quite dramatic things along this line using the Eskimo people of the Ungava region. Comparatively modest investments in training, housing and guidance, both on the individual and the community level, could pay good dividends. In the first place, the availability of local people of the Eskimo race has obvious advantages. In the second place, Canadians are likely to think well of companies that develop handsome communities, and show concern for including the local people in their activities and opportunities ... United States business men are very much interested in methods by which they can appear welcome to Canadians. I wonder, therefore, if it would not be worthwhile to use this theme in our discussions with business establishments that are making plans for work in northern Canada.[64]

Keeping the native native may have been one operative policy, but northern white administrators realized that the "good old days"--if they had ever existed--were gone. They were still very much colonial in their approach, as Inuit were still not consulted, but at least there was movement away from the Victorian way of doing things and the pre-war attitude of not doing anything.

In the Mackenzie District, Inuit were being employed in private industry, in the internal operations of federal government departments and agencies, and on federal and territorial construction and maintenance projects. True, most of the employment by 1957 consisted of part-time, seasonal and summer jobs, with few full-time jobs. Most

positions were in the unskilled categories, but it was hoped that within six years new jobs would be created in a number of sectors and that Inuit and other natives would be able to replace white personnel. To achieve this, Inuit needed appropriate training and proper placement with government and industry. A vocational training programme was instituted in 1954-55 and was open to young adults. Trainees were sent outside the Territories, although the majority of nurses aides were trained locally. As more vocational training schools were established as part of the expanded educational programme for the North, it was hoped that more students would be trained in the Territories. From 1955, 148 persons received vocational training; of those, twenty-nine (twenty-three males and six females) were Inuit, six coming from the Eastern Arctic. The federal government and private employers had encouraged and assisted Inuit from Ungava and Hudson Bay to move to Fort Churchill and to DEW line sites. A Sub-Committee on Northern Economic Problems was mandated to sensitize government departments -- Public Works, Indian and Northern Health Services, Agriculture, National Defense, the R.C.M.P., Mines and Technical Surveys, Transport -- to employ qualified local workers.[65]

Patience and flexibility, "revision in the light of experience, and trial again" were the policy of the day. Difficult transitions had to be made by the Inuit. There were individual failures, but those who trained and employed Inuit and Indians had to be aware of the pitfalls.[66] Special staff were needed, the best combination being a

hybrid of training supervisor and northern service officer. As such an animal did not exist, experienced officers were expected to work closely with those providing vocational training in the south.

> The main duty of the Northern Service Officer would be to handle the individual and group problems which arise with a class of Eskimos having no previous experience of training courses, or of life in a southern community. His work must be divided between the Eskimos on the one hand, and the southern community on the other. He must help the Eskimos in the personal problems which will arise by their propulsion into this entirely different world. He must arrange most of the programme for the sixteen house of the day when the Eskimos are not in the classroom to ensure that this time is usefully spent from both a professional and a personal viewpoint. He must maintain liaison with their families and ensure that personal home problems do not intrude or interfere with training. To act as a counsellor, he must have some familiarity with the Eskimo language, and a good deal of familiarity with the scope and limits of the Eskimos' world. His briefings will be personal and oral, by mimeographed special papers, by existing publications, and by films, all of which he will prepare or arrange.
>
> With the community at large, the Northern Service Officer's duties are equally extensive. He must ensure that there is an understanding of the Eskimos' problems in the community. He will be responsible for public relations in the broadest sense, not only with the press but with community organizations to ensure that they accept the Eskimos in a helpful way. For the sake of existing and future training programmes, he must "sell" the Eskimos to a population which has virtually no knowledge of them. There will also be immediate administrative problems such as arrangements for rooms and meals.[67]

As for the on-the-job performance of Inuit and their tendency to keep irregular hours -- something that annoyed white employers who were impatient and innocently insensitive to Inuit cultural traits--

> In the task of developing these people who have been only sketchily taught the standards and mores of our society we feel that something less than normal first class performance has to be expected and second and third chances have to be given to delinquent employees in circumstances where this would not be done on a construction job in southern Canada. In making this observation I do not suggest any let-up in the efforts to impress upon these rather simple and carefree men the need for accepting responsibility....
>
> In training Eskimos and Indians and converting them from a liability to an asset in Canada's northern activities, our best hope is undoubtedly in forming a corps of supervisors who are interested and willing to go a little out of their way to help. This probably applies down to the level of labour foreman and indeed to the other workmen on the job where our native people are at work.[68]

Within a few years the stated policy of the government was "to encourage Eskimo <u>whenever possible</u> to become steady wage earners."[69] In settlements where there was little or no wage employment, programmes of economic development were undertaken to make better use of natural resources by providing modern equipment and marketing facilities. For this purpose, co-operatives and credit unions had been encouraged.

Obviously, government policy in wage employment had come a long way since World War II. Encouragement was being given to Inuit to concentrate in larger settlements, the idea of living totally off the

land being out of joint with northern realities as seen by Ottawa and keynoted by Koniak's speech in 1959. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Resources had, by 1961, sponsored, through either grants or CMHC mortgages, the construction of 300 houses; 170 more were being built that year. About 20 per cent of the Inuit population lived in what southern administrators considered adequate housing. It was anticipated that all Inuit who wanted housing would be satisfied by 1967. On-the-job training and vocational training continued apace at the Sir John Franklin School in Yellowknife and elsewhere, in heavy construction equipment, carpentry, auto mechanics, clerical and secretarial training, and home economics.[70] In 1961, a total of seventy-five Inuit were being thus trained.[71] According to Ottawa's planners, the Inuit, along with other northern residents, would have to take their place in northern development to eradicate poverty[72] - the objective being to fill 75 per cent of northern positions with northern residents by 1977.[73]

By the end of Canada's first century, then, the Inuit were being accepted as equals, no longer required to live off the land. Most--if not all--of what had been done to date had been without their participation, but their southern masters were confident that the Inuit, so long neglected by Canada, could be brought into the twentieth century, not in two or three generations but within a decade or two. This may have been too optimistic, given the input and subsequent dislocations experienced by Inuit communities and individuals with the onslaught of southern ways. For better or worse, the twentieth century was upon them.

Much catching up was necessary, not only by the Inuit but by Ottawa. Wage employment, northern industrial development, the encouragement and support of other types of Inuit activity might help in the transition, but if the task were to be well-rounded, then education and Inuit participation would be the most important catalysts.

Education and Re-Education

If Inuit were to be part of the Canadian fabric, as the bureaucrats and planners hoped, extended forms of education were essential. The problem, as became evident in the 1950s, was to avoid imparting a southern style of education with concepts and assumptions which had no real meaning to the Inuit. Again, well intentioned whites were the determinants in the various forms of schooling policies that arose in the 1950s.

But southern planners suffered under a serious handicap: their own ignorance of the Inuit (and of the North generally). In other words, what made the Inuit tick? Just who were these people in Canada's far North and could they be neatly fitted into a southern system of education? It was to this end that the government itself had to be educated or re-educated. Such a process took place in the 1950s, at the same time that an educational system was being created for Inuit and other northerners by trial and revision. Neither process could be put off. As R.G. Robertson, deputy minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, pointed out in 1957,

> One of the greatest difficulties facing those responsible for the health, welfare and education of the natives of northern Canada is a lack of basic information on their social and cultural patterns and how these patterns are being changed by the advance of civilization. Some information is available about certain groups and communities but it is not adequate for a proper understanding of the overall picture. Such an understanding is essential if suitable government policies are to be evolved. There has never been a thorough sociological study of the natives in the north and a need for the information such a study would produce is being felt more and more each day.
>
> The same problem existed in Alaska and during the 1930s a team of specialists from Stanford University, supported by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation, carried out a comprehensive sociological study of the Alaskan native. This study has apparently been of considerable assistance to the United States Government in the development of their education and welfare policies in Alaska and would serve as an excellent guide to a similar study in the Canadian north. The results of such a project would be of immediate value to those in Canada concerned with native problems. At the present time, for instance, the Education Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources is attempting to draw up a curriculum to meet the specialized educational problems of the Eskimo and Indian but is handicapped by a lack of the type of information which such a study would provide.[74]

In 1954 a "Northern Research Co-ordination Centre" was established to carry out the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources' responsibility for "fostering through scientific investigation and technology, knowledge of the Canadian north and of the means of dealing with conditions related to its future development."[75] The terms of reference of the centre were wide ranging and reflect the extent to which the government had to educate itself in a number of matters, including "Social Anthropology":

Social Anthropology

To plan and carry out a programme of Eskimo research in the fields of social anthropology and related subjects such as psychology and sociology. This function requires a small staff of permanent research scientists in the Northern Research Co-ordination Centre to provide professional advice and to study problems of immediate concern to the administrator, and the employment of scientists on a seasonal basis - or through contracts or grants-in-aid - to make continuing field investigations into living conditions of Eskimos under-going social and economic change. This includes investigation of the following:

- Eskimo social organization and habits
- Problems associated with population movement.
- Problems associated with the availability of natural resources and the degree to which the Eskimo are or could become dependent on these.
- Problems associated with relocating Eskimo groups from one community to another.
- Problems associated with the introduction of new technical and social forms to the Eskimo, such as housing, clothing, handicraft industries, education, and social welfare programmes.
- Problems associated with the interrelationship of Eskimos, Indians, and men of European stock.

The programme of social anthropological research is directed towards the needs of the northern administrator. It differs from the anthropological research carried out by the National Museum as it is not concerned with the academic reconstruction of native cultures involving projects in archaeology, physical anthropology, ethnology, and folklore.[76]

Between 1955 and 1958, the Northern Research Co-ordination Centre was involved in approximately ten "social anthropological" studies of the Inuit which would help it understand who, and what, were the Inuit.[77]

Before the establishment in 1953 of the Eskimo Affairs Committee, with its sub-committee on education, and before encouragement and refinement of vocational training in the 1950s, the main contribution to the education of Inuit was through government-supported mission schools, where the rudiments of English writing and reading were imparted. The major contribution of the government in these years came in the form of The Book of Wisdom for Eskimos, published initially in 1947. First appearing in English and syllabics, it was republished in 1950 in English and Roman script for use in the Western Arctic.[78] The aim of the Book of Wisdom was to help the Inuit "make greater and greater use of white man's goods and ways,"[79] and to convey to them what the government of the day, through text and illustrations, thought most important for their immediate well-being. Part I was prepared by the Department of National Health and Welfare and included such subjects as "Where Sickness Comes From," "How Sickness Spreads," "The Clean Igloo," "Clean Pots and Dishes," "Care of New Baby" and "Lung Sickness". Part II, prepared by the Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs, dealt with items such as "Family Allowances," "Conservation of Game" and "Planning for Periods of Scarcity."[80] Very pragmatic and very necessary.

The matter of education was becoming paramount. To be sure, vocational training was a major and obviously pragmatic pillar of Inuit education in the fast-changing North of the 1950s. As for the "3Rs," as opposed to specific job-training programmes and health

education, their nature and scope would have to be determined. The approach taken would be at least as important as the curriculum proposed.

In 1950, after an inspection flight to the Western Arctic, an administrative officer of the Department of Resources and Development reported that the majority of white northerners "feel that it is essential that the Eskimos ... should be given the advantage of at least a few years schooling." Any opposition came from those who believed that Inuit should not be taught English as this would ultimately be soul-destroying, "for it is better for them not to do so, for it will rob them of the heritage of their own tongue of which they should be proud. They claim too that with the loss of their language the Eskimos will lose their independence of spirit and become dissatisfied with their way of life."

> If there is to be education for these Northern people, then it must be largely practical in content. The teaching of English in itself will give few immediate benefits to the Eskimos who will still have to make their living by hunting and trapping. Only a very limited number will be able to secure employment at "white" establishments. Everyone agreed that besides the teaching of simple English, the boys needed to be given instruction in such things as the making of fish nets and their use, the handling and repair of small boats, the handling and repair of engines, and generally given a good understanding in the use of tools that will be of help to them after graduation from the school. The girls should be given thorough training in the care of the home -- cleanliness in particular; the meaning of a proper diet; the proper methods of mixing and using new foods being introduced into the North,

> especially milk (about which there is much confusion at present time). The girls should be given good instruction too in the handling of hides for clothing. And for both boys and girls, handicrafts should be introduced, for these people are basically clever with their hands and should be able to make a number of revenue-producing items, an industry which is not being pursued by the people to any extent at present. All agree that it should not be our educational policy to train the Eskimo children into being "white men". Rather they should be helped to live their own lives more successfully, which should result in better health, more prosperity, and greater happiness for them[81]

But keeping them essentially "noble savages" was not in tune with the times.

An educational policy for the nomadic Inuit was difficult, especially during hunting season. Education had to come, but the change would have to be "voluntary and gradual."[82] By 1951, in established northern communities, the Northwest Territories government-appointed welfare teachers were involved in welfare work, leadership and community activities. In matters of schooling they were instructed to encourage the Inuit to speak English, ever mindful that they must also "retain pride in their own race, culture and language." Numbers and simple arithmetic were taught to make them proficient in their understanding of transactions that came within their daily purvue. Health, games and physical activities were also an integral part of the welfare teacher's responsibility, with attention given to conservation studies, handicrafts and the imparting of a sense of

resourcefulness. "In this way, they may be helped to depend more upon their own resources and not look for government assistance in its various forms."[83]

Throughout the 1950s there was a move away from mission schools, as the federal government began a massive campaign to provide its own educational facilities in the North. To federal authorities, now anxious to make up for lost time, mission schools had served their purpose, giving Inuit children the rudiments of education, usually in Ikuktitut mixed with a healthy dose of Bible reading and hymns in their native tongue.[84] But there appeared to be no set curriculum, and the atmosphere was relaxed. In the Eastern Arctic a wide variety of subjects were taught, from place to place during the summer months, but the "nature and content of the instruction given the children varies widely. The majority of the missions have a large common or recreation room for the natives where they may play games, warm themselves in winter, and visit. Any instruction is usually given in this room while the children are assembled for recreational purposes. The instruction is generally individual, the item dealt with being generally of the child's choice and the instruction being entirely voluntary insofar as each child is concerned."[85] To civil servants and planners, used to southern modes, such an approach to education was not only inefficient but politically unacceptable. More than souls had to be saved. Besides, given the pre-war system of grants made to the mission schools, it is no wonder that the churches could not do more. Some of the churches appeared to welcome the gradual

take-over and expansion by the government, but both Anglican and Roman Catholic establishments were alarmed by the pace and direction of this secularization. Throughout the 1950s they fought a rearguard action, arguing that the new forms of education introduced by the government had been ill-conceived. With hindsight, one could argue that there was a kernel of truth in their criticism. In point, those officials who wished to push ahead had hardly enough time to appreciate Inuit culture and their world vision. According to the Right Reverend Donald March, Anglican Bishop of the Arctic, Canada was going too fast. "In our own way ... we are trying to get Eskimos used to the white man's ways. But give us a little time; say twenty years. Now we are trying to telescope the centuries."[86] Marsh and other clerics deplored the curriculum being used for the Inuit. In the Western Arctic it was a carbon copy of that used in Alberta and, as such, contained "no provisions to retain the many wonderful things in Eskimo life." In the Eastern Arctic, the Ontario curriculum was followed. The new education was laying too much emphasis on material needs, ignoring the Inuit background and outlook, and teaching that the way of the white man was all important and all-embracing.[87] The Catholic Church, through its Oblate journal Eskimo, could only echo their ecclesiastical rival:

> The aggressiveness of competitive spirit of our ways has been presented as virtuous. Money is to be the motivation of all activity and the value of a man is to be measured in dollars. Few realize that this teaching strikes at the very root of the Eskimo personality ... An imbalance is bound to result since the Eskimo is brought to the point

> where he gives up his traditional values and finds nothing in the atmosphere of materialism to make up the loss. Talk of integration abounds but disintegration is the end product ... More and more today a certain secular tendency can be sensed. It is not expressed openly but many seem to think that the missionary has played a meritorious role but the time has come for him to step aside since the Eskimo no longer needs him. God grant that this error be corrected in time. The Eskimo caught in today's machinery needs the help of Christianity more than ever to come out victorious.[88]

Needless to day, government officials did not take kindly to this sort of public criticism--or any criticism for that matter--and tensions did exist between mandarins and missionaries throughout the decade.[89] Privately some serious administrators might agree with the perils of over-emphasizing the materialistic aspects of Inuit education, but they were at a loss to provide alternative answers.[90]

As long as the federal government felt it should be the sole administrator for the North, with responsibility for Indians and Inuit, it had few options but to proceed on the basis of good intentions, trial and revision. In 1955 the federal government announced a new educational programme for the Northwest Territories after reaching certain understandings and agreements with the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches.[91] Essentially, the government agreed to build and operate new residences and schools over a six-year period; in return, the residences were turned back to the churches but operated under contract with the government at public expense. The financial burden on the churches was thus eased, and they were

guaranteed the right to conduct religious instruction on these premises for one-half hour after classes. But the government of Canada had full responsibility for the school programme. After all, it was an obligation of white Canadians to ensure that the Inuit "be admitted to full participation in all the opportunities that Canada affords her people."[92]

That the missionaries were still providing for the Inuit the bulk of educational services after 1955 was distressing to newer members of Indian Affairs and National Resources, who may have been suspicious of missionaries or held a low view of their teaching abilities. To one, at least, it meant "that its continuation would be a failure of our trust towards the younger generation of Eskimos."[93] The view of the older guard in the department in response to such an observation was predictable:

> This sort of education is the best that we can, during the next, say ten years, hope to extend to the majority of the Eskimo children of school age. Many, indeed, will not even get this. I make this fairly blunt statement because I do not want there to be any misunderstanding as the nature and scope of the educational programme which we are planning over the next ten years. If your remark ... is intended to be an expression of opinion that all Eskimo children of school age should be given an education better than that which they get from missionaries, I can only say that I regard your view as being the statement of an ideal which there is no hope, under our present policies, of achieving for a considerable time in the future.[94]

It was one thing to engage in the building of new schools and hostels, and to prepare a curriculum for Inuit; it would be another to have the delivery system - the right teachers. Whatever their shortcomings, the missionaries had some experience in teaching Inuit. What would be necessary was their eventual replacement by a body of teachers properly attuned to the needs of the Inuit. To develop a cadre of qualified teachers sensitive to, and appreciative of, Inuit customs and habits would be the most crucial ingredient in the education formula. "This situation is so different to that of walking into an ordinary rural school in a long established white community to take over where the last teacher left off -- a process that has probably been going on for a century. There are Eskimo communities where anything resembling a school would be such a totally new experience for young native children...."[95] As well, any teacher's task would be doubly demanding, as the Eskimo Affairs Committee expected them to teach non-Inuit and Inuit together whenever the opportunity arose, as part of the policy of integration. One member of the committee, R.G. Sivertz, director of the northern administration and lands branch, felt this is to be so important "that this consideration should override any problems about specialized curricula."[96] The pace was quick and, one should note, white.

All in all, southern bureaucrats were anxious to get on with things. As unsure as they were about their actions, they knew full well that there could be no turning back, and that, perhaps, there was a tinge of arrogance and more than a streak of paternalism in their Inuit policies.[97] The planners would be impatient with those who

suggested any other course or goal in educational policies espoused in Ottawa. Yet warning notes were sounded in the mid 1950s. They seemed to have been lost in the succeeding decade, but their echoes have taken on new importance since the 1970s, with the talk of a northern homeland for whites, Indian and Inuit alike. Education policy was supposed to uplift the Inuit and in some mysterious fashion make him part of the Canadian mosaic. The mosaic may work for diverse groups with a common experience. The Inuit did not fit the pattern, yet there was an earnest desire they would or could be refashioned. To Father André Renaud, O.M.I., any period of transition had to be carefully planned and due respect given the Inuit and their tie to the land. To do otherwise "we, as a nation will be guilty of social genocide."[98] To Renaud, Inuit society had been in command of its own destiny before the white or southern invasion. They had developed a control over their environment, physically and socially,

> the best control that any group of human beings could develop in the Arctic.... It was simple but efficient and perfectly balanced.
>
> By invading the Artic [sic], we have put this control out of balance and thrown it over-board. Our trade has upset native economy and so have our welfare services. Simply increasing their life-span and cutting down infant mortality for instance has made their food gathering and distributing techniques inefficient in many areas. Social controls have been assumed by the whiteman. Literally, we have removed their environment from them and have transformed it into an almost completely different one....
>
> To give back to Eskimo society the controls over this changed environment, Education must have two specific objectives in sight. First, in relation

> to the persevering elements of the old environment (and to the unchanging needs of the Eskimo individual as a human being), improve the traditional techniques according to the redistribution of these elements (fishing, housing, clothing, health, family and group life), - leading the Eskimo to understand how and why these techniques are efficient (thus introducing science and scientific research as general tool of control) - and introduce new techniques. In choosing the latter, preference should be given to such techniques as will readily transfer from the renovated native way of life to our own way of life in the Artic [sic]. Traditional and new techniques must be integrated in the whole pattern of Eskimo living so as to strengthen it rather than disjoint it. Though the techniques can be taught to the individual in school, the integration process cannot be worked out except by the Eskimo society as a whole, made conscious, of the need for changes and assisted in adjusting its total living pattern to them.
>
> In relation to the new environment and techniques, the objective should be that, ideally, in three or four generations, members of the Eskimo society will be in almost full control, as equal partners with the rest of the nation, be it government services or companies operating in the North. This is their country as well as ours, the Artic [sic] is their living environment much more than ours. If we need to master the Artic [sic] as part of our environment, we must not do so at their expense, but let them control it for us as well as for themselves.[99]

In a spiritual sense, Renaud pointed to the beam in Ottawa's eye. Sovereignty, defence, mineral potential and exploitation opened grand vistas for southern bureaucrats and planners. The Canadian economy in general was booming in the 1950s. In their haste, in matters of educational policy and goals for the Inuit, they paid more than lip service; the concern was always genuine but the perspective failed to take into account, in any profound way, who and what the Inuit were.

VI

LOOSENING THE REINS

By the end of Canada's first century, significant changes were taking place in government policy vis à vis the Inuit (and minorities in general). A new concern had been expressed in the 1950s, even though this sometimes translated into accelerated programmes for the sake of acceleration. Just as important for the 1960s were signs of a profound change of attitude on the part of the government and its insulated policy-makers.

In many ways, the 1959 meeting between government representatives and Inuit spokesmen was one of the catalysts.

> I do not think that anyone listening could help but be moved and impressed by the extent to which the Eskimo representatives understood what was going on among their people and the extent to which they wanted the Eskimos to be equipped by education and training to play an equal part ... The evidence of ability and a capacity for leadership was extremely impressive.[1]

Immediately after the 1959 meeting, R.G. Robertson, deputy minister of Indian Affairs and Natural Resources, redoubled his department's efforts to have family allowance payments changed from payments in kind to cash. To that point, most Inuit could only apply to the police or to a store-keeper for supplies from a restricted list, never once seeing the family allowance cheque. Robertson now argued that

Inuit should receive this benefit in the same way as other Canadians, "as failure to do this is bound to create unfavourable reactions in the minds of the Eskimos as an evidence of discrimination with implications of asserting white superiority."[2] In 1960, cheques were being mailed directly and no strings were attached to what could, or could not, be purchased. There appeared to be a coming of age on the part of the government.

Even before the historic 1959 meeting, government officials could sense the winds of change. The most sensitive of government planners were a new breed who had to contend with outworn or incorrect perceptions of the Inuit on the part of older and more conservative elements of the bureaucracy. The likes of R.A.J. Phillips, Ben Sivertz, Vic Valentine and Graham Rowley all played a part in this change in attitude. As R.A.J. Phillips, chief of the arctic division, observed in 1958,

> To many, the Eskimo is still the noble savage, and a very substantial emotional investment had been made in this quaint creature surrounded by snow-houses, sleds, fishing spears and cliches.
>
> In this confusing mid-twentieth society of inter-planetary travel, delinquent youth and subliminal perception, the Eskimo has become something of an unchanging value, the embodiment, if distant and unseen, of unchanging values. He is, to quote the most dreadful phrase of all, "unspoiled", and those associated with the contact between our southern and northern civilizations are equated with the forces of mammon.
>
> This view, so long held, is not confined to any small lunatic fringe. It accounts for the extraordinary popularity of that long series of

> books of the "I Lived in an Igloo" School. It has been fundamental, at least until recently, in two of the three main elements operating in the north -- commerce and religion. And it certainly strongly influenced the third element -- administration . . . .
>
> We have never thought of the Eskimo as the man in the street -- that wonderful mythical hero who rises to his pedestal each election or slowly for the after-dinner speech. But the Eskimo man in the street is emerging gradually and carefully as a force. It is not a process to be hastened, for to reverse too quickly the legacy of three centuries might court the disaster of all form and no substance.
>
> I should like to [refer] to perhaps the most important change of all in Eskimo life, one that is beginning to embrace Eskimos in all groups which we delineated. We refer to it as the man in the igloo -- the idea that Eskimos can themselves form opinions on their future and be articulate about them. Unless we can restore the intellectual independence of the Eskimo, all else is lost.[3]

The formation of Inuit councils as precursors to local authority and local government was seen as the vehicle to achieve this end and to reduce - but not eliminate entirely - the time-worn paternalism of government. It was becoming impossible to do everything and be everything. Largesse was only one reason for this desire to reduce paternalism in the North. As the remarks of some of the participants to the Northern Conference of 1960 (one in a series initiated by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources since 1957) pointed out, there were more fundamental and immediate reasons:

> Mr. Sivertz termed the Conference particularly significant because of the increasing importance of the North to Canada ... We were becoming

> increasingly aware of the potential of the North. We had vast areas of land, empty of people but containing great resources. These resources would be needed by the people of the world ...
>
> One of our goals was to develop local authority and local government. This included not only the decentralization of authority to field staff of the Department, but the inclusion of residents of the settlements in decision-making which affects them. We needed to plan to develop past the stage where local residents were confused about who the "boss" was so that they might become active participants in the control of their own destiny.
>
> The development of resources on a large scale could not be handled on a local level. This aspect had, and would continue to be, the concern of the Government . . .
>
> Prof. Vallee noted that paternalism was not declining because we wanted it to decline but because some Eskimos were arriving at a power position which made the continuation of paternalism difficult. He noted, as an example, the increasing number of persons working in the north who were dependent on translators ... He also noted that the relationship between the Eskimos and the Hudson's Bay Company was changing. In the past, Eskimos were primarily producers; they are now becoming consumers. As consumers, more attention had to be paid to their wishes. Professor Vallee defined paternalism in the north as Kabluna acting for Eskimos on behalf of Eskimos and motivated at least in part by the old concepts of the "whitemen's burden" ...

Local councils would be a step in the right direction, but no one should have expected a miracle to occur overnight; such institutions had never been part of the Inuit experience or culture.

On 26 February 1957, under the guidance of a northern service officer, D.E. Wilkinson, the first Eskimo council meeting took place at Baker Lake in central Keewatin. Within five years similar councils were

established at Rankin Inlet, Great Whale River, Port Harrison, Povungnituk, Fort Chimo and Sugluk; fledgling advisory councils had also been established at Coppermine and Cambridge Bay.[5] In many ways, the Baker Lake council would be a model of development; others might, and would, experience an uneven pattern, but the Baker Lake experiment blossomed.

Initially the group of fourteen Inuit was formed to provide a forum for discussion on local issues and problems and to enable the Inuit to acquaint white representatives (northern service officers, R.C.M.P., nurses and teachers) in the community with their opinions.[6] A year later the Inuit of Baker Lake were handling the meetings themselves with a minimum of "outside" direction, and senior civil servants were enthusiastic, even though this development "could tend to disturb the old pattern of relationships between the Eskimo and non-Eskimo. The new trend is bound to upset some non-Eskimos, but we do not have to worry about them. This is precisely the kind of upset we have been wanting to see for a long time."[7] By the early 1960s the Eskimo council still flourished, and a parallel organization, the Baker Lake Residents Association, which included Inuit and non-Inuit, was actively involved in problems of waste disposal, water supply, fire protection, educational facilities and improvment of the local economy.[8] Initially, Baker Lake may have been unique in having two local councils or associations, with the Eskimo council being the voice of the native. But things were changing; Eskimo councils were

consolidating themselves, with the help of the government, and another vehicle for native expression and development was gaining popularity: the co-operative.

The first meeting of the Committee on Eskimo Co-operatives was held in December 1957 to discuss the possibility of encouraging and establishing such organizations in the North. Government officials saw co-operatives as one of a number of approaches to aid the precarious Inuit economy. V. Valentine, who had worked among the Metis of northern Saskatchewan and who now headed up the Northern Research Co-ordination Centre, emphasized

> that a co-operative enterprise should provide an educational as well as an economic benefit. He stressed that co-operatives must be built around some economic need and that a co-operative should be prepared to train its members to take charge of the business. He stressed that the problem of establishing a co-operative in the north would be complicated by the fact that very few of the Eskimo people had even a basic knowledge of English or of business practice. There was a need for small marketing and producing co-operatives. He thought that co-operatives would not solve the Eskimo economic problem, but they could provide an excellent training ground.[9]

In 1958, plans went ahead to study how best to implement co-operative programmes; research was conducted into schemes begun in third world countries participating in the Colombo Plan, and projects undertaken in Labrador and Newfoundland under the auspices of St. Francis Xavier University. Advice was also sought from the president of the

Co-operative Union of Canada.[10] Under guidance and supervision of the Department of Indian Affairs and Natural Resources, three co-operatives were established by the Northwest Territories Council: the first at Port Nouveau, Quebec (George River) engaging in char fishing, logging, boat building, handicrafts, carvings and retail store operations. Port Russell and Cape Dorset followed and were engaged in similar operations, as well as in graphic art, a bakery, fur buying and fur marketing. From rather modest beginnings, the co-operative movement caught like wildfire. By 1963 there were sixteen co-operatives in the North; three years later, twenty-two. All would be sending their own representatives to conferences of arctic co-operatives founded and supported by the government.[11] It brought together, for the first time, Inuit from all parts of the Canadian Arctic. Co-operatives certainly did not answer all the problems confronting the Inuit and the government, but they were appropriate and, perhaps, long overdue. At the 1966 Povungnituk conference of northern co-ops

> the most striking factor was the manner in which delegates made their own impressive contributions to this conference. Their deeper insight and active committee participation resulted in vitally important decisions, including a plan for a tri-federation of Arctic co-operatives with a central organization responsible for marketing, purchasing, education, technical training and co-ordination of all activities.[12]

On the surface, it appears that the Inuit had benefitted from government tutelage; in reality, however, the potential had been there for some time and one can only speculate as to what could have

transpired if concern and attention had been there earlier. One only has to think of the comparable studies and situation of Greenland Eskimos and wonder what could have been.

* * *

By the end of Canada's first century, things could never be the same. It was no accident that the Eskimo Affairs Committee was discontinued in 1963, as government officials questioned the usefulness of the exercise and began to see it "primarily [as] a forum for the Administration's view."[13] As well, the Northwest Territories Council had planned to create a new territory carved from the Northwest Territories called "Nunassiaq," the beautiful land, complete with its own territorial council and Inuit representation.[14] In 1963 federal legislation to create two new territories, Mackenzie and Nunassiaq, was brought forward but died on the order paper with the dissolution of Parliament. A change in government shelved the idea in favour of a federal commission under Dean A.W.R. Carruthers to study the question.[15] The commission reported in 1966 and scotched the idea of territorial division[16], but subsequent drives to recognize native rights in the North have revived the issue.

Despite this particular setback, white-dominated Inuit policy became history, as Inuit themselves began to participate in earnest in the process. In succeeding decades they would become more cohesive, more aware and more vocal - sometimes to the consternation and exasperation

of government authorities. The latter's lot had never been an easy one, especially in the postwar era, as inherited problems from the preceding decades cried out for attention and resolution.

Before World War II, government authorities, although concerned, did little. Parsimony and the relative inaccessibility of the North were determining factors, but just as important were the prevailing laissez-faire philosophies regarding government intervention, and the view that Inuit should rely almost exclusively on the land and its resources. The trauma of the war and the advent of the Cold War meant that previous government neglect, now bared to the world, had to be redressed. The Cold War made the North important and vital, and 'things northern,' fashionable for Canadians. Canada's long-standing anxieties over arctic sovereignty continued, as before, to be the driving force in its northern policies, but with a deep-seated feeling that the well-being of the Inuit, especially in the Eastern Arctic, was a moral responsibility that could no longer be shirked by government.

In many ways, government Inuit policy in the 1950s could be likened to Stephen Leacock's medieval knight, who jumped on his charger and rode off in all directions. There were policies, but no policy. And once southerners shed the assumption that they knew best and began to listen to both Inuit and other northerners, the painful process of trial and error could be eased. No one believed that solutions could be found overnight. Inuit participation in the 1959 conference had

been an eye-opener, and their subsequent participation at the national and, more important for the 1960s, at the local level was necessary if any progress was to be made. In these early years of Canada's second century, one can discern Inuit voices beginning to speak with equal authority, the combined result of earlier government policies and the collective will of the Inuit.

POSTSCRIPT

Today the government of Canada and the Inuit, through their native organizations, are in the throes of hammering out comprehensive land claim settlements and the establishment of a new northern political entity called Nunavut, "our land." The loosening of the reins, the experience gained in the co-operatives and the fledgling local councils in the 1960s all played their part in this desire to move beyond being merely cared for from cradle to grave. Also, during the 1960s federal arctic administration and power waned, as more power was concentrated in Yellowknife, the new capital of the Northwest Territories. In the past, Ottawa had initiated programmes and schemes to uplift the Inuit, creating in the process a new, sometimes terrifying and confusing society around them. Genuine fear and concern was expressed that the new territorial administration, whose interest and centre of gravity lay far off along the Mackenzie River, could not respond appropriately to the needs of far-flung, isolated, diverse and poorly-represented Inuit communities. Added to this was a new rush to the North to investigate its oil and gas potential. If the "rush" of the 1950s led to serious dislocations in Inuit society, the new boom underlined the fragile nature of that society when proper protective mechanisms were given a low priority.

Taking a lead from their Alaskan kinsmen, who had successfully insisted on the recognition and settlement of land claims before massive economic development could proceed, Mackenzie delta

communities created their own political organization: COPE, the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement. By the early 1970s this movement inspired other Inuit groups to organize, many of their leaders coming from the federal residential school at Churchill, Manitoba. Their hostility toward having things imposed on their people and homeland from without, perhaps no where more evident than in school, would foster other regional associations: the Northern Quebec Inuit Association (now succeeded by the Makivik Corporation); the Labrador Inuit Association; the Baffin Regional Inuit Association; the Kewatin Inuit Association; and the Kitikmeot Inuit Association in the Central Arctic. Their national organization is the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC). These associations, whose operating budgets were funded by Ottawa, speak for Inuit interests in matters of culture, social and economic improvements vis à vis government and industry, and are in the forefront in land claims negotiations. In effect, they are like governments-in-being and they speak on equal terms with their white counterparts. In 1973, the federal government agreed to negotiate native land claims in the North.

Strength and public sympathy were given to their cause with testimony given by Dene and Inuit before the Berger Commission, whose 1977 report spoke eloquently against the idea of development for its own sake; the North was a distinct homeland and not just an adjunct of southern Canada and its own aspirations in those northern latitudes. By this time, the first contemporary and far-reaching land claims agreement in Canada had been concluded between the Inuit and Cree of

Quebec and the Quebec provincial government. The process had begun and continues to this day. The federal government accepted for discussion claims on behalf of the Inuit in Labrador in 1978; an agreement-in-principle was signed the same year with COPE, representing approximately 2500 Inuit of the Western Arctic region. A year before (1977), the ITC submitted, on behalf of some 13 500 Inuit in the Central and Eastern Arctic, a proposal for a new territory, carved from the existing NWT, encompassing all land north of the treeline: Nunavut. Negotiations proceeded slowly. Then, in 1982, a plebiscite on the issue was sponsored by the government of the Northwest Territories; 80 per cent of the votes cast in the Eastern Arctic were in favour of such a division. As the over-all vote favoured such a move, the NWT Legislative Assembly voted 19-0 for the creation of Nunavut. Late in 1982 the federal government agreed that the concept of Nunavut was acceptable, and negotiations, difficult for both sides, are still continuing. One thing is certain: the Inuit in Canada have come a long way since their first contact with southerners, and especially since their first official representations to the government in 1959. For its part, the federal government has moved a considerable distance from its traditional, old-time paternalism. It appears, or at least it is hoped, that over the decades each has learned from the other.

END NOTES

CHAPTER ONE:

1 Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Record Group (RG) 85, Northern Affairs Programme, Volume 653, file 1012-9, Part 2, Remarks of Eskimo Delegates, 10th Meeting of the Eskimo Affairs Committee, 25 May 1959.

2 PAC, RG 22, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Vol. 254, file 40-8-1, part 3, F.J.G. Cunningham to Clyde Kennedy, 16 June 1952.

3 PAC, RG22/379/40-8-19/3, R.G. Robertson, Deputy Minister, Northern Affairs and National Resources to W.H. Clarke, 2 June 1959.

4 PAC, RG85/653/1012-19/2, Remarks of Eskimo Delegates ... , 25 May 1959.

CHAPTER TWO:

1 Diamond Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Canada (Montreal: The Arctic Institute of North America, 1964), p.7.

2 Wendell H. Oswalt, Eskimos and Explorers (Novato, California: Chandler and Sharp, 1979), p. 278; Jenness, p.9. It is not the intention of this historical study to trace the debates among archaeologists, anthropologists, linguists and ethnohistorians regarding Inuit origins and prehistory. For one of the more competent short treatments of this aspect, see Oswalt, pp. 273-310.

3 Ibid.

4 Jenness, p. 12

5 Ibid., p. 14

6 W.R. Morrison, Under the Flag: Canadian Sovereighty and the Native People in Northern Canada (Ottawa: Research Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984), pp. 31, 71-73.

7 Ibid., pp. 71-73

8 Ibid., chapters 5-8.

9 Jenness, p. 19.

10 Ibid., pp. 20-21

[11] See: Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Alaska and Eskimo Administration: Greenland [Montreal: Arctic Institute of North America, 196_ and 196_].

[12] Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Canada, p. 21

[13] Morrison, pp. 87-89.

[14] Ibid., pp. 127-30

[15] Ibid., p. 97.

[16] PAC, RG85/869/8455, Report of Sergeant F.A. Barnes, R.C.M.P., Tree River Detachment, 25 February 1925.

[17] PAC, RG85/1870/540-3/2, Report of Staff sergeant Joyce, 1 February 1928.

[18] PAC, RG85/869/8455, Crime Report by Inspector C.D. LaNauze, R.C.M.P., 2 July 1917.

[19] Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Canada, p. 21-22.

[20] Canada, Department of Interior Report, 1921-22, p. 19.

[21] PAC, RG85/869/8455, Report of Sergeant F.A. Barnes, R.C.M.P., Tree River Detachment, 25 February 1925.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., and Barnes Report, 1 July 1925.

[24] Ibid., Barnes Report, 31 January 1926; see also PAC, RG85/1870/540-3/2, Report of Sergeant F. Anderson, Cambridge Bay, 1 January 1927.

[25] Quoted in Morrison, p. 99, from Royal Northwest Mounted Police Report for 1914, p. 23.

[26] Morrison, p. 100.

[27] Ibid., p. 98.

[28] Quoted ibid., p. 100, R.L. Borden to comptroller, R.N.W.M.P., Lawrence Fortescue, 5 May 1914.

[29] Confession of Sinnisiak as quoted in R.G. Moyles, British Law and Arctic Men (Saskatoon, 1978), p.29.

[30] Quoted ibid., pp. 38-39.

[31] Ibid., p. 87.

[32] PAC, RG85/870/8631, Report of Inspector T.B. Caulkin, Herschel Island Detachment, 25 October 1924.

[33] PAC, RG85/667/4069/1. Notice composed by Reverend C.E. Whittaker, 10 November 1924, at request of D.C. Scott, superintendent of Indian affairs to Whittaker, 31 October 1924. Whittaker believed that the Inuit would respond more readily to this sort of wording as they would "recognize authority more quickly than reason ... based on the command of Original Authority." Ibid., Whittaker to Scott, 10 November 1924.

[34] Quoted in Morrison, p. 61, T.L. Cory, Solicitor, N.W.T. Branch, to O.S. Finnie, Director, N.W.T. Branch, 12 September 1922.

[35] PAC, RG85/1127/250-1-1/1A, Finnie to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister Department of the Interior, 24 October 1923.

[36] Ibid., J.B.M. (?) to E.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of Justice, 31 July 1924.

[37] PAC, RG85/1870/540-1/1, R.G. Gibson to F.P. Varcoe, Deputy Minister of Justice, 12 November 1941.

[38] Ibid., Gibson to W.L. Cory, 7 June 1945; Gibson to J.E. Gibben, Stipendiary Magistrate, Dawson, Yukon Territory, 22 June 1945.

[39] PAC, RG85/1870/540-1/2, W.L. Cory to Gibson, 22 June 1945.

[40] Ibid., J.G. Wright to Gibson, 10 January 1947.

[41] Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE:

[1] Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Canada, p. 23

[2] Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North, 1871-1914 (Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 1971), p. 272.

[3] Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Canada, p. 30

[4] PAC, RG85/569/96, Commissioner, R.C.M.P., to W.W. Cory, 7 May 1920

[5] PAC, RG85/127/250-1-1/1A, J.F. Moran to Finnie, 8 May 1923; PAC, RG85/568/27, Finnie to W. Cory, 19 March 1923.

[6] Jenness, Eskimo Administration: Canada, pp. 32-33.

[7] PAC, RG85/1127/250-1-1/1A, L.T. Burwash to Finnie, 12 May 1923.

[8] Ibid., J.L. Cory to Finnie, 23 November 1923.

[9] An Act to Amend the Indian Act, 14-15 George V. Chap. 47, Assented to 19 July 1924.

[10] PAC, RG85/1128/250-1-1/2, cited in J.W. Lock, Commissioner of Dominion Lands to H.E. Hume, Chairman, Dominion Lands Board, 20 September 1932.

[11] Canada, House of Commons Debates, 30 June 1924, p. 3825.

[12] PAC, RG85/1127/250-1-1/1A, Finnie to W.W. Cory, 22 September 1924.

[13] Ibid., Finnie memo to file, 22 March 1926.

[14] PAC, RG22/253/40-8-1/1. W.H.B. Hoare to Finnie, 10 May 1927.

[15] PAC, RG85/1127/250-1-1/1A, P.C. 709, 31 August 1927.

[16] Quoted in Jenness, p. 37. O.S. Finnie to Dr. Unquhart, 21 February 1930. See also, PAC, RG85/779/5747, Cortlandt Starnes, Commissioner, R.C.M.P. to Finnie, 24 October 1927.

[17] PAC, RG85/1128/250-1-1/2. Finnie to W.W. Cory, 25 January 1929.

[18] Department of Justice files, Ottawa, (hereafter D.J.), Report from Hugh Guthrie, Minister of Justice, 22 July 1932.

[19] Jenness, p. 40.

[20] Cited in D.J., H.H. Rowatt, Deputy Minister of Justice, to Philip Bill, Acting Minister of Justice, 22 July 1932.

[21] Ibid.

[22] D.J. Charles Lanctot, Deputy Attorney General of Quebec, to H.H. Rowatt, 3 August 1933.

[23] See Jenness, pp. 54-64.

[24] Excerpt from a letter written by the Director of Lands, N.W.T. and Yukon Branch, to the Deputy Minister of the Interior, February 1936, as cited in Jenness, p. 54.

[25] D.J., Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice to Plaxton, Deputy Minister of Justice, 9 August 1934. The American Act was dated 8 August 1934.

[26] D.J., James McGregor Stewart to Plaxton, 15 September 1934.

[27] D.J., McGregor to Plaxton, 18 September 1934.

[28] D.J., Edwards, Deputy Minister of Justice, to Ralph Parsons, Fur Trade Commissioner, Hudson's Bay Company, Winnipeg, 30 November 1935.

[29] Appearing for the government of Canada, Jenness made a rather bold statement at the proceedings and one that, probably in this day and age, goes without further comment. When asked the difference between Eskimos and west coast Siewash Indians he replied, "I should think the difference between them would be about as great between say, the Englishman and an Italian or Greek ..." Canada, Supreme Court, In the matter of a reference asked whether the term "Indians" in Head 24 Section 91 of the British North America Act, 1867, includes Eskimo inhabitants of the Province of Quebec. Case on Behalf of the Attorney-General of Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1938). Testimony of Diamond Jenness, 18 June 1938, p. 20.

[30] Rather than present in detail both sides of the argument, for the sake of brevity the author has decided, to relate the opinion(s) of the chief justices themselves who found in favour of the Quebec contention; see Supreme Court of Canada Decisions, pp. 104-24. For those interested in how the case proceeded and the arguments put forth by both governments, see the Case on Behalf of the Attorney General of Canada, and the Case on Behalf of the Attorney General of the Province of Quebec, and their respective Factums; all in all, some 1447 pages of testimony, exhibits and arguments.

[31] Supreme Court, Decisions, p. 109.

[32] See ibid., pp. 109-15.

[33] Ibid., pp. 118-19.

[34] Quebec Case, Exhibit 37, p. 178.

[35] See Quebec Case Exhibit Nos. 131, p. 394; 132 pp. 397-8; 133, pp. 339-400; 134, pp. 407, 409; 135, p. 418; 136, p. 410; 139, pp. 446-7; 141, p. 451; 142, p. 461; for others see Quebec Factum, pp. 46-53.

[36] Supreme Court, Decisions, p. 121.

[37] Ibid., p. 123.

[38] Quebec Case, Exhibit 133, pp. 466-9.

39 Ibid.

40 Quebec Factum, p. 60.

41 PAC, RG85/1676/250-1-1/2A, Extracts of Minutes of 92nd. Session of the N.W.T. Council, 27 April 1939; Special Session of N.W.T. Council, 9 January 1940; Extracts of Special Session, N.W.T. Council, 15 February 1940.

42 Ibid., Extracts of Minutes, 107th Session of N.W.T. Council, 2 April 1940.

43 Ibid., T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources to J. Arthur Mathewson, Provincial Treasurer of Quebec, 17 November 1943.

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47 For example see: PAC, RG85/1234/250-1-1/4A, J.G. Wright, Chief, Arctic Division, to Gibson, 14 June 1950.

48 Files of Treaties and Historical Research Branch, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Affairs, P.C. - 3153, 27 June 1950.

49 R.S.C. 1951, C. 29.

50 R.S. 1970, C. 149, 5-4(1).

51 PAC, RG85/1898/1003-32/3, Draft, "Constitutional Position of Indians and Eskimos," 13 May 1968.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., Memo from Department of Indian and Northern Affairs to Privy Council, 15 May 1968.

CHAPTER FOUR:

1 PAC, RG85/1667/4069/2, Finnie to C.E. Whittaker, 4 December 1926.

2 Richard J. Diubaldo, Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), pp. 135-60.

3 Canada. Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Possibilities of the Reindeer and Musk-Ox Industries in the Arctic and Sub-Arctic Regions of Canada. (Ottawa, 1922), pp. 36-38.

4 PAC, RG85/883/9104, "A Letter from the Government to the Eskimo People," 1 April 1924.

5 See: PAC, RG85/667/4069/2, R. Bouchard, District Administrator, Aklavik, to Gibson, 6 September 1949; Gibson to Bouchard, 24 November 1949.

6 See: PAC, RG85/145/400-6/2.

7 Diubaldo, pp. 161-186.

8 PAC, RG85/1127/250-1-1/1A, H.T. Munn to Charles Stewart, 31 March 1925.

9 Ibid., Munn to J.D. Craig, Department of the Interior, 6 May [1924]

10 "The Passing Eskimo," Ottawa Citizen, 22 September 1924.

11 H.T. Munn, "The Passing Eskimo," National Life (March, 1924), pp. 6, 7, 26.

12 PAC, RG85/1127/251-1-1/1A, Finnie to W.W. Cory, 22 September 1924.

13 Ibid., W.W. Cory to Finnie, 7 April 1925.

14 Ibid., Finnie to W.W. Cory, 16 April 1925.

15 See: Denmark; Ministry of Education, Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition. The Danish Expedition to Arctic North America in charge of Knud Rasmussen. 12 vols. (Copenhagen, 1927-19-). Vols. 3, 4, 5, 11, and 12 not published; also, Knud Rasmussen, Across Arctic America. (New York: Putman, 1927).

16 Those in attendance in Finnie's office for the four meetings varied from meeting to meeting, but included R.M. Anderson, J.B. Harkin, Arthur Gibson, Diamond Jenness, Henry Toke Munn, and Colonel C. Starnes. For a complete list and detailed discussion see: PAC, RG85/145/400-6/2, Meetings of the Advisory Board on Wild Life Protection, 29 and 30 April, and 1 and 5 May 1925.

17 Ibid.

18 PAC, RG85/1069/251-1/1, Report of Inspector S.T. Wood, Herschel Island, 8 May 1924.

19 Ibid., Queries put to Dr. Rasmussen, n.d., received 20 July 1925.

[20] Ibid., Testimony of Knud Rasmussen before Advisory Board on Wild Life Protection, 1 May 1925.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See Morrison, pp. 87-88, who takes a less critical view of H.B.C. trading practices.

[23] PAC, RG85/1069/251-1/1, Inspector S.T. Wood to Finnie, 22 August 1924.

[24] Ibid., Burwash to Finnie, 30 October 1924.

[25] "Greenland Trade State Monopoly," Danish Foreign Office Journal, Danish Commercial Review, no. 41 (June, 1924), p. 63.

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[28] Ibid., See also ibid., Report of Sergeant A.H. Joy, 11 February 1925.

[29] Ibid., Reply of Edmund Fitzgerald, Deputy Chairman, Canadian Committee, H.B.C., 10 April 1925.

[30] For example, see ibid., W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister and Commissioner, N.W.T. to Fitzgerald, 16 October 1925.

[31] Ibid., Finnie to W.W. Cory, 26 October 1924.

[32] Ibid., W.M. Conn for A. Brabant, Fur Trade Commissioner, H.B.C., to Finnie, 5 September 1925.

[33] Ibid., W.W. Cory to Finnie, 10 June 1925.

[34] Ibid., Finnie to W.W. Cory, 12 October 1926.

[35] See especially, ibid., J. Lorne Turner, Director, Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch to R.A. Gibson, 27 March 1936.

[36] PAC, RG85/1129/253-1/1, J.H. MacBrian, Commissioner, R.C.M.P., to H.E. Hume, Chairman, Dominion Lands Board, 4 January 1933.

[37] Ibid., Minutes, Special Meeting of Interdepartmental Representatives - Department of the Interior, Pensions and National Health, Indian Affairs, R.C.M.P., 3 April 1933.

[38] PAC, RG85/1129/253-1/1, Return of Reverend Father J. Easton, Povungnituk, 1931; see ibid. for returns from other posts.

[39] PAC, RG85/1130/253-1/2, MacBrien to Hume, 4 January 1933.

[40] PAC, RG85/827/7242, Finnie to W.W. Cory, 25 June 1928.

[41] PAC, RG85/1129/253-1/1, D.L. McKeand to J. Lorne Turner, Acting Chairman, Dominion Lands Board, 13 January 1934.

[42] PAC, RG85/1130/253-1/4, F.J.G. Cunningham to L.A.C.O. Hunt, District Administrator, Fort Smith, 30 December 1952.

[43] PAC, RG85/1129/253-1/1, Precis for N.W.T. Council, 14 March 1938.

[44] PAC, RG85/1129/253-1/1A, A.L. Cumming to R.A. Gibson, 12 September 1938.

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[47] PAC, RG85/1132/270-1/1, Reasons for the Purchase of the Reindeer Hotel, n.d., probably mid-1930s.

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[49] Diubaldo, pp. 145-60.

[50] PAC, RG85/1132/270-1/1, Extracts, Interdepartmental Reindeer Committee, 18 June 1935.

[51] PAC, RG85/1132/270-1/1A, Report of M. Meikle, Agent and Superintendant, Wood Buffalo Park, on Mackenzie River Reindeer Herd, [1935].

[52] PAC, RG85/1132/270-1/1, Minutes, Interdepartmental Reindeer Committee, 23 February 1937; PAC, RG85/1132/270-1/2, Minutes, 25 October 1937.

[53] PAC, RG85/1130/253-1/1B, Extracts of Report by Dr. Bildfell, 15 July 1941 to Northern Advisory Board; also D.L. McKeand to Gibson, 27 October 1941.

[54] For example see ibid., McKeand to Gibson, 18 November 1941.

[55] Ibid., R.H. Chesshire, Assistant Manager, Fur Trade Department, H.B.C. to Gibson, 7 November 1941.

[56] PAC, RG85/1130/253-1/2, G. Doyle to Cumming, 5 November 1942.

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[64] PAC, RG85/1130/253-1/2, Extract, Report of S.J. Bailey, Eastern Arctic Patrol, 24 August 1924.

[65] Ibid., W.A. Buhr, Post Manager, H.B.C. Sugluk to J.W. Anderson, Manager, Ungava Section, H.B.C., 11 October 1948.

[66] Ibid., R.A. Gibson's circular letter to Traders, R.C.M.P., Missionaries and Doctors, 2 February 1949.

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[68] See: RG85/779/5747, Report of Constable C.M. Wall, R.C.M.P., 8 August 1927; Report of Inspector A.M. Kempt, 18 August 1927; Commissioner Cortlandt Starnes, R.C.M.P., to Finnie, 24 October 1927.

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[70] PAC, RG85/1112/590-8/1, H.E. Hume, Chairman, Dominion Lands Board to H.H. Rowatt, Deputy Minister, Department of the Interior, 8 September 1933.

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[72] Ibid., Minutes, 50th Session, N.W.T. Council, 13 February 1934.

[73] Ibid., J.J. Heagerty, Chief Executive Assistant, Department of Pensions and National Health, to H.E. Hume, 5 January 1933, and 7 February 1933.

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[76] Ibid., T. Clifford to Cumming, 19 September 1944.

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[79] PAC, RG85/1112/590-5/1, "Eskimos and Liquor," 26 April 1952.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., "An Ordinance to Provide for the Control and sale of liquor in the Northwest Territories," 27 January 1955.

[82] Ibid., Instructions Respecting Liquor Privileges for Eskimos in the Northwest Territories, 24 June 1955.

[83] Ibid., B. Sivertz, Chief, Arctic Division, to F.J. Cunningham, Deputy Commissioner, N.W.T., 1 April 1955.

[84] Ibid., Dr. Ian Black, Aklavik to Cunningham, 14 November 1955.

[85] Jenness, p. 155. This was also granted to Indians in the territories as well by the same legislation.

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[87] PAC, RG85/1130/254-1/1, F.W. White, R.C.M.P. to Frank Pedley, Deputy Superintendant General of Indian Affairs, 19 February 1906.

[88] Ibid., J.D. McLean to Reverend E.J. Peck, 18 February 1909.

[89] Ibid., Peck to D.C. Scott(?), 13 May 1909.

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[91] Jenness, p. 32.

[92] Ibid., pp. 42-42.

[93] W.C. Methune, "Canada's Eastern Arctic, its history, resources, population and administration." (Ottawa: Department of the Interior, 1935), p. 55.

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[114] See Jenness, p. 46, for a sampling.

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[117] Ibid.

[118] For example: PAC, RG85/863/8276/1, Reports of H.B.C. Medical Officers: R. Gordon Douglas on board Nascopie, 1924; R.B. Stewart on board Bay Eskimo, 1924; R.B. Stewart on board Bay Rupert, 1926; T.M. Jones on board Nascopie, 1926.

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[123] See ibid., Report of Dr. John McCrombe, March, 1944, "Survey of Medical Conditions Among the Eskimo People of the Eastern Arctic and More Particularly Those of Hudson Strait."

[124] Ibid., Reverend A. Steinmann to T. Manning (?), September, 1943.

[125] PAC, RG85/815/6954/3, McKeand to Gibson, 5 February 1942.

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[127] Ibid., Dr. Ross Millar, Medical Assistant to Deputy Minister of Pensions and National Health, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 April 1943.

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[130] Ibid., McKeand to Gibson, 28 October 1943.

[131] Ibid., "Policy respecting the operation of hospitals in the N.W.T.," Precis for N.W.T. Council, 1 March 1943; see also, ibid., A.L. Cumming to Gibson, 16 March 1937.

[132] PAC, RG85/863/8276/2, Meeting re. Eastern Arctic Medical Service (draft), 13 November 1944, pp. 22-23.

133 PAC, RG85/1871/550-1/1A, "Policy respecting ... N.W.T.," 1 March 1943.

134 Ibid., Minutes, N.W.T. Council, January - February, 1944 . .

135 PAC, RG85/863/8276/2, Report by J.L. Robinson concerning Diptheria ("Septic Throat") Epidemics, 1944, 20 September 1944.

136 See: ibid., Preliminary Report of 1944 and Recommendations for the Administration of the Canadian Eastern Arctic, by J.L. Robinson, 20 September 1944; Recommendations of Major P.D. Paird, Second in Command, Eastern Arctic Patrol (1944), [n.d., received 14 November 1944]. PAC, RG85/863/8276/3, Medical Report of Dr. Dennis Jordan, Eastern Arctic Patrol, 20 September 1944; Report of Dr. George Hooper, Eastern Arctic Patrol (1944), 8 November 1944.

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[10] PAC, RG85/1072/254-1/2, Report of the 1st Meeting, Sub-Committee on Eskimo Education, 26 September 1952.

[11] Ibid., Minutes, 1st Meeting of the Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs, 16 October 1952.

[12] "Policy for the North," Ottawa Journal, 12 June 1953.

[13] PAC, RG85/300/1009-3/3, Minutes, 1st Meeting of the Administration Sub-Committee, A.C.N.D., 24 August 1953.

[14] PAC, RG22/544/Rawley-1954, [September 1944]; PAC, RG85/651/1009-3/5, Minutes, 2nd Meeting, Administration Sub-Committee, A.C.N.D., 11 February 1955.

[15] Jean Lesage, "Canada and our Eskimos," Beaver (March 1955).

[16] PAC, RG85/651/1009-3-5, Instructions for Northern Service Officers. Representing the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources on Construction of the Distant Early Warning Line, [February 1955].

[17] PAC, RG85/1514/1012-1/7, Report on the History of Delineation of Responsibility: Allocation of Responsibilities between Northern Service Officers and Officers of the R.C.M.P., 13 January 1959.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Jenness, pp. 53-64.

[20] PAC, RG85/1070/251-4/1, Minutes of Meeting ... to Discuss the Transfer of Certain Eskimo Families from Northern Quebec to Cornwallis and Ellesmere Islands, 10 August 1953.

[21] PAC, RG85/1129/252-3/2, F.J.G. Cunningham to L.H. Nicholson, Commissioner, R.C.M.P., 5 December 1950; PAC, RG85/1070/251-4/1, Nicholson to Major General H.A. Young, 11 February 1952.

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[23] See: PAC/RG85/1235/251-2/1, Regulations Governing Advances and Repayment of Loans made under authority of Section 69 of the Indian Act, P.C. 5687, 25 October 1951; ibid; Eskimo Loan Fund, Approved by Treasury Board, no. 452928, 24 June 1953.

[24] PAC, RG85/1070/251-4/2, J. Cantley to Cunningham, 29 June 1954.

[25] See: ibid., B.G. Sivertz to P.A.C. Michaels, Manager, Arctic Division, H.B.C., 16 May 1955; J.G. Walton, Northern Service Officer, to Sivertz, 1 November 1955.

[26] PAC, RG85/1070/251-4/4, Sivertz to R.G. Robertson, 6 June 1958.

[27] PAC, RG85/1382/1012-13/5, Minutes of Meeting ... to Discuss Resources Studies for the Proposed Relocation of Eskimos, 18 November 1958.

[28] PAC, RG22/335/40-8-14, Inspector W.J. Fitzsimmons, R.C.M.P., to Officer Commanding, "G" Division, Ottawa, 3 December 1957.

[29] PAC, RG22/335/40-8-23/1, L.A.C.O. Hunt to Cunningham, 26 January 1959.

[30] Ibid. Internal Report to L.H. Nicholson, Commissioner, R.C.M.P., 26 January 1959.

[31] PAC, RG22/335/40-8-14, Graham Rawley to R.G. Robertson, 22 January 1958.

[32] PAC, RG22/298/40-8-1/5, J.B. Cantley to R.G. Robertson, 13 January 1955.

[33] See: Farley Mowat, "The Two Ordeals of Kikik," MacLean's (31 January 1959); also, PAC, RG22/335/40-8-23/1, Internal Report to Commissioner Nicholson re. Mowat article, 26 January 1959.

[34] PAC, RG22/545/ACND-1958, Rawley to Geert van den Steenhoven (anthropologist), 2 June 1958.

[35] PAC, RG22/335/40-8-14, Sivertz to Robertson, 1 May 1958.

[36] PAC, RG22/545/ACND-1958, Rawley to van der Steenhoven, 2 June 1958.

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[38] PAC, RG85/1962/1012-13, C.M. Bolger, Administrator of the Arctic to Sivertz, 15 November 1960.

[39] Ibid.

[40] PAC, RG85/1660/NR4/3-3/1, Meeting of Sub-Committee on Eskimo Affairs to discuss resettlement in southern Canada, 1 June 1956.

[41] PAC, RG85/1514/1012-1/6, Minutes of 8th Meeting, Eskimo Affairs Committee, 13 May 1957.

[42] PAC, RG85/1514/1012-1/5, Report on the Proposed Eskimo Resettlements in Southern Canada [March, 1957].

[43] Ibid.

[44] PAC, RG85/1514/1012-1/6, Minutes of 8th Meeting, Eskimo Affairs Committee, 13 May 1957.

[45] Ibid., W. Rudnicki, Chief, Welfare Section, Memo to file, 16 October 1957.

[46] PAC, RG85/1069/251-3-7/2, W.T. Larmour, Arctic Division to Sivertz, 11 January 1953.

[47] Jenness, p. 109.

[48] PAC, RG85/1069/251-3-7/2, Fred Fraser, Acting Director to R.G. Robertson, 25 January 1955.

[49] PAC, RG85/364/251-3-17, Sivertz, to C.H. Gouldner, Director, Central Experimental Farm, 15 August 1957.

[50] Ibid., R.A.J. Phillips to J.G. Walton, Northern Service Officer, Great Whale River, 25 April 1958.

[51] Ibid., Walton to Phillips, 22 May 1958.

[52] Ibid., D.F. Symington, Chief, Projects Division to Mr. Doyle, 26 May 1959. Original letter not sent, as it was considered too "florid." Ibid., Memo, 26 May 1959.

[53] For details, see PAC, RG85/1069/251-3-7/2 and RG85/97-251-3-19.

[54] PAC, RG85/1070/251-5, Report of Constable V.H. Marchbank, R.C.M.P., 26 September 1944.

[55] Ibid., Gibson to Commissioner, R.C.M.P., 14 December 1946.

[56] PAC, RG22/324/40-8-2, Gibson to Commissioner, R.C.M.P., 29 March 1947.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., Laurent Beaudry, Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to H.L. Keenleyside, Deputy Minister, Mines and Resources, 27 August 1947.

[59] PAC, RG85/1070/251-5/2, J. Cantley to J. Wright, 19 June 1951.

[60] PAC, RG22/324/40-8-2, Keenleyside to W. Gordon Mills, Deputy Minister, National Defence, 31 January 1948.

[61] Ibid., Keenleyside to C.M. Drury, Deputy Minister, National Defence, 27 February 1950.

[62] PAC, RG22/378/40-8-2/2, J.P. Richards, Acting Chief, Arctic Division to Sivertz, 11 January 1957.

[63] PAC, RG22/485/40-8-13, "Eskimo Employment in the Mining Industry", [1958].

[64] PAC, RG22/378/40-8-2/2, Cunningham to Robertson, 19 November 1956

[65] PAC, RG22/335/40-8-13/2, Measures to Facilitate Employment of Native Labour ..., 7 January 1957.

[66] PAC, RG85/40-8-13/2, Sivertz to Cunningham, 30 May 1957.

[67] Ibid., Cunningham to Robertson, 28 March 1957.

[68] Ibid., Sivertz to G.T. Jackson, Assistant Deputy Minister, Public Works, 20 June 1957.

[69] PAC, RG22/546, Statement on Measures Being Taken by the Federal Government to Improve Eskimo Living Standards, 20 April 1961. Emphasis added.

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[71] Ibid., PAC, RG85/1898/1003-32/2, Rawley memo to ACND, 7 December 1966.

[72] PAC, RG85/1898/1003-32/2, Programmes related to the eradication of Poverty, 10 February 1967.

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[74] PAC, RG22/545/ACND-1957, Robertson to E.L. Harvie, 17 June 1957.

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[76] Ibid.

[77] See ibid., List of Projects Undertaken by the Northern Research Co-ordination Centre from 1955 to 1958, [October, 1958].

[78] PAC, RG85/1072/254-1/2, G.E.B. Sinclair, Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Resources and Development, to A.A. Day, Information Division, External Affairs, 16 July 1951.

[79] Ibid.

[80] PAC, RG85/1131/254-2/1A, Table of Contents, The Book of Wisdom, 1947.

[81] PAC, RG85/1072/254-1/2A, Report of S. Bailey, 9 April 1950.

[82] Ibid., General Development of the Northwest Territories, [n.d., probably 1951].

[83] Ibid., C.K. LeCapelain, Acting Director, to Roland Larivière, Welfare Teacher, Chesterfield Inlet, 23 August 1951.

[84] PAC, RG85/1072/254-1/2, G.E.B. Sinclair to A.A. Day, 16 July 1951.

[85] PAC, RG85/1072/254-1-2A, "Education for the Eskimos," prepared by E.N. Grantham, Mines and Resources, May 1952.

[86] Montreal Gazette, 17 January 1955.

[87] "Eskimo Education Not Practical," Winnipeg Free Press, 21 January 1960.

[88] "Some Reflections on the present evolution of the Eskimo," Eskimo 48 (September 1958), 4-5, 10.

[89] For an example of an explosive confrontation see, PAC, RG85/1232/1012-9/3, "Verbatim" Report of Discussion re Education, including Deputy Minister's talk, 11th Meeting, Eskimo Advisory Board (formerly, Eskimo Affairs Committee).

[90] For example, PAC, RG85/1476/254-1 (603-1)/13, Phillips to Donald March, Bishop of the Arctic, 13 January 1959.

[91] Ibid., Press Release, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 28 March 1955; See also ibid., "Grants for Mission Schools" by E.N. Grantham, 31 March 1953.

[92] Jean Lesage, "Obligations of White Race to the Eskimos," Ottawa Journal, 23 March 1955.

[93] PAC, RG85/1476/254-1 (603-1)/9, Phillips to Cunningham, 23 October 1956, as cited in Cunningham to Phillips, 24 October 1956.

[94] Ibid., Cunningham to Phillips, 24 October 1956.

[95] Ibid., School Inspection Report by E.N. Grantham, Education Division, Central and Western Arctic Patrol, March-April, 1956.

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[15] Canada, Report of the Special Representative for Constitutional Development in the Northwest Territories, (Hull, 1979), pp. 7-8.

[16] See: Canada, Advisory Commission on the Development of the Northwest Territories. Report to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Ottawa, 1966).

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